GHSA-4595-RVPX-4Q34
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 20:47 – Updated: 2026-09-15 20:47Summary
The http_poll C2 transport accepts attacker-controlled HTTP polling sessions before CBOR MsgAuth authentication is completed. A remote unauthenticated attacker can create arbitrary polling sessions and send request bodies that are forwarded into the C2 dispatch path. This can consume server resources and trigger pre-auth C2 processing.
Details
The plain HTTP C2 server starts the HTTP polling listener and forwards requests into HandleHTTPServerSession:
// core/internal/cc/server/c2_http_server.go
mux.HandleFunc(c2Path, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
stream, err := transport.HandleHTTPServerSession(w, req, &live.RuntimeConfig.MalleableC2)
...
if stream != nil {
go cborStreamAccept(transport.NewStreamTransport(stream, req.RemoteAddr))
}
})
The HTTP polling handler accepts an attacker-supplied sessionID and init=1 cookie, then creates and stores a server-side stream before authentication:
// core/internal/transport/c2channel_http.go
if isInit {
stream = newHTTPServerStream(sessionID)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return stream, nil
}
POST bodies for that unauthenticated session are read and queued before CBOR authentication rejects them:
// core/internal/transport/c2channel_http.go
case http.MethodPost:
data, err := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
if err == nil && len(data) > 0 {
select {
case stream.readCh <- data:
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
...
}
}
Authentication only happens later in the C2 dispatch layer:
// core/internal/cc/server/dispatcher.go
secureConn := transport.NewSecureConn(t)
...
n, err := secureConn.Read(authFrame)
PoC
- Start the C2 server in a lab environment with the HTTP polling transport exposed, for example with
--http-port 12345. - Send an unauthenticated HTTP POST to the default polling path
/api/v1/telemetrywith a randomsessionIDcookie and theinit=1cookie value. - Send a second unauthenticated HTTP POST to
/api/v1/telemetryusing the samesessionID, with a request body containing repeatedAbytes. - Observe that both unauthenticated requests return HTTP
200. - Observe the C2 server log showing attacker-controlled bytes reaching the encrypted C2 frame parser, for example:
read: invalid encrypted chunk length: 1094795585. 1094795585is0x41414141, which corresponds toAAAA, confirming unauthenticated request body data reachedcborProtocolDispatchbefore CBORMsgAuthauthentication.- Repeat the request sequence concurrently to increase server resource usage and log volume.
Impact
- Remote unauthenticated attackers can create arbitrary HTTP polling sessions.
- Attacker-controlled request bodies reach pre-auth C2 dispatch handling.
- Repeated requests can consume server memory, goroutines, request handling capacity, and log volume.
- C2 service availability and operator reliability may be degraded under sustained traffic.
Remediation
- Require authentication before creating long-lived HTTP polling sessions.
- Do not forward request bodies into the C2 stream before validation.
- Add strict request body limits.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260531142011-aed3d81641ab"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61554"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-15T20:47:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `http_poll` C2 transport accepts attacker-controlled HTTP polling sessions before CBOR `MsgAuth` authentication is completed. A remote unauthenticated attacker can create arbitrary polling sessions and send request bodies that are forwarded into the C2 dispatch path. This can consume server resources and trigger pre-auth C2 processing.\n\n### Details\nThe plain HTTP C2 server starts the HTTP polling listener and forwards requests into `HandleHTTPServerSession`:\n```go\n// core/internal/cc/server/c2_http_server.go\nmux.HandleFunc(c2Path, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n stream, err := transport.HandleHTTPServerSession(w, req, \u0026live.RuntimeConfig.MalleableC2)\n ...\n if stream != nil {\n go cborStreamAccept(transport.NewStreamTransport(stream, req.RemoteAddr))\n }\n})\n```\nThe HTTP polling handler accepts an attacker-supplied `sessionID` and `init=1` cookie, then creates and stores a server-side stream before authentication:\n\n```go\n// core/internal/transport/c2channel_http.go\nif isInit {\n stream = newHTTPServerStream(sessionID)\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n return stream, nil\n}\n```\nPOST bodies for that unauthenticated session are read and queued before CBOR authentication rejects them:\n```go\n// core/internal/transport/c2channel_http.go\ncase http.MethodPost:\n data, err := io.ReadAll(req.Body)\n if err == nil \u0026\u0026 len(data) \u003e 0 {\n select {\n case stream.readCh \u003c- data:\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n ...\n }\n }\n```\nAuthentication only happens later in the C2 dispatch layer:\n```go\n// core/internal/cc/server/dispatcher.go\nsecureConn := transport.NewSecureConn(t)\n...\nn, err := secureConn.Read(authFrame)\n```\n\n### PoC\n1. Start the C2 server in a lab environment with the HTTP polling transport exposed, for example with `--http-port 12345`.\n2. Send an unauthenticated HTTP POST to the default polling path `/api/v1/telemetry` with a random `sessionID` cookie and the `init=1` cookie value.\n3. Send a second unauthenticated HTTP POST to `/api/v1/telemetry` using the same `sessionID`, with a request body containing repeated `A` bytes.\n4. Observe that both unauthenticated requests return HTTP `200`.\n5. Observe the C2 server log showing attacker-controlled bytes reaching the encrypted C2 frame parser, for example: `read: invalid encrypted chunk length: 1094795585`.\n6. `1094795585` is `0x41414141`, which corresponds to `AAAA`, confirming unauthenticated request body data reached `cborProtocolDispatch` before CBOR `MsgAuth` authentication.\n7. Repeat the request sequence concurrently to increase server resource usage and log volume.\n\n### Impact\n- Remote unauthenticated attackers can create arbitrary HTTP polling sessions.\n- Attacker-controlled request bodies reach pre-auth C2 dispatch handling.\n- Repeated requests can consume server memory, goroutines, request handling capacity, and log volume.\n- C2 service availability and operator reliability may be degraded under sustained traffic.\n\n### Remediation\n- Require authentication before creating long-lived HTTP polling sessions.\n- Do not forward request bodies into the C2 stream before validation.\n- Add strict request body limits.",
"id": "GHSA-4595-rvpx-4q34",
"modified": "2026-09-15T20:47:17Z",
"published": "2026-09-15T20:47:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/security/advisories/GHSA-4595-rvpx-4q34"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/releases/tag/v4.2.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "emp3r0r has an unauthenticated HTTP Polling DoS"
}
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