FKIE_CVE-2026-98265
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-06 09:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Clamp implicit feedback packet count to URB capacity
data_ep_set_params() allocates each data URB for exactly u->packets
isochronous frames, so urb->iso_frame_desc[] has u->packets slots and
ctx->packets is the driver's only record of that limit. For an implicit
feedback sink, snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs() overwrites it with the
sync source's packet count, which is calculated independently from the
capture endpoint's parameters. When that count is larger,
prepare_playback_urb() and prepare_silent_urb() can write
iso_frame_desc[] past the allocation; their existing bounds limit payload
bytes, not the descriptor index.
The reproducer uses a high-speed UAC2 device declaring bInterval 1 for
implicit feedback capture (8 packets) and bInterval 4 for playback
(1 packet). On the first capture completion after the stream starts, it
accesses seven descriptors spanning 112 bytes beyond the one-packet URB:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801e696ad0 by task vhci_rx/178
prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)
prepare_outbound_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:340)
snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs (sound/usb/endpoint.c:501)
snd_complete_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:1834)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741)
vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e696a00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 208-byte region [ffff88801e696a00, ffff88801e696ad0)
Record the allocated packet count per endpoint and clamp both the adopted
count and the packet-size copy to it. Fold the Format Type II delimiter
into urb_packs before the allocation loop so the recorded limit matches
every URB.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/card.h",
"sound/usb/endpoint.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "ad279ba0dc1781229f5b52f58d38d56960400e06",
"status": "affected",
"version": "32a1f64f8ff6e2c5391f5964baec697bce25b83c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "79c55a7b5d71cf2a6bbd4bd7698e1b10b70f813a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e949fd266cfa1dcca7caa3faa698578c4ffd26d6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ab77e3f453c5f2499c08d6e8e218501d25bab39e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cf044e44190234a41a788de1cdbb6c21f4a52e1e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "76a986c980bb502c7688d605ac7a67fd257a9a1b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cf044e44190234a41a788de1cdbb6c21f4a52e1e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "df75696e70c88b22ed1d8c9d515993a858c58fd0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3a74f6b46c01d9a816378cd83c327a59f61475ec",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "c26bde6301f20d9aafbfb7c2459a88c6a6ec178f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fbdf797e016fbf968dd54301026b182175985a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12.112",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.75",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.54",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.16",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15.202",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.165",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.128",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.20",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19.6",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/card.h",
"sound/usb/endpoint.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usb-audio: Clamp implicit feedback packet count to URB capacity\n\ndata_ep_set_params() allocates each data URB for exactly u-\u003epackets\nisochronous frames, so urb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[] has u-\u003epackets slots and\nctx-\u003epackets is the driver\u0027s only record of that limit. For an implicit\nfeedback sink, snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs() overwrites it with the\nsync source\u0027s packet count, which is calculated independently from the\ncapture endpoint\u0027s parameters. When that count is larger,\nprepare_playback_urb() and prepare_silent_urb() can write\niso_frame_desc[] past the allocation; their existing bounds limit payload\nbytes, not the descriptor index.\n\nThe reproducer uses a high-speed UAC2 device declaring bInterval 1 for\nimplicit feedback capture (8 packets) and bInterval 4 for playback\n(1 packet). On the first capture completion after the stream starts, it\naccesses seven descriptors spanning 112 bytes beyond the one-packet URB:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801e696ad0 by task vhci_rx/178\n prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)\n prepare_outbound_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:340)\n snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs (sound/usb/endpoint.c:501)\n snd_complete_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:1834)\n __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)\n usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741)\n vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e696a00\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n allocated 208-byte region [ffff88801e696a00, ffff88801e696ad0)\n\nRecord the allocated packet count per endpoint and clamp both the adopted\ncount and the packet-size copy to it. Fold the Format Type II delimiter\ninto urb_packs before the allocation loop so the recorded limit matches\nevery URB."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98265",
"lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:15.797",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:15.797",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76a986c980bb502c7688d605ac7a67fd257a9a1b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79c55a7b5d71cf2a6bbd4bd7698e1b10b70f813a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab77e3f453c5f2499c08d6e8e218501d25bab39e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad279ba0dc1781229f5b52f58d38d56960400e06"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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