GHSA-2M3X-37GX-2CHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer
iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP, REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer.
The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the initiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer.
Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74556"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T13:18:01Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer\n\niscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types\ninto the fixed-size conn-\u003edata buffer, which is allocated for\nISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP,\nREJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU\nwhose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer.\n\nThe SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its\ndata segment (sense/response data) into conn-\u003edata via\niscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The\nonly upstream bound on in.datalen is conn-\u003emax_recv_dlength, the\ninitiator\u0027s advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly\nnegotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target\nthat returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and\nmax_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn-\u003edata buffer.\n\nOnce the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly\nlike those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn-\u003edata\nwhen present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the\nopcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.",
"id": "GHSA-2m3x-37gx-2chv",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:53Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T15:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/084af0253673425ce2ae62e3c7f74f0dd023711b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72815741715bd41556dac5eeb068bf0f8af06ee7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0aa3e8e2ab4ca92adb28a3ef41873b3363b8676"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1dea15f819cded9b3faf58f8bec72323568b6e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c97b5265cc47775f77fd2a23d6bde0426997b233"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.