GHSA-5Q8V-J673-M5V4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-07 02:10 – Updated: 2026-03-07 02:10
VLAI
Summary
Firefly III user API endpoints expose all users' information to any authenticated user (IDOR)
Details
Summary
The User management API endpoints (GET /api/v1/users and GET /api/v1/users/{id}) are accessible to any authenticated user without admin/owner role verification, exposing all users' email addresses, roles, and account status.
Affected Endpoints
- GET /api/v1/users (UserController::index, line 94) — Lists ALL users with full details. No role check.
- GET /api/v1/users/{id} (UserController::show, line 126) — Shows any user's details by ID. No role check.
Root Cause (1-of-N Inconsistency)
Other methods in the same controller properly check for the 'owner' role:
store()—UserStoreRequest::authorize()checksauth()->user()->hasRole('owner')✓destroy()— Explicitly checks$this->repository->hasRole($admin, 'owner')✓
But index() and show() have no role check at all. The route group at routes/api.php:734-747 has no admin middleware, only the global auth:api middleware.
Exposed Data
The UserTransformer (line 40-54) returns:
- email — user's email address
- role — user's role (owner/demo)
- blocked — account blocked status
- blocked_code — block reason
- created_at / updated_at — timestamps
Impact
Any authenticated user can: 1. Enumerate ALL user accounts in the instance 2. Harvest email addresses for phishing/social engineering 3. Identify admin/owner accounts by role 4. Determine which accounts are blocked
Exploitation
# List all users
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any_user_token>" https://instance/api/v1/users
# View specific user details
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any_user_token>" https://instance/api/v1/users/1
Suggested Fix
Add owner role checks to index() and show(), or restrict the route group with admin middleware:
// Option 1: Add check in controller methods
public function show(User $user): JsonResponse
{
if (!$this->repository->hasRole(auth()->user(), 'owner') && auth()->user()->id !== $user->id) {
throw new FireflyException('200025: No access to function.');
}
// ...
}
// Option 2: Add middleware to route group
Route::group(['middleware' => ['admin'], ...], ...)
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "grumpydictator/firefly-iii"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.4.23"
},
{
"fixed": "6.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-07T02:10:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe User management API endpoints (`GET /api/v1/users` and `GET /api/v1/users/{id}`) are accessible to any authenticated user without admin/owner role verification, exposing all users\u0027 email addresses, roles, and account status.\n\n### Affected Endpoints\n\n1. **GET /api/v1/users** (UserController::index, line 94) \u2014 Lists ALL users with full details. No role check.\n2. **GET /api/v1/users/{id}** (UserController::show, line 126) \u2014 Shows any user\u0027s details by ID. No role check.\n\n### Root Cause (1-of-N Inconsistency)\n\nOther methods in the same controller properly check for the \u0027owner\u0027 role:\n\n- `store()` \u2014 `UserStoreRequest::authorize()` checks `auth()-\u003euser()-\u003ehasRole(\u0027owner\u0027)` \u2713\n- `destroy()` \u2014 Explicitly checks `$this-\u003erepository-\u003ehasRole($admin, \u0027owner\u0027)` \u2713\n\nBut `index()` and `show()` have no role check at all. The route group at `routes/api.php:734-747` has no admin middleware, only the global `auth:api` middleware.\n\n### Exposed Data\n\nThe `UserTransformer` (line 40-54) returns:\n- `email` \u2014 user\u0027s email address\n- `role` \u2014 user\u0027s role (owner/demo)\n- `blocked` \u2014 account blocked status\n- `blocked_code` \u2014 block reason\n- `created_at` / `updated_at` \u2014 timestamps\n\n### Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can:\n1. Enumerate ALL user accounts in the instance\n2. Harvest email addresses for phishing/social engineering\n3. Identify admin/owner accounts by role\n4. Determine which accounts are blocked\n\n### Exploitation\n\n```bash\n# List all users\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" https://instance/api/v1/users\n\n# View specific user details\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" https://instance/api/v1/users/1\n```\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nAdd owner role checks to `index()` and `show()`, or restrict the route group with admin middleware:\n\n```php\n// Option 1: Add check in controller methods\npublic function show(User $user): JsonResponse\n{\n if (!$this-\u003erepository-\u003ehasRole(auth()-\u003euser(), \u0027owner\u0027) \u0026\u0026 auth()-\u003euser()-\u003eid !== $user-\u003eid) {\n throw new FireflyException(\u0027200025: No access to function.\u0027);\n }\n // ...\n}\n\n// Option 2: Add middleware to route group\nRoute::group([\u0027middleware\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027admin\u0027], ...], ...)\n```",
"id": "GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4",
"modified": "2026-03-07T02:10:45Z",
"published": "2026-03-07T02:10:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii/security/advisories/GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Firefly III user API endpoints expose all users\u0027 information to any authenticated user (IDOR)"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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