GHSA-365G-VJW2-GRX8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-09 15:26 – Updated: 2025-10-09 15:27
VLAI
Summary
n8n: Execute Command Node Allows Authenticated Users to Run Arbitrary Commands on Host
Details

Impact

The Execute Command node in n8n allows execution of arbitrary commands on the host system where n8n runs. While this functionality is intended for advanced automation and can be useful in certain workflows, it poses a security risk if all users with access to the n8n instance are not fully trusted.

An attacker—either a malicious user or someone who has compromised a legitimate user account—could exploit this node to run arbitrary commands on the host machine, potentially leading to data exfiltration, service disruption, or full system compromise.

This vulnerability affects all n8n deployments where:

  • The Execute Command node is enabled, and
  • Not all user accounts are strictly controlled and trusted.

n8n.cloud is not impacted.

Patches

No code changes have been made to alter the behavior of the Execute Command node. The recommended mitigation is to disable the node by default in environments where it is not explicitly required.

Future n8n versions may change the default availability of this node.

Workarounds

Administrators can disable the Execute Command node by setting the following environment variable before starting n8n:

export NODES_EXCLUDE: "[\"n8n-nodes-base.executeCommand\"]"

References

n8n docs: Execute Command n8n docs: Blocking nodes

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n-nodes-base"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.113.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.114.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-09T15:26:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe `Execute Command` node in n8n allows execution of arbitrary commands on the host system where n8n runs. While this functionality is intended for advanced automation and can be useful in certain workflows, it poses a security risk if all users with access to the n8n instance are not fully trusted.\n\nAn attacker\u2014either a malicious user or someone who has compromised a legitimate user account\u2014could exploit this node to run arbitrary commands on the host machine, potentially leading to data exfiltration, service disruption, or full system compromise.\n\nThis vulnerability affects all n8n deployments where:\n\n- The `Execute Command` node is enabled, and\n- Not all user accounts are strictly controlled and trusted.\n\nn8n.cloud is **not** impacted.\n\n\n### Patches\nNo code changes have been made to alter the behavior of the `Execute Command` node. The recommended mitigation is to disable the node by default in environments where it is not explicitly required.\n\nFuture n8n versions may change the default availability of this node.\n\n### Workarounds\nAdministrators can disable the `Execute Command` node by setting the following environment variable before starting n8n:\n\n```bash\nexport NODES_EXCLUDE: \"[\\\"n8n-nodes-base.executeCommand\\\"]\"\n```\n\n### References\nn8n docs: [Execute Command](https://docs.n8n.io/integrations/builtin/core-nodes/n8n-nodes-base.executecommand/)\nn8n docs: [Blocking nodes](https://docs.n8n.io/hosting/securing/blocking-nodes/)",
  "id": "GHSA-365g-vjw2-grx8",
  "modified": "2025-10-09T15:27:00Z",
  "published": "2025-10-09T15:26:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-365g-vjw2-grx8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "n8n: Execute Command Node Allows Authenticated Users to Run Arbitrary Commands on Host"
}



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Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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