GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-56F8-X2FW-63M3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation

End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB before IPv4 interprets skb->cb.

The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and ts.

The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to 40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees optlen = 40 and rr = 40.

Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte option-data area.

Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel both produced:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() Write of size 255

The relevant End.DX4 call path is:

__ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dx4_finish input_action_end_dx4

The relevant End.DT4 call path is:

__ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dt4

tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so it does not appear as a separate frame.

When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and End.DT46's IPv4 arm.

Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master; IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80840"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:18:12Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation\n\nEnd.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through\ndecap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner\npacket therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB\nbefore IPv4 interprets skb-\u003ecb.\n\nThe skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and\nIPCB use the same skb-\u003ecb storage, so IP6CB(skb)-\u003elastopt overlaps\nIPCB(skb)-\u003eopt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)-\u003enhoff overlaps rr and\nts.\n\nThe sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer\nextension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination\nOptions header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the\nSegment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled\nDestination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to\n40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees\noptlen = 40 and rr = 40.\n\nBoth tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying\nwhen optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates\nroom for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The\nstale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the\nRecord Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled\nbyte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte\noption-data area.\n\nSeparate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5\nkernel both produced:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()\n  Write of size 255\n\nThe relevant End.DX4 call path is:\n\n  __ip_options_echo\n  tcp_v4_route_req\n  tcp_conn_request\n  tcp_v4_conn_request\n  tcp_rcv_state_process\n  tcp_v4_do_rcv\n  tcp_v4_rcv\n  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu\n  ip_local_deliver_finish\n  ip_local_deliver\n  input_action_end_dx4_finish\n  input_action_end_dx4\n\nThe relevant End.DT4 call path is:\n\n  __ip_options_echo\n  tcp_v4_route_req\n  tcp_conn_request\n  tcp_v4_conn_request\n  tcp_rcv_state_process\n  tcp_v4_do_rcv\n  tcp_v4_rcv\n  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu\n  ip_local_deliver_finish\n  ip_local_deliver\n  input_action_end_dt4\n\ntcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so\nit does not appear as a separate frame.\n\nWhen decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress\ninterface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing\nthis in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and\nEnd.DT46\u0027s IPv4 arm.\n\nUse IP6CB(skb)-\u003eiif rather than skb-\u003eskb_iif. These actions run after\nl3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master;\nIP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.",
  "id": "GHSA-56f8-x2fw-63m3",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80840"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e3f01fe2e704e76af4385b8a1742641885a191c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10fd1a8f58ac619a9e251f2858e2e2c8fd6cd667"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e4476e58343fb8f2fffced9e22d935376b17aaf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44930446dde45a7a90fe1446fa38eb0e2c561646"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9039e4f3e1c0ffe2b575b655b3f58fdd10f7e40c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf1c1151560d11036a144d917fa4c131831342d7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb0f422487228e140f3d609b032ac61aedcab8fa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4be3b391265e24c7720fc867c50062b436acf33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f52f1e75716d2ee49e013edf204ac92337c72fd8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…