FKIE_CVE-2026-98216
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-07 07:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix the PIO_CRED credit-return mmap
hfi1_file_mmap()'s PIO_CRED case must hand user space the single
credit-return page that holds this context's entry. That page is the
second or third page of the per-node credit-return allocation once the
hardware send context index reaches 64 or 128, so the failure below is
intermittent: when the entry lands on the first page the offset is zero
and everything works.
Two things are wrong.
First, cr_page_offset is a byte offset but .va is a struct
credit_return *, so adding it is pointer arithmetic and scales the offset
by sizeof(struct credit_return) == 64. memvirt then lands 256 KiB or
512 KiB past a 10240-byte allocation. With an IOMMU translating, that
address is inside the vmalloc range but in no vm_area, so
dma_mmap_coherent() -> iommu_dma_mmap() finds no pages, vmalloc_to_pfn()
returns page_to_pfn(NULL), and remap_pfn_range() installs a frame above
MAXPHYADDR. The first user read then takes:
psm2_ep_open_pr: Corrupted page table at address 7a14d007e000
PGD 800000013886a067 P4D 800000013886a067 PUD 13886b067 PMD 13886c067
PTE 800049168e911235
Oops: Bad pagetable: 000d [#1] SMP PTI
Second, and still wrong once the arithmetic is corrected,
dma_mmap_coherent() describes a whole coherent buffer and selects the
page within it with vma->vm_pgoff. Offsetting cpu_addr has no effect:
for a vmap'd allocation iommu_dma_mmap() uses cpu_addr only to locate the
vm_area and then maps pages[vm_pgoff], which hfi1_file_mmap() has just
set to 0. User space therefore always receives the first credit-return
page, every credit read is for the wrong context, and send PIO stalls
forever.
Use the DMA API as intended: pass the base of the allocation with its
full length and select the page with vm_pgoff. A separate length is
needed because memlen must keep describing the VMA for the existing size
check. The dma-direct path stays correct as well, since dma_direct_mmap()
adds the same vm_pgoff to the base pfn.
Tested on a Dell T7610 (Xeon E5-2650 v2, Intel IOMMU in DMA-FQ mode)
against a Threadripper PRO 3995WX peer, both Omni-Path 100. Before this
change psm2_ep_open() Oopses the kernel; with only the arithmetic
corrected psm2_ep_open() succeeds but any transfer that uses send PIO
hangs, PSM2_SDMA=2 (send PIO disabled) completing normally while
PSM2_SDMA=0 (send PIO only) hangs every time. With this change send PIO,
send DMA and the default mixed mode all work.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/file_ops.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "535530bb2ea5254e1e9f55280143d262dd065204",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1ec82317a1daac78c04b0c15af89018ccf9fa2b7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dcebe0b0bb080a25fe08011fd6b6e741f7912f01",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1ec82317a1daac78c04b0c15af89018ccf9fa2b7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "180752deb7270ad37394ab6ef7cf4978fad040b3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1ec82317a1daac78c04b0c15af89018ccf9fa2b7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bafeac9ce5d1ce5256bcf7e5702e831e9aaf419b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1ec82317a1daac78c04b0c15af89018ccf9fa2b7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "62f0f34fbd2b2d5653d33d3b9d42fdcabb1c0101",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1ec82317a1daac78c04b0c15af89018ccf9fa2b7",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/file_ops.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.3"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.3",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nIB/hfi1: Fix the PIO_CRED credit-return mmap\n\nhfi1_file_mmap()\u0027s PIO_CRED case must hand user space the single\ncredit-return page that holds this context\u0027s entry. That page is the\nsecond or third page of the per-node credit-return allocation once the\nhardware send context index reaches 64 or 128, so the failure below is\nintermittent: when the entry lands on the first page the offset is zero\nand everything works.\n\nTwo things are wrong.\n\nFirst, cr_page_offset is a byte offset but .va is a struct\ncredit_return *, so adding it is pointer arithmetic and scales the offset\nby sizeof(struct credit_return) == 64. memvirt then lands 256 KiB or\n512 KiB past a 10240-byte allocation. With an IOMMU translating, that\naddress is inside the vmalloc range but in no vm_area, so\ndma_mmap_coherent() -\u003e iommu_dma_mmap() finds no pages, vmalloc_to_pfn()\nreturns page_to_pfn(NULL), and remap_pfn_range() installs a frame above\nMAXPHYADDR. The first user read then takes:\n\n psm2_ep_open_pr: Corrupted page table at address 7a14d007e000\n PGD 800000013886a067 P4D 800000013886a067 PUD 13886b067 PMD 13886c067\n PTE 800049168e911235\n Oops: Bad pagetable: 000d [#1] SMP PTI\n\nSecond, and still wrong once the arithmetic is corrected,\ndma_mmap_coherent() describes a whole coherent buffer and selects the\npage within it with vma-\u003evm_pgoff. Offsetting cpu_addr has no effect:\nfor a vmap\u0027d allocation iommu_dma_mmap() uses cpu_addr only to locate the\nvm_area and then maps pages[vm_pgoff], which hfi1_file_mmap() has just\nset to 0. User space therefore always receives the first credit-return\npage, every credit read is for the wrong context, and send PIO stalls\nforever.\n\nUse the DMA API as intended: pass the base of the allocation with its\nfull length and select the page with vm_pgoff. A separate length is\nneeded because memlen must keep describing the VMA for the existing size\ncheck. The dma-direct path stays correct as well, since dma_direct_mmap()\nadds the same vm_pgoff to the base pfn.\n\nTested on a Dell T7610 (Xeon E5-2650 v2, Intel IOMMU in DMA-FQ mode)\nagainst a Threadripper PRO 3995WX peer, both Omni-Path 100. Before this\nchange psm2_ep_open() Oopses the kernel; with only the arithmetic\ncorrected psm2_ep_open() succeeds but any transfer that uses send PIO\nhangs, PSM2_SDMA=2 (send PIO disabled) completing normally while\nPSM2_SDMA=0 (send PIO only) hangs every time. With this change send PIO,\nsend DMA and the default mixed mode all work."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98216",
"lastModified": "2026-10-07T07:17:04.653",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:08.260",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/180752deb7270ad37394ab6ef7cf4978fad040b3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/535530bb2ea5254e1e9f55280143d262dd065204"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62f0f34fbd2b2d5653d33d3b9d42fdcabb1c0101"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bafeac9ce5d1ce5256bcf7e5702e831e9aaf419b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcebe0b0bb080a25fe08011fd6b6e741f7912f01"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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