GHSA-6G6R-XM94-6P2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: disable DIM work before freeing q_vectors
idpf never drains the Tx/Rx DIM works before freeing the memory they live in. tx_dim and rx_dim are embedded in struct idpf_q_vector, they are queued from the NAPI poll via net_dim(), and idpf_vport_intr_rel() ends with kfree(rsrc->q_vectors). Nothing in the driver cancels them.
idpf_tx_dim_work() and idpf_rx_dim_work() then run on freed memory: idpf_vport_intr_write_itr() writes the ITR register through q_vector->intr_reg.tx_itr / rx_itr, void __iomem pointers loaded out of the freed q_vector. No configuration is needed to get there -- IDPF_ITR_IS_DYNAMIC() is defined as (itr_mode) and idpf_vport_alloc() initialises both modes to IDPF_ITR_DYNAMIC.
Draining after idpf_vport_intr_napi_dis_all() is not enough on its own. idpf_net_dim() is called from inside the "if (napi_complete_done(napi, work_done))" branch of the poll, and napi_complete_done() has already cleared NAPIF_STATE_SCHED by then. napi_disable_locked() waits only while (val & (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)), so napi_disable() can return while the poll tail is still queueing the work, and a plain cancel_work_sync() would be re-armed behind the drain.
Use disable_work_sync(): schedule_work() on a work with a non-zero disable count is dropped by clear_pending_if_disabled() before __queue_work() is reached.
Move idpf_init_dim() to idpf_vport_intr_alloc() so the works are initialised on every path that can reach the drain -- the three "goto intr_deinit" sites between idpf_vport_intr_init() and idpf_vport_intr_ena() get there without the enable side having run. Nothing re-enables them: rsrc->q_vectors is freed on every exit from idpf_vport_open() and on every idpf_vport_stop(), so the count dies with the object.
It is a race, not a deterministic failure -- net_dim() only schedules once DIM_NEVENTS events have accumulated and the profile index changes. A KASAN ifup/ifdown loop under load is the way to see it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97603"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nidpf: disable DIM work before freeing q_vectors\n\nidpf never drains the Tx/Rx DIM works before freeing the memory they\nlive in. tx_dim and rx_dim are embedded in struct idpf_q_vector, they\nare queued from the NAPI poll via net_dim(), and idpf_vport_intr_rel()\nends with kfree(rsrc-\u003eq_vectors). Nothing in the driver cancels them.\n\nidpf_tx_dim_work() and idpf_rx_dim_work() then run on freed memory:\nidpf_vport_intr_write_itr() writes the ITR register through\nq_vector-\u003eintr_reg.tx_itr / rx_itr, void __iomem pointers loaded out of\nthe freed q_vector. No configuration is needed to get there --\nIDPF_ITR_IS_DYNAMIC() is defined as (itr_mode) and idpf_vport_alloc()\ninitialises both modes to IDPF_ITR_DYNAMIC.\n\nDraining after idpf_vport_intr_napi_dis_all() is not enough on its own.\nidpf_net_dim() is called from inside the\n\"if (napi_complete_done(napi, work_done))\" branch of the poll, and\nnapi_complete_done() has already cleared NAPIF_STATE_SCHED by then.\nnapi_disable_locked() waits only while (val \u0026 (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED |\nNAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)), so napi_disable() can return while the poll tail is\nstill queueing the work, and a plain cancel_work_sync() would be\nre-armed behind the drain.\n\nUse disable_work_sync(): schedule_work() on a work with a non-zero\ndisable count is dropped by clear_pending_if_disabled() before\n__queue_work() is reached.\n\nMove idpf_init_dim() to idpf_vport_intr_alloc() so the works are\ninitialised on every path that can reach the drain -- the three\n\"goto intr_deinit\" sites between idpf_vport_intr_init() and\nidpf_vport_intr_ena() get there without the enable side having run.\nNothing re-enables them: rsrc-\u003eq_vectors is freed on every exit from\nidpf_vport_open() and on every idpf_vport_stop(), so the count dies with\nthe object.\n\nIt is a race, not a deterministic failure -- net_dim() only schedules\nonce DIM_NEVENTS events have accumulated and the profile index changes.\nA KASAN ifup/ifdown loop under load is the way to see it.",
"id": "GHSA-6g6r-xm94-6p2f",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d64d4c6bb6bb63b6cdb7de133c3ec48333b27b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd4c829bac2916be98a3e34b41daaba7f42b4c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e4312953788244d47074987d40d76702cf929f1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd7a1598645b6917a8676b7e2efe8d97ce68a952"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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