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GHSA-4RJ2-GPMH-QQ5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:36 – Updated: 2026-03-10 22:21
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)
Details

Summary

An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.

Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.1
  • Fixed in: >= 2026.2.2

Details

In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.

This allowed two bypasses:

  1. Missing/empty from values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.
  2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.

Proof Of Concept

  1. Configure the voice-call extension with inboundPolicy: allowlist and allowFrom: ["+15550001234"].
  2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
  3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with 15550001234 (for example +99915550001234). The call is accepted.

Impact

Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.

Fix

The fix hardens inbound policy handling:

  • Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
  • Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
  • Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.

Fix commit(s):

  • f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Severity
9.4 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
9.2 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28446"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:36:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:16Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.\n\nDeployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed in: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Details\n\nIn affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.\n\nThis allowed two bypasses:\n\n1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.\n2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [\"+15550001234\"]`.\n2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.\n3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix hardens inbound policy handling:\n\n- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.\n- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).\n- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- `f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb`\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T22:21:59Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:36:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-inbound-allowlist-policy-bypass-in-voice-call-extension-via-empty-caller-id"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)"
}



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