GHSA-2MXR-P26X-MJ73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 13:38 – Updated: 2026-06-10 13:38Affected: @hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: High — CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)
Summary
The S3 bucket that AccountFoundation creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:
- No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket. The startup-hardened tier hard-coded
objectLock: falseon the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.) forceDestroywas forwarded to the audit bucket. Nothing prevented a downstream stack from settinglogBucketForceDestroy: true, which madepulumi destroypurge every audit-log object on teardown.- Sandbox tier dropped everything. Sandbox-tier
AccountFoundationcreated its audit bucket withtier: "sandbox", which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-LakeEventDataStore(the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.
Impact
Consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).
Patches
Upgrade to @hulumi/baseline@1.4.0. A single invariant in SecureBucket now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true):
- refuses
forceDestroy: trueon the startup-hardened tier; - emits the CloudTrail-Lake
EventDataStoreregardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture); - adds a deny-
s3:DeleteObject*bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS ConfigConfigWritabilityCheckFileprobe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.
Workarounds
Replicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.
Resources
- PR #178 (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG
### Migrationfor theforceDestroybehaviour change.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@hulumi/baseline"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48035"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1059"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-10T13:38:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `\u003c 1.4.0` \u2014 **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` \u2014 **Severity:** High \u2014 **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)**\n\n#### Summary\n\nThe S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant \u2014 if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:\n\n1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the audit bucket. (The reason was real \u2014 bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe \u2014 but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)\n2. **`forceDestroy` was forwarded to the audit bucket.** Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting `logBucketForceDestroy: true`, which made `pulumi destroy` purge every audit-log object on teardown.\n3. **Sandbox tier dropped everything.** Sandbox-tier `AccountFoundation` created its audit bucket with `tier: \"sandbox\"`, which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` (the independent immutable mirror) \u2014 leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.\n\n#### Impact\n\nConsumers using `AccountFoundation` could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal \u2014 while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).\n\n#### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@hulumi/baseline@1.4.0`. A single invariant in `SecureBucket` now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. `awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true`):\n\n- refuses `forceDestroy: true` on the startup-hardened tier;\n- emits the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture);\n- adds a deny-`s3:DeleteObject*` bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config `ConfigWritabilityCheckFile` probe key so Config\u0027s write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.\n\n#### Workarounds\n\nReplicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.\n\n#### Resources\n\n- [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG `### Migration` for the `forceDestroy` behaviour change.",
"id": "GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73",
"modified": "2026-06-10T13:38:37Z",
"published": "2026-06-10T13:38:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/security/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.