GHSA-6H3M-36W8-HV68

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-10 22:07 – Updated: 2022-03-24 00:21
VLAI
Summary
Arbitrary file write in nats-server
Details

(This document is canonically: https://advisories.nats.io/CVE/CVE-2022-26652.txt)

Background

NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.

JetStream is the optional RAFT-based resilient persistent feature of NATS.

Problem Description

The JetStream streams can be backed up and restored via NATS. The backup format is a tar archive file. Inadequate checks on the filenames within the archive file permit a so-called "Zip Slip" attack in the stream restore.

NATS nats-server through 2022-03-09 (fixed in release 2.7.4) did not correctly sanitize elements of the archive file, thus a user of NATS could cause the NATS server to write arbitrary content to an attacker-controlled filename.

Affected versions

NATS Server: * 2.2.0 up to and including 2.7.3. + Introduced with JetStream Restore functionality * Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.7.4 * Docker image: nats https://hub.docker.com/_/nats * NB users of OS package files from our releases: a change in goreleaser defaults, discovered late in the release process, moved the install directory from /usr/local/bin to /usr/bin; we are evaluating the correct solution for subsequent releases, but not recutting this release.

NATS Streaming Server * 0.15.0 up to and including 0.24.2 * Fixed with nats-io/nats-streaming-server: 0.24.3 * Embeds a nats-server, but this server is the old approach which JetStream replaces, so unlikely (but not impossible) to be configured with JS support

Workarounds

  • Disable JetStream for untrusted users.
  • If only one NATS account uses JetStream, such that cross-user attacks are not an issue, and any user in that account with access to the JetStream API is fully trusted anyway, then appropriate sandboxing techniques will prevent exploit.
  • Eg, with systemd, the supplied util/nats-server-hardened.service example configuration demonstrates that NATS runs fine as an unprivileged user under ProtectSystem=strict and PrivateTmp=true restrictions; by only opening a ReadWritePaths hole for the JetStream storage area, the impact of this vulnerability is limited.

Solution

Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.7.4.

We fully support the util/nats-server-hardened.service configuration for running a NATS server and encourage this approach.

Credits

This issue was reported (on 2022-03-07) to the NATS Maintainers by Yiming Xiang, TIANJI LAB of NSFOCUS.
Thank you / 谢谢你!

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nats-io/nats-streaming-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.15.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.24.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-26652"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-10T22:07:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-10T17:47:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "(This document is canonically: \u003chttps://advisories.nats.io/CVE/CVE-2022-26652.txt\u003e)\n\n## Background\n\nNATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.\n\nJetStream is the optional RAFT-based resilient persistent feature of NATS.\n\n\n## Problem Description\n\nThe JetStream streams can be backed up and restored via NATS. The backup format is a tar archive file.  Inadequate checks on the filenames within the archive file permit a so-called \"Zip Slip\" attack in the stream restore.\n\nNATS nats-server through 2022-03-09 (fixed in release 2.7.4) did not correctly sanitize elements of the archive file, thus a user of NATS\ncould cause the NATS server to write arbitrary content to an attacker-controlled filename.\n\n\n## Affected versions\n\nNATS Server:\n * 2.2.0 up to and including 2.7.3.\n   + Introduced with JetStream Restore functionality\n * Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.7.4\n * Docker image:  nats \u003chttps://hub.docker.com/_/nats\u003e\n * NB users of OS package files from our releases: a change in goreleaser defaults, discovered late in the release process, moved the install directory from /usr/local/bin to /usr/bin; we are evaluating the correct solution for subsequent releases, but not recutting this release.\n\nNATS Streaming Server\n * 0.15.0 up to and including 0.24.2\n * Fixed with nats-io/nats-streaming-server: 0.24.3\n * Embeds a nats-server, but this server is the old approach which JetStream replaces, so unlikely (but not impossible) to be\n   configured with JS support\n\n\n## Workarounds\n\n * Disable JetStream for untrusted users.\n * If only one NATS account uses JetStream, such that cross-user attacks are not an issue, and any user in that account with access to the JetStream API is fully trusted anyway, then appropriate sandboxing techniques will prevent exploit.\n   + Eg, with systemd, the supplied util/nats-server-hardened.service example configuration demonstrates that NATS runs fine as an unprivileged user under ProtectSystem=strict and PrivateTmp=true restrictions; by only opening a ReadWritePaths hole for the JetStream storage area, the impact of this vulnerability is limited.\n\n\n## Solution\n\nUpgrade the NATS server to at least 2.7.4.\n\nWe fully support the util/nats-server-hardened.service configuration for running a NATS server and encourage this approach.\n\n\n## Credits\n\nThis issue was reported (on 2022-03-07) to the NATS Maintainers by\nYiming Xiang, TIANJI LAB of NSFOCUS.  \nThank you / \u8c22\u8c22\u4f60\uff01\n",
  "id": "GHSA-6h3m-36w8-hv68",
  "modified": "2022-03-24T00:21:10Z",
  "published": "2022-03-10T22:07:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server/security/advisories/GHSA-6h3m-36w8-hv68"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26652"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server/pull/2917"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisories.nats.io/CVE/CVE-2022-26652.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server/releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server/releases/tag/v2.7.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-streaming-server/releases/tag/v0.24.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/03/10/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arbitrary file write in nats-server"
}



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