GHSA-2FQJ-W26W-HJ6R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-05 09:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()

p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds that many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 ("wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()") closed the destination overflow by copying a fixed priv->eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len), but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long enough to supply that many bytes.

A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches priv->eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0 Call Trace: ... __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005) ...

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff88800f0770c0, ffff88800f077380)

Check that the slice fits in the skb before copying.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64571"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T08:16:36Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()\n\np54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a\ndevice-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds\nthat many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 (\"wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in\np54_rx_eeprom_readback()\") closed the destination overflow by copying a\nfixed priv-\u003eeeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len),\nbut the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long\nenough to supply that many bytes.\n\nA malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches\npriv-\u003eeeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check\npasses and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)\n  Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cIRQ\u003e\n   ...\n   __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)\n   p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)\n   p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163)\n   __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)\n   dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005)\n   ...\n   \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n\n  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0\n   which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704\n  The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of\n   allocated 704-byte region [ffff88800f0770c0, ffff88800f077380)\n\nCheck that the slice fits in the skb before copying.",
  "id": "GHSA-2fqj-w26w-hj6r",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T09:31:17Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T09:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64571"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25c3b85af3fc4f8043159b14e65790fc3bbdaf48"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9096e1f7014174067239a63df18ae5f28301990d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d38f5d868a0a4770e3bcd0925e16c46acdbc9509"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebd6d37fa94bee929e0b4c9ca19fdf9b1dcf6cea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f46f8f9c43fd02f4dd5f716d4bda296a523c04f0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…