GHSA-3FQC-MC38-J2CM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-08 03:31BubbleChatActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported="true" with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with mimeType text/plain. The activity reads a conversation_id from Intent extras and, on onDestroy, calls BubbleChatNotification.dismiss whenever no active in-process session matches the caller-supplied conversation_id. BubbleChatNotification.dismiss unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 — the hard-coded Bits AI chat notification — using NotificationManager.cancel, with no validation of the caller's identity or ownership of the supplied conversation_id. A zero-permission co-installed application can therefore launch BubbleChatActivity with any random conversation_id; when the activity is finished, the Bits AI chat notification is cancelled on the victim device. No data exposure: chat content is server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller. Shortcut removal is scoped to the attacker-supplied conversation ID, which is a random string and is not reachable without prior knowledge. Impact is confined to denial of the Bits AI chat notification (a nuisance and a potential aid to phishing of in-app workflows).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47361"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-926"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-07T18:17:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "BubbleChatActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported=\"true\" with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with mimeType text/plain. The activity reads a conversation_id from Intent extras and, on onDestroy, calls BubbleChatNotification.dismiss whenever no active in-process session matches the caller-supplied conversation_id.\nBubbleChatNotification.dismiss unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 \u2014 the hard-coded Bits AI chat notification \u2014 using NotificationManager.cancel, with no validation of the caller\u0027s identity or ownership of the supplied conversation_id. A zero-permission co-installed application can therefore launch BubbleChatActivity with any random conversation_id; when the activity is finished, the Bits AI chat notification is cancelled on the victim device.\nNo data exposure: chat content is server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller. Shortcut removal is scoped to the attacker-supplied conversation ID, which is a random string and is not reachable without prior knowledge. Impact is confined to denial of the Bits AI chat notification (a nuisance and a potential aid to phishing of in-app workflows).",
"id": "GHSA-3fqc-mc38-j2cm",
"modified": "2026-08-08T03:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T18:31:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47361"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/926.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://trust.datadoghq.com/?tcuUid=2e8b8fa5-39ca-43f4-9f6a-aeafafb440ef"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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