GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-5XV7-X5QX-3WV4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK

tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:

tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);

msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true and starving the connection of further transmits.

Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or, for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74282"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK\n\ntipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count\nfrom the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it\ndoes not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:\n\n\ttsk-\u003esnt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);\n\nmsg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK\nmessage. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction\nwraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true\nand starving the connection of further transmits.\n\nValidate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the\nmessage if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,\nfor a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a\nTIPC connection\u0027s send side by sending an oversized connection ack.",
  "id": "GHSA-5xv7-x5qx-3wv4",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e2c956745777e6ffdee7f30da5935741c03ee1e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3388145d258cf2c4c98278e3987296007d30672e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3cfa3d8e0dc167850edeb5bf5a07757db83fd54e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47ed873e4ceda34098bd46d8e96b4bb13cad3a04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67e55b054bf8025658dc0e255057f2a6236416bd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96f91b8ae1a489b3eca137e7acf42cf985fb8939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab3e10b44ba5411779aac7afd2477917dd77750f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b44bebdd32c9ff66ee2aebfc317ced44bedd9335"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…