FKIE_CVE-2026-80800
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-04 16:18 - Updated: 2026-09-04 16:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: bound the connect_sn TLV walk to the skb
Commit 27256cdb290e ("nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and
add length checks") fixed the unbounded TLV walk in nfc_llcp_recv_snl(),
and commit d8bd2dedbde5 ("nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in
TLV parsers") subsequently bounded nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and
nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv(). One sibling parser sharing the same
pattern remains unbounded: nfc_llcp_connect_sn().
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() walks a TLV list, reading a two-byte header
(type, length) followed by length bytes of value, without checking that
the two header bytes or the declared length stay within the buffer. It
returns a pointer to a service name of up to 255 bytes that may point
past the end of the skb; it is subsequently consumed by memcmp() in
nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). In addition tlv_array_len was computed as
"skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE" in size_t, so a CONNECT/CC frame shorter
than the LLCP header underflows to a huge length and the walk runs far
past the buffer.
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() is reachable from nfc_llcp_recv_connect() and
nfc_llcp_recv_cc(), i.e. from received CONNECT and CC PDUs. A nearby
NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation
happens automatically after NFC-DEP, and the nfc_llcp_rx_skb()
dispatcher applies no minimum-length guard.
Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer(skb), and
validate each declared length before use, matching the approach already
used for nfc_llcp_recv_snl(). Starting the walk at
&skb->data[LLCP_HEADER_SIZE] against the tail pointer also removes the
size_t underflow for short frames.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/nfc/llcp_core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b2ebdfe3d5b76e91f267a61cbc3f9a0e3f77071e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e18d044bab6d3d0280639098c3fe6621692cbfe2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "65a0ec7783b06068dda6745dd689bf4a91ee64aa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1964addc8dd535a05d5d3b55b4d1ac19ae31aa65",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "389986fd79e4d43f971a03b512645a1bb63c982f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e87527b506c40db9af528714b7b1240918eb80fc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "22e5177ba1196a0b272a6a46c2575eb940a939c4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0cfbdb0e13ab5b0765d77f96af67eb879cbc9736",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "55c68ac93e7dacc0f5f608b9c39dd4ff48cf28e8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/nfc/llcp_core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.3"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.3",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.267",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.218",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.185",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.154",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.106",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.47",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfc: llcp: bound the connect_sn TLV walk to the skb\n\nCommit 27256cdb290e (\"nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and\nadd length checks\") fixed the unbounded TLV walk in nfc_llcp_recv_snl(),\nand commit d8bd2dedbde5 (\"nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in\nTLV parsers\") subsequently bounded nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and\nnfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv(). One sibling parser sharing the same\npattern remains unbounded: nfc_llcp_connect_sn().\n\nnfc_llcp_connect_sn() walks a TLV list, reading a two-byte header\n(type, length) followed by length bytes of value, without checking that\nthe two header bytes or the declared length stay within the buffer. It\nreturns a pointer to a service name of up to 255 bytes that may point\npast the end of the skb; it is subsequently consumed by memcmp() in\nnfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). In addition tlv_array_len was computed as\n\"skb-\u003elen - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE\" in size_t, so a CONNECT/CC frame shorter\nthan the LLCP header underflows to a huge length and the walk runs far\npast the buffer.\n\nnfc_llcp_connect_sn() is reachable from nfc_llcp_recv_connect() and\nnfc_llcp_recv_cc(), i.e. from received CONNECT and CC PDUs. A nearby\nNFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation\nhappens automatically after NFC-DEP, and the nfc_llcp_rx_skb()\ndispatcher applies no minimum-length guard.\n\nWalk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer(skb), and\nvalidate each declared length before use, matching the approach already\nused for nfc_llcp_recv_snl(). Starting the walk at\n\u0026skb-\u003edata[LLCP_HEADER_SIZE] against the tail pointer also removes the\nsize_t underflow for short frames.\n\nFound by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai)."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80800",
"lastModified": "2026-09-04T16:18:06.797",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-04T16:18:06.797",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cfbdb0e13ab5b0765d77f96af67eb879cbc9736"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1964addc8dd535a05d5d3b55b4d1ac19ae31aa65"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22e5177ba1196a0b272a6a46c2575eb940a939c4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/389986fd79e4d43f971a03b512645a1bb63c982f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55c68ac93e7dacc0f5f608b9c39dd4ff48cf28e8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65a0ec7783b06068dda6745dd689bf4a91ee64aa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2ebdfe3d5b76e91f267a61cbc3f9a0e3f77071e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e18d044bab6d3d0280639098c3fe6621692cbfe2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e87527b506c40db9af528714b7b1240918eb80fc"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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