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GHSA-3CW6-2J68-868P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:16 – Updated: 2026-03-11 20:42
VLAI
Summary
Envoy vulnerable to crash for scoped ip address during DNS
Details

Summary

Calling Utility::getAddressWithPort with a scoped IPv6 addresses causes a crash. This utility is called in the data plane from the original_src filter and the dns filter.

Details

The crashing function is Utility::getAddressWithPort. The crash occurs if a string containing a scoped IPv6 address is passed to this function.

This vulnerability affects:

  1. The original src filter: If the filter is configured and the original source is a scoped IPv6 address, it will cause a crash.
  2. DNS response address resolution: If a DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address, this will also trigger the crash.

PoC

To reproduce the vulnerability:

  1. Method A (Original Src Filter): Configure the original src filter in Envoy and provide a scoped IPv6 address as the original source.
  2. Method B (DNS Resolution): Trigger a DNS resolution process within Envoy where the DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address.

Impact

This is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. It impacts users who have the original src filter configured or whose Envoy instances resolve addresses from DNS responses that may contain scoped IPv6 addresses.

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.37.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.36.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.36.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.35.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.35.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.34.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26310"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:16:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T20:16:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nCalling `Utility::getAddressWithPort` with a scoped IPv6 addresses causes a crash. This utility is called in the data plane from the original_src filter and the dns filter.\n\n### Details\n\nThe crashing function is `Utility::getAddressWithPort`. The crash occurs if a string containing a scoped IPv6 address is passed to this function.\n\nThis vulnerability affects:\n\n1. The **original src filter**: If the filter is configured and the original source is a scoped IPv6 address, it will cause a crash.\n2. **DNS response address resolution**: If a DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address, this will also trigger the crash.\n\n### PoC\n\nTo reproduce the vulnerability:\n\n1. **Method A (Original Src Filter):** Configure the `original src` filter in Envoy and provide a scoped IPv6 address as the original source.\n2. **Method B (DNS Resolution):** Trigger a DNS resolution process within Envoy where the DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. It impacts users who have the `original src` filter configured or whose Envoy instances resolve addresses from DNS responses that may contain scoped IPv6 addresses.",
  "id": "GHSA-3cw6-2j68-868p",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T20:42:23Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:16:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-3cw6-2j68-868p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26310"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Envoy vulnerable to crash for scoped ip address during DNS"
}



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