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GHSA-68J8-V58C-G6H7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-30 15:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI/DOE: Fix destroy_work_on_stack() race

The following debug object splat was observed in testing:

ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: 0000000097d23782 object type: work_struct hint: doe_statemachine_work+0x0/0x510 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 71 at lib/debugobjects.c:514 debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ... Workqueue: pci 0000:36:00.0 DOE [1 doe_statemachine_work RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ... Call Trace: ? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ? __pfx_doe_statemachine_work+0x10/0x10 debug_object_free.part.0+0x11b/0x150 doe_statemachine_work+0x45e/0x510 process_one_work+0x1d4/0x3c0

This occurs because destroy_work_on_stack() was called after signaling the completion in the calling thread. This creates a race between destroy_work_on_stack() and the task->work struct going out of scope in pci_doe().

Signal the work complete after destroying the work struct. This is safe because signal_task_complete() is the final thing the work item does and the workqueue code is careful not to access the work struct after.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-54235"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T13:16:11Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI/DOE: Fix destroy_work_on_stack() race\n\nThe following debug object splat was observed in testing:\n\n  ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: 0000000097d23782 object type: work_struct hint: doe_statemachine_work+0x0/0x510\n  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 71 at lib/debugobjects.c:514 debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0\n  ...\n  Workqueue: pci 0000:36:00.0 DOE [1 doe_statemachine_work\n  RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0\n  ...\n  Call Trace:\n   ? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0\n   ? __pfx_doe_statemachine_work+0x10/0x10\n   debug_object_free.part.0+0x11b/0x150\n   doe_statemachine_work+0x45e/0x510\n   process_one_work+0x1d4/0x3c0\n\nThis occurs because destroy_work_on_stack() was called after signaling\nthe completion in the calling thread.  This creates a race between\ndestroy_work_on_stack() and the task-\u003ework struct going out of scope in\npci_doe().\n\nSignal the work complete after destroying the work struct.  This is safe\nbecause signal_task_complete() is the final thing the work item does and\nthe workqueue code is careful not to access the work struct after.",
  "id": "GHSA-68j8-v58c-g6h7",
  "modified": "2025-12-30T15:30:32Z",
  "published": "2025-12-30T15:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54235"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19cf3ba16dcc2ef059dcf010072d4f96d76486e0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4f9c0a3a6df143f2e1092823b7fa9e07d6ab57f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d96799ee3b78962c80e4b6653734f488f999ca09"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3a3a097eaebaf234a482b4d2f9f18fe989208c1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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