GHSA-6FGX-X7M2-74QM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-13 20:19 – Updated: 2025-10-13 20:19Impact
For tracexec's command line reconstruction feature, when a traced process executes another process with a environment variable where the key starts with a dash, tracexec incorrectly shows its commandline where such environment variables could cause argument injection for the env command.
Such an injection is completely at the UI level unless the user tries to copy the command line with the injection and paste it into a terminal to execute it.
A minimal POC is executing env -- -a=b bash --norc in tracexec's TUI mode. The resulting command line of env executing bash would be env -a bash -a=b _=/usr/bin/env /usr/bin/bash --norc in tracexec's TUI, which injects -a=b into env's arguments.
This has very limited effect for security. A local adversarial could leverage this to make tracexec show an inaccurate reconstructed commandline for their executed command. If the user of tracexec decides to copy and run the reconstructed commandline,
there could be injection for env's --block-signal, --default-signal, --ignore-signal, --split-string, --unset, --chdir, --argv0 arguments.
Patches
The fix is https://github.com/kxxt/tracexec/pull/118. Users are advised to upgrade to 0.14.0.
Workarounds
Don't blindly paste and execute commands copied from tracexec that contains environment variable where the key starts with a dash.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tracexec"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-13T20:19:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nFor tracexec\u0027s command line reconstruction feature, when a traced process executes another process with a environment variable where the key starts with a dash, tracexec incorrectly shows its commandline where such environment variables could cause argument injection for the `env` command.\nSuch an injection is completely at the UI level unless the user tries to copy the command line with the injection and paste it into a terminal to execute it.\n\nA minimal POC is executing `env -- -a=b bash --norc` in tracexec\u0027s TUI mode. The resulting command line of `env` executing bash would be `env -a bash -a=b _=/usr/bin/env /usr/bin/bash --norc` in tracexec\u0027s TUI, which injects `-a=b` into `env`\u0027s arguments.\n\nThis has very limited effect for security. A local adversarial could leverage this to make tracexec show an inaccurate reconstructed commandline for their executed command. If the user of tracexec decides to copy and run the reconstructed commandline,\nthere could be injection for `env`\u0027s `--block-signal`, `--default-signal`, `--ignore-signal`, `--split-string`, `--unset`, `--chdir`, `--argv0` arguments.\n\n### Patches\nThe fix is https://github.com/kxxt/tracexec/pull/118. Users are advised to upgrade to 0.14.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDon\u0027t blindly paste and execute commands copied from tracexec that contains environment variable where the key starts with a dash.",
"id": "GHSA-6fgx-x7m2-74qm",
"modified": "2025-10-13T20:19:36Z",
"published": "2025-10-13T20:19:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kxxt/tracexec/security/advisories/GHSA-6fgx-x7m2-74qm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kxxt/tracexec/pull/118"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kxxt/tracexec/commit/0dbe63214c8686df5bb62dbe6142cce27868ecff"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kxxt/tracexec"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "tracexec has `env` command argument injection via environment variables starting with dash in traced exec events"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.