GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-12 18:30internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:62-66 sets only Content-Type: application/yaml. The Web-UI sibling at internal/web/handlers.go:1316-1321 sets Cache-Control: no-store, Pragma: no-cache, Expires: 0, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff — and has a test asserting it. The API path was missed.
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
Threat model
The endpoint returns a freshly minted X25519 private key inline. Without no-store, any intermediary proxy or CDN that caches 200 OK YAML responses retains the private key for its cache TTL. Same applies to browser disk cache for direct API hits. Combined with the cross-tenant authz advisory (critical), even a corrected authz layer would still leak via cache after fix.
Suggested fix
Copy the four headers from the Web sibling:
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/yaml; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
w.Header().Set("Expires", "0")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
Mirrors internal/web/handlers.go:1316-1321. Add a parallel test to the existing web-side coverage.
Suggested patch
Verified locally: go vet, go test -race -count=1 ./..., golangci-lint v2.12 all clean.
diff --git a/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go b/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go
index fc09da0..73152eb 100644
--- a/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go
+++ b/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go
@@ -58,8 +58,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleMobileBundle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
- // Return YAML bundle with proper content-type
+ // Return YAML bundle with proper content-type. The bundle inlines a
+ // freshly-minted X25519 private key, so suppress every layer of cache
+ // between server and operator (intermediate proxies/CDNs, browser disk
+ // cache). Mirrors the Web-UI sibling at internal/web/handlers.go.
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/yaml; charset=utf-8")
+ w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+ w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
+ w.Header().Set("Expires", "0")
+ w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err := w.Write(bundle); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("write mobile bundle response", "error", err)
diff --git a/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go b/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go
index dcb8cd9..da08b01 100644
--- a/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go
+++ b/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go
@@ -52,6 +52,19 @@ func TestHandleMobileBundle_Success(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8'", ct)
}
+ // Bundle inlines a private key — every cache between server and operator
+ // must drop the response. Mirrors the Web-UI sibling's headers.
+ for header, want := range map[string]string{
+ "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+ "Pragma": "no-cache",
+ "Expires": "0",
+ "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+ } {
+ if got := w.Header().Get(header); got != want {
+ t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", header, got, want)
+ }
+ }
+
// Verify body is valid YAML with expected keys
var yamlData map[string]interface{}
if err := yaml.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &yamlData); err != nil {
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-525"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T18:30:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "`internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:62-66` sets only `Content-Type: application/yaml`. The Web-UI sibling at `internal/web/handlers.go:1316-1321` sets `Cache-Control: no-store`, `Pragma: no-cache`, `Expires: 0`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` \u2014 and has a test asserting it. The API path was missed.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions up to v0.3.0.\n\n## Threat model\nThe endpoint returns a freshly minted X25519 private key inline. Without `no-store`, any intermediary proxy or CDN that caches `200 OK` YAML responses retains the private key for its cache TTL. Same applies to browser disk cache for direct API hits. Combined with the cross-tenant authz advisory (critical), even a corrected authz layer would still leak via cache after fix.\n\n## Suggested fix\nCopy the four headers from the Web sibling:\n\n```go\nw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/yaml; charset=utf-8\")\nw.Header().Set(\"Cache-Control\", \"no-store\")\nw.Header().Set(\"Pragma\", \"no-cache\")\nw.Header().Set(\"Expires\", \"0\")\nw.Header().Set(\"X-Content-Type-Options\", \"nosniff\")\n```\n\nMirrors `internal/web/handlers.go:1316-1321`. Add a parallel test to the existing web-side coverage.\n\n## Suggested patch\n\nVerified locally: `go vet`, `go test -race -count=1 ./...`, `golangci-lint v2.12` all clean.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go b/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go\nindex fc09da0..73152eb 100644\n--- a/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go\n+++ b/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go\n@@ -58,8 +58,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleMobileBundle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\t// Return YAML bundle with proper content-type\n+\t// Return YAML bundle with proper content-type. The bundle inlines a\n+\t// freshly-minted X25519 private key, so suppress every layer of cache\n+\t// between server and operator (intermediate proxies/CDNs, browser disk\n+\t// cache). Mirrors the Web-UI sibling at internal/web/handlers.go.\n \tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/yaml; charset=utf-8\")\n+\tw.Header().Set(\"Cache-Control\", \"no-store\")\n+\tw.Header().Set(\"Pragma\", \"no-cache\")\n+\tw.Header().Set(\"Expires\", \"0\")\n+\tw.Header().Set(\"X-Content-Type-Options\", \"nosniff\")\n \tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n \tif _, err := w.Write(bundle); err != nil {\n \t\ts.logger.Error(\"write mobile bundle response\", \"error\", err)\ndiff --git a/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go b/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go\nindex dcb8cd9..da08b01 100644\n--- a/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go\n+++ b/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go\n@@ -52,6 +52,19 @@ func TestHandleMobileBundle_Success(t *testing.T) {\n \t\tt.Errorf(\"Content-Type = %q, want \u0027application/yaml; charset=utf-8\u0027\", ct)\n \t}\n \n+\t// Bundle inlines a private key \u2014 every cache between server and operator\n+\t// must drop the response. Mirrors the Web-UI sibling\u0027s headers.\n+\tfor header, want := range map[string]string{\n+\t\t\"Cache-Control\": \"no-store\",\n+\t\t\"Pragma\": \"no-cache\",\n+\t\t\"Expires\": \"0\",\n+\t\t\"X-Content-Type-Options\": \"nosniff\",\n+\t} {\n+\t\tif got := w.Header().Get(header); got != want {\n+\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"%s = %q, want %q\", header, got, want)\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n \t// Verify body is valid YAML with expected keys\n \tvar yamlData map[string]interface{}\n \tif err := yaml.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), \u0026yamlData); err != nil {\n```",
"id": "GHSA-6vgg-xhvh-38ff",
"modified": "2026-06-12T18:30:09Z",
"published": "2026-06-12T18:30:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-6vgg-xhvh-38ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/c13d5b2c013b4b323bc0c87a6ecc6afba6384ee5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.