GHSA-58W9-8G37-X9V5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 17:22 – Updated: 2026-06-15 17:22
VLAI
Summary
@angular/compiler: Two-Way Property Binding Sanitization Bypass (XSS)
Details

An issue in the @angular/compiler package allows bypassing DOM property sanitization through the use of two-way property bindings.

Specifically, when a native DOM property that requires sanitization (such as innerHTML, srcdoc, src, href, data, or sandbox) is bound using the two-way binding syntax (e.g., [(innerHTML)]="value" or bindon-innerHTML="value"), the Angular template compiler failed to apply the appropriate schema-derived sanitizer resolution to the TwoWayProperty operation. As a result, native two-way DOM bindings were emitted without the required sanitizer function, whereas equivalent one-way bindings would be properly sanitized.

This flaw enables an attacker who can control the value of a two-way bound sensitive property to bypass Angular's built-in sanitization logic, potentially leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

Impact

Any Angular application that uses two-way data binding ([()] or bindon-) on security-sensitive native DOM properties (like innerHTML, href on <a>, src on <img>/<iframe>, etc.) is vulnerable to this security bypass.

Once exploited, this allows a malicious actor to supply an unsanitized property binding value that bypasses core sanitization constraints. This could lead to the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the target user's browser context, potentially resulting in session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.

Attack Preconditions

To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the following environment parameters and application states must concurrently exist: 1. Two-Way Binding on Sensitive Properties: The application must bind to a sensitive native DOM property using the two-way binding syntax (e.g., <div [(innerHTML)]="userContent"></div>). 2. User-Controlled Input: The value bound to this property must be influenceable by user-controlled input. 3. Absence of Additional Sanitization: The application does not perform separate manual sanitization (e.g., via DomSanitizer) before passing the value to the bound property.

Patches

  • 22.0.1
  • 21.2.17
  • 20.3.25
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/compiler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "22.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "22.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/compiler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.2.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/compiler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.3.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/compiler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "19.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54265"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:22:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue in the `@angular/compiler` package allows bypassing DOM property sanitization through the use of two-way property bindings.\n\nSpecifically, when a native DOM property that requires sanitization (such as `innerHTML`, `srcdoc`, `src`, `href`, `data`, or `sandbox`) is bound using the two-way binding syntax (e.g., `[(innerHTML)]=\"value\"` or `bindon-innerHTML=\"value\"`), the Angular template compiler failed to apply the appropriate schema-derived sanitizer resolution to the `TwoWayProperty` operation. As a result, native two-way DOM bindings were emitted without the required sanitizer function, whereas equivalent one-way bindings would be properly sanitized.\n\nThis flaw enables an attacker who can control the value of a two-way bound sensitive property to bypass Angular\u0027s built-in sanitization logic, potentially leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that uses two-way data binding (`[()]` or `bindon-`) on security-sensitive native DOM properties (like `innerHTML`, `href` on `\u003ca\u003e`, `src` on `\u003cimg\u003e`/`\u003ciframe\u003e`, etc.) is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to supply an unsanitized property binding value that bypasses core sanitization constraints. This could lead to the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the target user\u0027s browser context, potentially resulting in session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\nTo successfully exploit this vulnerability, the following environment parameters and application states must concurrently exist:\n1. **Two-Way Binding on Sensitive Properties:** The application must bind to a sensitive native DOM property using the two-way binding syntax (e.g., `\u003cdiv [(innerHTML)]=\"userContent\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e`).\n2. **User-Controlled Input:** The value bound to this property must be influenceable by user-controlled input.\n3. **Absence of Additional Sanitization:** The application does not perform separate manual sanitization (e.g., via `DomSanitizer`) before passing the value to the bound property.\n\n### Patches\n* 22.0.1\n* 21.2.17\n* 20.3.25",
  "id": "GHSA-58w9-8g37-x9v5",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T17:22:40Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T17:22:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-58w9-8g37-x9v5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69107"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/3c70270c96677c0dd33585f2afe8e187113e5fb4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@angular/compiler: Two-Way Property Binding Sanitization Bypass (XSS)"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.