GHSA-72QV-M5JW-M97F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length
svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the wire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to gss_unwrap():
if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
goto unwrap_failed;
offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
...
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);
The wire value len flows unchanged as the upper bound into the
krb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is
handed to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token
header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left()
before any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header
reads run past the token, and _rotate_left()'s shift %= buf->len
path can divide by zero when buf->len has been driven to zero by
the truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally
invalid: with a non-zero RRC field and the opaque blob ending at
the XDR buffer boundary, rotate_left() builds a zero-length
subbuffer, reaching the same division.
Reject the token at the server entry point before it reaches the krb5 unwrap core. A valid sealed RFC 4121 token must contain the 16-byte header plus at least some encrypted payload.
Fix by adding a minimum-length check immediately after the existing upper-bound check:
if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89550"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:38Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length\n\nsvcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the\nwire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to\ngss_unwrap():\n\n if (len \u003e xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))\n goto unwrap_failed;\n offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);\n ...\n maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);\n\nThe wire value `len` flows unchanged as the upper bound into the\nkrb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is\nhanded to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in\ngss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token\nheader fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left()\nbefore any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header\nreads run past the token, and _rotate_left()\u0027s `shift %= buf-\u003elen`\npath can divide by zero when buf-\u003elen has been driven to zero by\nthe truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally\ninvalid: with a non-zero RRC field and the opaque blob ending at\nthe XDR buffer boundary, rotate_left() builds a zero-length\nsubbuffer, reaching the same division.\n\nReject the token at the server entry point before it reaches the\nkrb5 unwrap core. A valid sealed RFC 4121 token must contain\nthe 16-byte header plus at least some encrypted payload.\n\nFix by adding a minimum-length check immediately after the\nexisting upper-bound check:\n\n if (len \u003c= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)\n goto unwrap_failed;",
"id": "GHSA-72qv-m5jw-m97f",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ea5b0c7f212c2772d32c2b88287b89a9cdf6edd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2eed1e6a976a44015c3ee78841fe336796e2b21c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a919c5c88769cf8fb3ec071e6078d830bf512489"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd6afc6cab8c5d387d1ed2f069562ef7bdadd651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de942dd8c2c8358bcad04ce44271954c48924423"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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