FKIE_CVE-2026-68173
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 - Updated: 2026-08-17 05:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub->completion
ub->completion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If
the ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START
failed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by
the stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is
marked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still
running and ubq->canceling is still set. The kick redispatches a
previously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees ->canceling
and parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH
clears ->canceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the
request is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush
machinery's flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible
sleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a
lost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery.
ub->completion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level
condition "every queue has fetched all I/O commands", which can regress
(F_BATCH's UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop
it and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper
ublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via
wait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then
re-checks it under ub->mutex, waiting again on regression, and returns
with the mutex held and readiness guaranteed.
Readiness becomes true in the same ub->mutex critical section that
clears the last queue's ->canceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the
device LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after ->canceling
clears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can
still be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the
fail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready->UNPREP regression with waiting
until the device is ready again.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/ublk_drv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7dd26adf7e7d482af524e3a0cca4a81ef7c159d0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "728cbac5fe219d3b8a21a0688a08f2b7f8aeda2b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8f188dd11a1c2ad94caeaee36ef68bb8221d4a12",
"status": "affected",
"version": "728cbac5fe219d3b8a21a0688a08f2b7f8aeda2b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "432a9b2780c0a01caf547bd1fc2fcf28aeb8d173",
"status": "affected",
"version": "728cbac5fe219d3b8a21a0688a08f2b7f8aeda2b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "42ea64e01c96e594fb4f80c54dfe4f934d008a6e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14.6",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/ublk_drv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub-\u003ecompletion\n\nub-\u003ecompletion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If\nthe ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START\nfailed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by\nthe stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is\nmarked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still\nrunning and ubq-\u003ecanceling is still set. The kick redispatches a\npreviously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees -\u003ecanceling\nand parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH\nclears -\u003ecanceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the\nrequest is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush\nmachinery\u0027s flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible\nsleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a\nlost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery.\n\nub-\u003ecompletion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level\ncondition \"every queue has fetched all I/O commands\", which can regress\n(F_BATCH\u0027s UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop\nit and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper\nublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via\nwait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then\nre-checks it under ub-\u003emutex, waiting again on regression, and returns\nwith the mutex held and readiness guaranteed.\n\nReadiness becomes true in the same ub-\u003emutex critical section that\nclears the last queue\u0027s -\u003ecanceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the\ndevice LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after -\u003ecanceling\nclears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can\nstill be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the\nfail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready-\u003eUNPREP regression with waiting\nuntil the device is ready again."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68173",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:18:18.770",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:04.067",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/432a9b2780c0a01caf547bd1fc2fcf28aeb8d173"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd26adf7e7d482af524e3a0cca4a81ef7c159d0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f188dd11a1c2ad94caeaee36ef68bb8221d4a12"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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