GHSA-5JP7-RP9X-4M4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: restrict socket creation to the initial network namespace
QRTR keeps its entire port and node state in module-global variables that are not partitioned per network namespace: qrtr_local_nid is a single global node id (always 1) and qrtr_ports is a single global xarray. qrtr_port_lookup() and qrtr_local_enqueue() operate on that global state with no network-namespace check, and qrtr_create() places no restriction on the namespace a socket is created in.
As a result an unprivileged process that creates an AF_QIPCRTR socket in a separate network namespace, e.g. via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET), can send QRTR datagrams - including control-plane messages such as QRTR_TYPE_NEW_SERVER - to QRTR sockets owned by another namespace, and vice versa. The receiving socket sees such a message as coming from node id 1, indistinguishable from a legitimate local client, breaking the isolation that network namespaces are expected to provide.
QRTR is a transport to global hardware endpoints (the modem and other remote processors) and has no per-namespace semantics; its in-kernel name service already creates its socket in init_net only. Confine the socket family to the initial network namespace, as other non-namespace-aware socket families do (see llc_ui_create() and the ieee802154 socket code).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68294"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: qrtr: restrict socket creation to the initial network namespace\n\nQRTR keeps its entire port and node state in module-global variables\nthat are not partitioned per network namespace: qrtr_local_nid is a\nsingle global node id (always 1) and qrtr_ports is a single global\nxarray. qrtr_port_lookup() and qrtr_local_enqueue() operate on that\nglobal state with no network-namespace check, and qrtr_create() places\nno restriction on the namespace a socket is created in.\n\nAs a result an unprivileged process that creates an AF_QIPCRTR socket\nin a separate network namespace, e.g. via\nunshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET), can send QRTR datagrams -\nincluding control-plane messages such as QRTR_TYPE_NEW_SERVER - to QRTR\nsockets owned by another namespace, and vice versa. The receiving\nsocket sees such a message as coming from node id 1, indistinguishable\nfrom a legitimate local client, breaking the isolation that network\nnamespaces are expected to provide.\n\nQRTR is a transport to global hardware endpoints (the modem and other\nremote processors) and has no per-namespace semantics; its in-kernel\nname service already creates its socket in init_net only. Confine the\nsocket family to the initial network namespace, as other\nnon-namespace-aware socket families do (see llc_ui_create() and the\nieee802154 socket code).",
"id": "GHSA-5jp7-rp9x-4m4q",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d22b94a154ccb9755dddfff802fe3e2b1adbab5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b536db8fb32da9e9c62f2bb45e2e319331f0426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b95e1f0d6e6342c427cb341ee18a894b146b789"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/659b9b4f194bb56b9903cc95e786ef1d438baa7d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7814f6a3415cad38aa8d6dfc573df778260d66aa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8150c48fb978e01689f94ed80148f8a7499ae571"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d351fe0654a20c9f95a61b05d24ebe6d4be3fbb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f488116df769bdaf89c93371350e49e12133e70f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.