GHSA-62XR-3QF5-9QPJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-07 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range
ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU walk on swapout failure") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under "if (!ret)", so the ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink() infinite LRU walk on backup failure") tests "lret > 0", which is what was intended here as well.
Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO's bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable. When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move (ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()), ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its !ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos->first / pos->last is left pointing at freed memory. The next ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(), "list_del corruption" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL dereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a hibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel Ainsworth's analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the dangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it dangles.
Testing the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD Phoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on a 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug crashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one hibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the removal happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles were clean.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98166"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:17:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range\n\nttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and\na negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns\nzero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d (\"drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU\nwalk on swapout failure\") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in\nttm_bo_swapout_cb() under \"if (!ret)\", so the\nttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail()\npair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change\nfor the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 (\"drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink()\ninfinite LRU walk on backup failure\") tests \"lret \u003e 0\", which is what\nwas intended here as well.\n\nBefore b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the\nswapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO\u0027s\nbulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable.\nWhen it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move\n(ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()),\nttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its\n!ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos-\u003efirst /\npos-\u003elast is left pointing at freed memory. The next\nttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor\nis a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(),\n\"list_del corruption\" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL\ndereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a\nhibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel\nAinsworth\u0027s analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the\ndangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it\ndangles.\n\nTesting the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD\nPhoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on\na 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug\ncrashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one\nhibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero\nttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the\nremoval happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles\nwere clean.",
"id": "GHSA-62xr-3qf5-9qpj",
"modified": "2026-10-07T09:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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