Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-268C-4CFR-FMCJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-03 15:32

Details

In Eclipse Arrowhead versions from 5.0.0 to 5.2.1 when the MQTT API is enabled with the certificate authentication policy, CertificateMqttFilter parses an X.509 certificate that the client sends inside the MQTT message payload (the authentication field of MqttRequestTemplate) and treats its Subject DN as the authenticated identity. The certificate is decoded with CertificateFactory.generateCertificate() but its signature is never verified and its issuer chain is never validated against any trust store. Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal "sy" or "op", and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server's. Both values are public (the cloud name is in the server's own TLS certificate). An attacker who can publish to the MQTT broker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate with CN=Sysop...arrowhead.eu, dnQualifier=op, send it as the authentication field, and be authenticated as the cloud's system operator with isSysOp == true. This passes the downstream ManagementServiceMqttFilter (request.isSysOp() → allowed) and gives full management access over MQTT. The HTTP CertificateFilter is not affected — it reads the certificate from jakarta.servlet.request.X509Certificate, which Tomcat populates only after a successful mTLS handshake against the configured trust store.

Severity

9.5 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82180"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T14:17:02Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In Eclipse Arrowhead versions from 5.0.0 to 5.2.1 when the MQTT API is enabled with the certificate authentication policy, CertificateMqttFilter parses an X.509 certificate that the client sends inside the MQTT message payload (the authentication field of MqttRequestTemplate) and treats its Subject DN as the authenticated identity. The certificate is decoded with CertificateFactory.generateCertificate() but its signature is never verified and its issuer chain is never validated against any trust store. Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal \"sy\" or \"op\", and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server\u0027s. Both values are public (the cloud name is in the server\u0027s own TLS certificate). An attacker who can publish to the MQTT broker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate with CN=Sysop.\u003ccloud\u003e.\u003corg\u003e.arrowhead.eu, dnQualifier=op, send it as the authentication field, and be authenticated as the cloud\u0027s system operator with isSysOp == true. This passes the downstream ManagementServiceMqttFilter (request.isSysOp() \u2192 allowed) and gives full management access over MQTT. The HTTP CertificateFilter is not affected \u2014 it reads the certificate from jakarta.servlet.request.X509Certificate, which Tomcat populates only after a successful mTLS handshake against the configured trust store.",
  "id": "GHSA-268c-4cfr-fmcj",
  "modified": "2026-09-03T15:32:22Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T15:32:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/work_items/812"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-82180 (GCVE-0-2026-82180)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-03 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-03 13:31

Summary

In Eclipse Arrowhead versions from 5.0.0 to 5.2.1 when the MQTT API is enabled with the certificate authentication policy, CertificateMqttFilter parses an X.509 certificate that the client sends inside the MQTT message payload (the authentication field of MqttRequestTemplate) and treats its Subject DN as the authenticated identity. The certificate is decoded with CertificateFactory.generateCertificate() but its signature is never verified and its issuer chain is never validated against any trust store. Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal "sy" or "op", and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server's. Both values are public (the cloud name is in the server's own TLS certificate). An attacker who can publish to the MQTT broker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate with CN=Sysop.<cloud>.<org>.arrowhead.eu, dnQualifier=op, send it as the authentication field, and be authenticated as the cloud's system operator with isSysOp == true. This passes the downstream ManagementServiceMqttFilter (request.isSysOp() → allowed) and gives full management access over MQTT. The HTTP CertificateFilter is not affected — it reads the certificate from jakarta.servlet.request.X509Certificate, which Tomcat populates only after a successful mTLS handshake against the configured trust store.

Severity

9.5 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-03 13:31 UTC

CWE

CWE-295 - Improper certificate validation
CWE-290 - Authentication bypass by spoofing

Assigner

eclipse mitre root

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Eclipse Foundation	Eclipse Arrowhead	Affected: 5.0.0 , ≤ 5.2.1 (semver)

Credits

Eclipse Foundation Security Team

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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                "timestamp": "2026-09-03T13:31:11.099809Z",
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              "value": "In Eclipse Arrowhead versions from 5.0.0 to 5.2.1 when the MQTT API is enabled with the \u003ccode\u003ecertificate\u003c/code\u003e authentication policy, \u003ccode\u003eCertificateMqttFilter\u003c/code\u003e parses an X.509 certificate that the client sends \u003cstrong\u003einside the MQTT message payload\u003c/strong\u003e (the \u003ccode\u003eauthentication\u003c/code\u003e field of \u003ccode\u003eMqttRequestTemplate\u003c/code\u003e) and treats its Subject DN as the authenticated identity. The certificate is decoded with \u003ccode\u003eCertificateFactory.generateCertificate()\u003c/code\u003e but \u003cstrong\u003eits signature is never verified and its issuer chain is never validated against any trust store\u003c/strong\u003e. Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal \u003ccode\u003e\"sy\"\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003e\"op\"\u003c/code\u003e, and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server\u0027s. Both values are public (the cloud name is in the server\u0027s own TLS certificate). An attacker who can publish to the MQTT broker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate with \u003ccode\u003eCN=Sysop.\u0026lt;cloud\u0026gt;.\u0026lt;org\u0026gt;.arrowhead.eu, dnQualifier=op\u003c/code\u003e, send it as the \u003ccode\u003eauthentication\u003c/code\u003e field, and be authenticated as the cloud\u0027s system operator with \u003ccode\u003eisSysOp == true\u003c/code\u003e. This passes the downstream \u003ccode\u003eManagementServiceMqttFilter\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003erequest.isSysOp()\u003c/code\u003e \u2192 allowed) and gives full management access over MQTT. The HTTP \u003ccode\u003eCertificateFilter\u003c/code\u003e is \u003cstrong\u003enot\u003c/strong\u003e affected \u2014 it reads the certificate from \u003ccode\u003ejakarta.servlet.request.X509Certificate\u003c/code\u003e, which Tomcat populates only after a successful mTLS handshake against the configured trust store."
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-268C-4CFR-FMCJ

CVE-2026-82180 (GCVE-0-2026-82180)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature