GHSA-5M9F-RPHJ-C435

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 16:32 – Updated: 2026-08-18 16:32
VLAI
Summary
RabbitMQ Java client: TrustEverythingTrustManager used by default in useSslProtocol() enables MITM
Details

Vulnerability Summary

com.rabbitmq.client.TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts ANY TLS certificate (including null chains) and is used as the default trust manager when calling ConnectionFactory.useSslProtocol() without arguments. Combined with hostname verification being disabled by default, this enables trivial man-in-the-middle attacks.

Affected Components

  • com.rabbitmq.client.TrustEverythingTrustManager — accepts any certificate
  • com.rabbitmq.client.ConnectionFactory.useSslProtocol() — uses TrustEverythingTrustManager
  • Hostname verification disabled by default (enableHostnameVerification() must be called explicitly)
  • com.rabbitmq.client.ConnectionFactory.getPassword() — returns plaintext with no redaction
  • Default port 5672 (plaintext) with PLAIN SASL — credentials sent unencrypted

POC (Verified on Java 21, amqp-client 5.25.0)

// TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts ANY certificate including null
TrustEverythingTrustManager tm = new TrustEverythingTrustManager();
tm.checkServerTrusted(null, "RSA");  // No exception — accepts null cert chain
tm.getAcceptedIssuers();  // Returns empty array — trusts all CAs

// ConnectionFactory defaults
ConnectionFactory factory = new ConnectionFactory();
factory.useSslProtocol();  // Uses TrustEverythingTrustManager internally
// enableHostnameVerification() NOT called by default

// Credential exposure
factory.setPassword("secret_password_123");
factory.getPassword();  // Returns "secret_password_123" — no redaction

// Default plaintext port
factory.getPort();  // 5672 (plaintext, not 5671/TLS)

// PLAIN SASL sends cleartext credentials
PlainMechanism pm = new PlainMechanism();
// handleChallenge() sends username+password in cleartext

Attack Scenarios

  1. MITM: Attacker presents self-signed cert → TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts it → all RabbitMQ traffic intercepted
  2. Credential theft: Default plaintext port (5672) + PLAIN SASL = credentials readable on network
  3. DNS rebinding: No hostname verification → attacker DNS record → MITM without cert
  4. Logging exposure: getPassword() returns plaintext → credentials in logs/stack traces

Suggested Fix

  1. Deprecate TrustEverythingTrustManager — it should never be used in production
  2. useSslProtocol() should use the JVM default trust store, not TrustEverything
  3. Enable hostname verification by default
  4. Redact password in getPassword() or remove the public getter
  5. Warn when using PLAIN SASL without TLS
Severity
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.rabbitmq:amqp-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.33.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63336"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T16:32:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability Summary\n\n`com.rabbitmq.client.TrustEverythingTrustManager` accepts ANY TLS certificate (including null chains) and is used as the default trust manager when calling `ConnectionFactory.useSslProtocol()` without arguments. Combined with hostname verification being disabled by default, this enables trivial man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- `com.rabbitmq.client.TrustEverythingTrustManager` \u2014 accepts any certificate\n- `com.rabbitmq.client.ConnectionFactory.useSslProtocol()` \u2014 uses TrustEverythingTrustManager\n- Hostname verification disabled by default (`enableHostnameVerification()` must be called explicitly)\n- `com.rabbitmq.client.ConnectionFactory.getPassword()` \u2014 returns plaintext with no redaction\n- Default port 5672 (plaintext) with PLAIN SASL \u2014 credentials sent unencrypted\n\n## POC (Verified on Java 21, amqp-client 5.25.0)\n\n```java\n// TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts ANY certificate including null\nTrustEverythingTrustManager tm = new TrustEverythingTrustManager();\ntm.checkServerTrusted(null, \"RSA\");  // No exception \u2014 accepts null cert chain\ntm.getAcceptedIssuers();  // Returns empty array \u2014 trusts all CAs\n\n// ConnectionFactory defaults\nConnectionFactory factory = new ConnectionFactory();\nfactory.useSslProtocol();  // Uses TrustEverythingTrustManager internally\n// enableHostnameVerification() NOT called by default\n\n// Credential exposure\nfactory.setPassword(\"secret_password_123\");\nfactory.getPassword();  // Returns \"secret_password_123\" \u2014 no redaction\n\n// Default plaintext port\nfactory.getPort();  // 5672 (plaintext, not 5671/TLS)\n\n// PLAIN SASL sends cleartext credentials\nPlainMechanism pm = new PlainMechanism();\n// handleChallenge() sends username+password in cleartext\n```\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\n1. **MITM**: Attacker presents self-signed cert \u2192 `TrustEverythingTrustManager` accepts it \u2192 all RabbitMQ traffic intercepted\n2. **Credential theft**: Default plaintext port (5672) + PLAIN SASL = credentials readable on network\n3. **DNS rebinding**: No hostname verification \u2192 attacker DNS record \u2192 MITM without cert\n4. **Logging exposure**: `getPassword()` returns plaintext \u2192 credentials in logs/stack traces\n\n## Suggested Fix\n1. Deprecate `TrustEverythingTrustManager` \u2014 it should never be used in production\n2. `useSslProtocol()` should use the JVM default trust store, not TrustEverything\n3. Enable hostname verification by default\n4. Redact password in `getPassword()` or remove the public getter\n5. Warn when using PLAIN SASL without TLS",
  "id": "GHSA-5m9f-rphj-c435",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T16:32:59Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T16:32:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-5m9f-rphj-c435"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/1999"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2001"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/1e7deb2e6020c9793a81385a53ea378ec63b9339"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/a4bf571dd368765baaa9cecfae68ce09f1bdcc01"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.33.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RabbitMQ Java client: TrustEverythingTrustManager used by default in useSslProtocol() enables MITM"
}



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