FKIE_CVE-2026-80780
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-04 16:18 - Updated: 2026-09-04 16:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from
list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)
without first checking that hid->inputs is non-empty. The list member
of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()
yields &hid->inputs itself and the following hidinput->input load reads
an unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused
pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each
set_bit(FF_*, dev->ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of
the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further
writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.
Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from
usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at
least one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a
PID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only
application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid->inputs empty while
hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches
the unguarded list_entry().
The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so
plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker
software and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte
out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from
universal_pidff_probe().
Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the
other HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe()
propagates the error and unwinds.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2e0471bf3ab2a6b7eedcc3b8a2a17286b6a9ae1a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c1fde337b317f0a226de92803288741c30799eb0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ad9330f7e74a97842815a291a0d7389ed2f34504",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f45f26a6b3e7260c129c7c6bb0ace63aeb7b3868",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4529c03c3da8f91392cd630453452f569973f4cd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d416eeb7d016d82af67c149d884bc6a9323c4ac7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "86b63adfa5e132beac4be72668fdf9128fe51d2e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "67bb1074e3d2d12fa059a9cc707e89398a4e4704",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "af9f2471dfe5a48384f5b7f021a673fbc741465e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "b797352954eee6dc084cfaed0659dea60adfb484",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6.156",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.88",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12.108",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.24",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.14",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.13.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14.3",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.156",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.108",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.47",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-\u003einputs is empty\n\nhid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from\n\n\tlist_entry(hid-\u003einputs.next, struct hid_input, list)\n\nwithout first checking that hid-\u003einputs is non-empty. The list member\nof struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()\nyields \u0026hid-\u003einputs itself and the following hidinput-\u003einput load reads\nan unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused\npointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each\nset_bit(FF_*, dev-\u003effbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of\nthe object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further\nwrites of a heap pointer and two function pointers.\n\nUntil hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from\nusbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at\nleast one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with\nHID_CONNECT_DEFAULT \u0026 ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls\nhid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a\nPID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only\napplication collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-\u003einputs empty while\nhid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches\nthe unguarded list_entry().\n\nThe write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so\nplugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker\nsoftware and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte\nout-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from\nuniversal_pidff_probe().\n\nCheck for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the\nother HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe()\npropagates the error and unwinds.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee \u003cbaul.lee@xbow.com\u003e"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80780",
"lastModified": "2026-09-04T16:18:03.723",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-04T16:18:03.723",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e0471bf3ab2a6b7eedcc3b8a2a17286b6a9ae1a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4529c03c3da8f91392cd630453452f569973f4cd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67bb1074e3d2d12fa059a9cc707e89398a4e4704"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86b63adfa5e132beac4be72668fdf9128fe51d2e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad9330f7e74a97842815a291a0d7389ed2f34504"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d416eeb7d016d82af67c149d884bc6a9323c4ac7"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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