GHSA-6HF3-MHGC-CM65

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 22:43 – Updated: 2026-02-18 22:43
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback
Details

Vulnerability

In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.

In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account webhookSecret when only the account-level secret was configured.

Typical Use Case Context

Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.

Impact

  • Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.
  • Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.
  • Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: npm openclaw
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14
  • Patched version: 2026.2.15 (planned next release)

Remediation

  • Add and enforce tools.sessions.visibility (self | tree | agent | all) across session tools, defaulting to tree.
  • Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.
  • Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.

Fix Commit(s)

  • c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

Severity ?
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27004"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T22:43:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability\n\nIn some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.\n\nIn Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.\n\n## Typical Use Case Context\n\nMost regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.\n- Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.\n- Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: npm `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`.\n- Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.\n- Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c`\n\nThanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65",
  "modified": "2026-02-18T22:43:53Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T22:43:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback"
}


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