GHSA-5FQC-MRG8-W798
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 18:53 – Updated: 2026-10-02 18:53Summary
Dulwich's filter_branch.py CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.
Root Cause
_apply_index_filter() at dulwich/filter_branch.py:212 calls build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...) which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The finally block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (os.unlink(tmp_index_path)) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When process_commit() processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.
On dulwich 1.2.7, build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection, and validate_path_element only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.
Impact
An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running filter_branch with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets .git/hooks/.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has:
- Ancestor commit: tree entry
evil(mode 120000, symlink →/target_dir) - Descendant commit: tree entry
evil/payload(mode 100644, attacker content) - Victim clones repository and runs
filter_branchwith an index filter process_commit()processes ancestor first → materializesevilas symlink to/target_dirin CWD- CWD is NOT cleaned between commits
- Processing descendant:
os.path.exists("./evil")→ True (symlink exists).build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload")→open("./evil/payload", "wb")follows intermediate symlink → writes to/target_dir/payload
Suggested Fix
Clean the CWD between commit iterations in _apply_index_filter(), or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.
Reported by zx (Jace)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dulwich"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.23.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T18:53:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nDulwich\u0027s `filter_branch.py` `CommitFilter._apply_index_filter()` is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`_apply_index_filter()` at `dulwich/filter_branch.py:212` calls `build_index_from_tree(\".\", tmp_index_path, ...)` which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The `finally` block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (`os.unlink(tmp_index_path)`) \u2014 NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When `process_commit()` processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.\n\nOn dulwich 1.2.7, `build_file_from_blob()` has no symlink protection, and `validate_path_element` only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can craft a malicious repository where running `filter_branch` with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets `.git/hooks/`.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has:\n - Ancestor commit: tree entry `evil` (mode 120000, symlink \u2192 `/target_dir`)\n - Descendant commit: tree entry `evil/payload` (mode 100644, attacker content)\n2. Victim clones repository and runs `filter_branch` with an index filter\n3. `process_commit()` processes ancestor first \u2192 materializes `evil` as symlink to `/target_dir` in CWD\n4. CWD is NOT cleaned between commits\n5. Processing descendant: `os.path.exists(\"./evil\")` \u2192 True (symlink exists). `build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, \"./evil/payload\")` \u2192 `open(\"./evil/payload\", \"wb\")` follows intermediate symlink \u2192 writes to `/target_dir/payload`\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nClean the CWD between commit iterations in `_apply_index_filter()`, or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.\n\nReported by **zx (Jace)**",
"id": "GHSA-5fqc-mrg8-w798",
"modified": "2026-10-02T18:53:05Z",
"published": "2026-10-02T18:53:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-5fqc-mrg8-w798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/9571ac60b851fce228dae7ededb380c6ce9b3fb8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in filter-branch index_filter via cross-commit state persistence"
}
Sightings
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