FKIE_CVE-2026-89767
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:20 - Updated: 2026-09-13 07:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: fix double end_creating() on the casefold-mismatch path
ovl_create_real() releases the new dentry twice when the casefold
consistency check fails. The S_IFDIR branch calls end_creating() and
sets err, then falls through to the common out: label which calls
end_creating() on the same dentry again:
case S_IFDIR:
newdentry = ovl_do_mkdir(ofs, dir, newdentry, attr->mode);
err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(newdentry);
if (!err && ofs->casefold != ovl_dentry_casefolded(newdentry)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited(...);
end_creating(newdentry); /* first */
err = -EINVAL;
}
break;
...
if (err)
goto out;
...
out:
if (err) {
end_creating(newdentry); /* second, same dentry */
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
end_creating() is end_dirop(), which does inode_unlock() on the parent
and dput() on the dentry, so the parent directory's i_rwsem is unlocked
twice and the dentry is put twice. The second unlock releases a lock
that is not held, which is what wedges every later creation under that
parent, and the second dput() drops a reference that was never taken.
The branch was added by commit dfc7da402ccc ("ovl: Check for casefold
consistency when creating new dentries") as a bare dput(), which already
released the reference twice; commit fe497f0759e0 ("VFS: change
vfs_mkdir() to unlock on failure.") converted both sites to
end_creating(), adding the double unlock.
This is reachable by an unprivileged user. The casefold consistency of
the layers is validated at mount time in ovl_parse_layer(), and again on
every lookup in ovl_lookup_single(), but ofs->workdir is the internal
"work" subdirectory created inside the user-supplied workdir, and that
subdirectory is not re-checked. Marking it casefolded after the mount
therefore makes every ovl_create_temp() inherit the wrong state - and
that path reaches ovl_create_real() through ovl_start_creating_temp(),
which uses start_creating() with a generated name and so never runs the
lookup-time check.
unshare -Urm
mount -t tmpfs -o casefold=utf8-12.1.0 tmpfs mnt
mkdir -p mnt/lower/d mnt/upper mnt/work mnt/merged
mount -t overlay ovl -o lowerdir=mnt/lower,\
upperdir=mnt/upper,workdir=mnt/work mnt/merged
chattr +F mnt/work/work
mkdir mnt/merged/d/sub # directory copy-up
overlayfs: wrong inherited casefold (work/#5)
and the next copy-up blocks forever on the parent's i_rwsem:
mkdir D start_creating+0x65/0xb0
ovl_start_creating_temp+0xb0/0xe0 [overlay]
ovl_create_temp+0xa3/0x1d0 [overlay]
ovl_copy_up_one+0x1f1c/0x21c0 [overlay]
ovl_copy_up_flags+0xf5/0x140 [overlay]
ovl_create_object+0xb7/0x220 [overlay]
ovl_mkdir+0x23/0x40 [overlay]
Drop the end_creating() from the branch and let out: own the cleanup,
which is what every other error path in this function already does.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/overlayfs/dir.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2fa220bc0f84597cb6de665e5b5021c5901ddf00",
"status": "affected",
"version": "dfc7da402ccc92d6e4b01a4778a3f15f2496b9af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b1aa8ab78a8e87aee9e306971465408e059f839a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "dfc7da402ccc92d6e4b01a4778a3f15f2496b9af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "077ab8985ee278c3d8618182d335b0f0cd919e16",
"status": "affected",
"version": "dfc7da402ccc92d6e4b01a4778a3f15f2496b9af",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/overlayfs/dir.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.51",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novl: fix double end_creating() on the casefold-mismatch path\n\novl_create_real() releases the new dentry twice when the casefold\nconsistency check fails. The S_IFDIR branch calls end_creating() and\nsets err, then falls through to the common out: label which calls\nend_creating() on the same dentry again:\n\n\tcase S_IFDIR:\n\t\tnewdentry = ovl_do_mkdir(ofs, dir, newdentry, attr-\u003emode);\n\t\terr = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(newdentry);\n\t\tif (!err \u0026\u0026 ofs-\u003ecasefold != ovl_dentry_casefolded(newdentry)) {\n\t\t\tpr_warn_ratelimited(...);\n\t\t\tend_creating(newdentry);\t/* first */\n\t\t\terr = -EINVAL;\n\t\t}\n\t\tbreak;\n\t...\n\tif (err)\n\t\tgoto out;\n\t...\n out:\n\tif (err) {\n\t\tend_creating(newdentry);\t/* second, same dentry */\n\t\treturn ERR_PTR(err);\n\t}\n\nend_creating() is end_dirop(), which does inode_unlock() on the parent\nand dput() on the dentry, so the parent directory\u0027s i_rwsem is unlocked\ntwice and the dentry is put twice. The second unlock releases a lock\nthat is not held, which is what wedges every later creation under that\nparent, and the second dput() drops a reference that was never taken.\n\nThe branch was added by commit dfc7da402ccc (\"ovl: Check for casefold\nconsistency when creating new dentries\") as a bare dput(), which already\nreleased the reference twice; commit fe497f0759e0 (\"VFS: change\nvfs_mkdir() to unlock on failure.\") converted both sites to\nend_creating(), adding the double unlock.\n\nThis is reachable by an unprivileged user. The casefold consistency of\nthe layers is validated at mount time in ovl_parse_layer(), and again on\nevery lookup in ovl_lookup_single(), but ofs-\u003eworkdir is the internal\n\"work\" subdirectory created inside the user-supplied workdir, and that\nsubdirectory is not re-checked. Marking it casefolded after the mount\ntherefore makes every ovl_create_temp() inherit the wrong state - and\nthat path reaches ovl_create_real() through ovl_start_creating_temp(),\nwhich uses start_creating() with a generated name and so never runs the\nlookup-time check.\n\n unshare -Urm\n mount -t tmpfs -o casefold=utf8-12.1.0 tmpfs mnt\n mkdir -p mnt/lower/d mnt/upper mnt/work mnt/merged\n mount -t overlay ovl -o lowerdir=mnt/lower,\\\n upperdir=mnt/upper,workdir=mnt/work mnt/merged\n chattr +F mnt/work/work\n mkdir mnt/merged/d/sub\t\t# directory copy-up\n\n overlayfs: wrong inherited casefold (work/#5)\n\nand the next copy-up blocks forever on the parent\u0027s i_rwsem:\n\n mkdir D start_creating+0x65/0xb0\n ovl_start_creating_temp+0xb0/0xe0 [overlay]\n ovl_create_temp+0xa3/0x1d0 [overlay]\n ovl_copy_up_one+0x1f1c/0x21c0 [overlay]\n ovl_copy_up_flags+0xf5/0x140 [overlay]\n ovl_create_object+0xb7/0x220 [overlay]\n ovl_mkdir+0x23/0x40 [overlay]\n\nDrop the end_creating() from the branch and let out: own the cleanup,\nwhich is what every other error path in this function already does."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89767",
"lastModified": "2026-09-13T07:17:41.050",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:20:07.960",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/077ab8985ee278c3d8618182d335b0f0cd919e16"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fa220bc0f84597cb6de665e5b5021c5901ddf00"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1aa8ab78a8e87aee9e306971465408e059f839a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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