ghsa-378x-6p4f-8jgm
Vulnerability from github
Summary
The Card
class of skops
, used for model documentation and sharing, allows arbitrary code execution. When a file other than .zip
is provided to the Card
class during instantiation, the internally invoked Card.get_model
method silently falls back to joblib
without warning. Unlike the .skops
zip-based format, joblib
permits unrestricted code execution, hence bypassing the security measures of skops
and enabling the execution of malicious code.
Details
The Card
class supports loading the model linked to the card using the get_model
method. When a .skops
model is provided, it uses the load
function from skops
, which includes security mechanisms. The Card
class also supports consistent management of the trusted
list, which can be passed during instance creation. As expected, if a .skops
model is provided without a trusted
list and an untrusted type is encountered during loading, an error is raised. This behavior is consistent with the security principles of skops
.
The problem arises when a file format other than .zip
is provided. As shown in the code snippet below, in this case, the joblib
library is used to load the model. This happens silently, without any warning or indication that joblib
is being used. This is a significant security risk because joblib
does not enforce the same security measures as skops
, allowing arbitrary code execution.
```python
from card/_model_card.py:354-358
try: if zipfile.is_zipfile(model_path): model = load(model_path, trusted=trusted) else: model = joblib.load(model_path) ```
To increase the concern, get_model
is actually called internally by skops
during card creation, so the user does not need to call it explicitly—only to create the Card
object passing a joblib
file.
PoC
Consider the following example:
```python from skops.card import Card
card = Card("model.skops") ```
An attacker could share a model.skops
file that, despite its name, is not a .zip
file. In this case, the joblib.load
function is called, allowing arbitrary code execution if the file is actually a pickle-like object. This is difficult for the user to detect, as the check is based on the file’s format, not its extension or name.
This vulnerability exists regardless of the trusted
list provided (or omitted) during Card
instance creation, and is unaffected by any other parameters. Moreover, it occurs at the time of Card
instantiation.
Attack Scenario
An attacker can craft a malicious model file that, when used to instantiate a Card
object, enables arbitrary code on the victim’s machine. This requires no user interaction beyond instantiating the Card
object (not even explicit loading). Given that skops
is often used in collaborative environments and is designed with security in mind, this vulnerability poses a significant threat.
Attachments
The complete PoC is available on GitHub at io-no/CVE-2025-54886.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "PyPI", "name": "skops" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "0.13.0" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2025-54886" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-502" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-07T16:42:54Z", "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-08T01:15:25Z", "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `Card` class of `skops`, used for model documentation and sharing, allows arbitrary code execution. When a file other than `.zip` is provided to the `Card` class during instantiation, the internally invoked `Card.get_model` method silently falls back to `joblib` without warning. Unlike the `.skops` zip-based format, `joblib` permits unrestricted code execution, hence bypassing the security measures of `skops` and enabling the execution of malicious code.\n\n\n## Details\n\nThe `Card` class supports loading the model linked to the card using the `get_model` method. When a `.skops` model is provided, it uses the `load` function from `skops`, which includes security mechanisms. The `Card` class also supports consistent management of the `trusted` list, which can be passed during instance creation. As expected, if a `.skops` model is provided without a `trusted` list and an untrusted type is encountered during loading, an error is raised. This behavior is consistent with the security principles of `skops`.\n\nThe problem arises when a file format other than `.zip` is provided. As shown in the code snippet below, in this case, the `joblib` library is used to load the model. This happens **silently**, without any warning or indication that `joblib` is being used. This is a significant security risk because `joblib` does not enforce the same security measures as `skops`, allowing arbitrary code execution.\n\n```python\n# from `card/_model_card.py:354-358`\ntry:\n if zipfile.is_zipfile(model_path):\n model = load(model_path, trusted=trusted)\n else:\n model = joblib.load(model_path)\n```\n\nTo increase the concern, `get_model` is actually called internally by `skops` during card creation, so the user does not need to call it explicitly\u2014only to create the `Card` object passing a `joblib` file.\n\n## PoC\n\nConsider the following example:\n\n```python\nfrom skops.card import Card\n\ncard = Card(\"model.skops\")\n```\n\nAn attacker could share a `model.skops` file that, despite its name, is **not** a `.zip` file. In this case, the `joblib.load` function is called, allowing arbitrary code execution if the file is actually a pickle-like object. This is difficult for the user to detect, as the check is based on the file\u2019s format, not its extension or name.\n\nThis vulnerability exists regardless of the `trusted` list provided (or omitted) during `Card` instance creation, and is unaffected by any other parameters. Moreover, it occurs at the time of `Card` instantiation.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nAn attacker can craft a malicious model file that, when used to instantiate a `Card` object, enables **arbitrary code** on the victim\u2019s machine. This requires no user interaction beyond instantiating the `Card` object (not even explicit loading). Given that `skops` is often used in collaborative environments and is designed with security in mind, this vulnerability poses a significant threat.\n\n## Attachments\nThe complete PoC is available on GitHub at [io-no/CVE-2025-54886](https://github.com/io-no/CVE-Reports/tree/main/CVE-2025-54886).", "id": "GHSA-378x-6p4f-8jgm", "modified": "2025-09-10T20:52:05Z", "published": "2025-08-07T16:42:54Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-378x-6p4f-8jgm" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54886" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/commit/29d61ea8a92f2bde6830e8f32cc72a1a87211cda" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/io-no/CVE-Reports/tree/main/CVE-2025-54886" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "SKOPS Card.get_model happily allows arbitrary code execution" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.