ghsa-32x8-xhwp-vhg9
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-12-27 15:31
Modified
2025-01-06 18:31
Severity ?
5.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: u_serial: Fix the issue that gs_start_io crashed due to accessing null pointer

Considering that in some extreme cases, when u_serial driver is accessed by multiple threads, Thread A is executing the open operation and calling the gs_open, Thread B is executing the disconnect operation and calling the gserial_disconnect function,The port->port_usb pointer will be set to NULL.

E.g. Thread A Thread B gs_open() gadget_unbind_driver() gs_start_io() composite_disconnect() gs_start_rx() gserial_disconnect() ... ... spin_unlock(&port->port_lock) status = usb_ep_queue() spin_lock(&port->port_lock) spin_lock(&port->port_lock) port->port_usb = NULL gs_free_requests(port->port_usb->in) spin_unlock(&port->port_lock) Crash

This causes thread A to access a null pointer (port->port_usb is null) when calling the gs_free_requests function, causing a crash.

If port_usb is NULL, the release request will be skipped as it will be done by gserial_disconnect.

So add a null pointer check to gs_start_io before attempting to access the value of the pointer port->port_usb.

Call trace: gs_start_io+0x164/0x25c gs_open+0x108/0x13c tty_open+0x314/0x638 chrdev_open+0x1b8/0x258 do_dentry_open+0x2c4/0x700 vfs_open+0x2c/0x3c path_openat+0xa64/0xc60 do_filp_open+0xb8/0x164 do_sys_openat2+0x84/0xf0 __arm64_sys_openat+0x70/0x9c invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114 el0_svc_common+0x80/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x38/0x68

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-56670"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T15:15:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: u_serial: Fix the issue that gs_start_io crashed due to accessing null pointer\n\nConsidering that in some extreme cases,\nwhen u_serial driver is accessed by multiple threads,\nThread A is executing the open operation and calling the gs_open,\nThread B is executing the disconnect operation and calling the\ngserial_disconnect function,The port-\u003eport_usb pointer will be set to NULL.\n\nE.g.\n    Thread A                                 Thread B\n    gs_open()                                gadget_unbind_driver()\n    gs_start_io()                            composite_disconnect()\n    gs_start_rx()                            gserial_disconnect()\n    ...                                      ...\n    spin_unlock(\u0026port-\u003eport_lock)\n    status = usb_ep_queue()                  spin_lock(\u0026port-\u003eport_lock)\n    spin_lock(\u0026port-\u003eport_lock)              port-\u003eport_usb = NULL\n    gs_free_requests(port-\u003eport_usb-\u003ein)     spin_unlock(\u0026port-\u003eport_lock)\n    Crash\n\nThis causes thread A to access a null pointer (port-\u003eport_usb is null)\nwhen calling the gs_free_requests function, causing a crash.\n\nIf port_usb is NULL, the release request will be skipped as it\nwill be done by gserial_disconnect.\n\nSo add a null pointer check to gs_start_io before attempting\nto access the value of the pointer port-\u003eport_usb.\n\nCall trace:\n gs_start_io+0x164/0x25c\n gs_open+0x108/0x13c\n tty_open+0x314/0x638\n chrdev_open+0x1b8/0x258\n do_dentry_open+0x2c4/0x700\n vfs_open+0x2c/0x3c\n path_openat+0xa64/0xc60\n do_filp_open+0xb8/0x164\n do_sys_openat2+0x84/0xf0\n __arm64_sys_openat+0x70/0x9c\n invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114\n el0_svc_common+0x80/0xe0\n do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28\n el0_svc+0x38/0x68",
  "id": "GHSA-32x8-xhwp-vhg9",
  "modified": "2025-01-06T18:31:00Z",
  "published": "2024-12-27T15:31:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56670"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1247e1df086aa6c17ab53cd1bedce70dd7132765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28b3c03a6790de1f6f2683919ad657840f0f0f58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cfbca86f6a8b801f3254e0e3c8f2b1d2d64be2b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4efdfdc32d8d6307f968cd99f1db64468471bab1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ca07a3d18f39b1669927ef536e485787e856df6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c83213b6649d22656b3a4e92544ceeea8a2c6c07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd6b0ca6025f64ccb465a6a3460c5b0307ed9c44"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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