FKIE_CVE-2026-68096
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-10 13:19 - Updated: 2026-08-17 05:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe()
A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating
executable-related rules.
When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks
the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an
fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the
file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls
audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then,
audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path,
leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock
already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking
deadlock:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1);
lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
6 locks held by mv/5099:
#0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13)
at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0
#1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3)
at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0
#2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1)
at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0
#3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5)
at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0
#4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu)
at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0
#5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex)
at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0
stack backtrace:
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca
validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00
__lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20
lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360
down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230
__kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0
kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40
audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0
audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0
audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00
audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0
audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0
send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0
fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0
fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630
vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0
do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0
__x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e
Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff
c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <48>
3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a
R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c
</TASK>
The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running
the script below:
audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh
--------------------------
#!/bin/bash
auditctl -D
mkdir -p /tmp/foo
touch /tmp/file
auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr
mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file
rm -Rf /tmp/foo
This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass
the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the
already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the
kern_path_parent() path resol
---truncated---
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/audit.h",
"kernel/audit_fsnotify.c",
"kernel/audit_watch.c",
"kernel/auditfilter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "36eb77f14b4e6f2dc1008c1fabe31236397be27a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "34d99af52ad40bd498ba66970579a5bc1fb1a3bc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7d1f66c69898ffb1a718926c32a777ecc471caca",
"status": "affected",
"version": "34d99af52ad40bd498ba66970579a5bc1fb1a3bc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "40879c39d6740f3dddfb52b5d6ba7fb8cceb84d8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "34d99af52ad40bd498ba66970579a5bc1fb1a3bc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3b601938314c24fcd1afb6659cad92fe96c9c2f8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "34d99af52ad40bd498ba66970579a5bc1fb1a3bc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "81905b5acbe77284734438df3fbec1158e6429a3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "34d99af52ad40bd498ba66970579a5bc1fb1a3bc",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/audit.h",
"kernel/audit_fsnotify.c",
"kernel/audit_watch.c",
"kernel/auditfilter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.3"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.3",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naudit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe()\n\nA deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating\nexecutable-related rules.\n\nWhen a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks\nthe parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an\nfsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the\nfile being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls\naudit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then,\naudit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path,\nleading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock\nalready held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking\ndeadlock:\n\n ============================================\n WARNING: possible recursive locking detected\n 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted\n --------------------------------------------\n mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock:\n ffff888132845358 (\u0026inode-\u003ei_sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},\n at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0\n\n but task is already holding lock:\n ffff888132846b58 (\u0026inode-\u003ei_sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},\n at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0\n\n other info that might help us debug this:\n Possible unsafe locking scenario:\n\n CPU0\n ----\n lock(\u0026inode-\u003ei_sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_dir_key/1);\n lock(\u0026inode-\u003ei_sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_dir_key/1);\n\n *** DEADLOCK ***\n\n May be due to missing lock nesting notation\n\n 6 locks held by mv/5099:\n #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13)\n at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0\n #1: ffff888112a9c790 (\u0026type-\u003es_vfs_rename_key#3)\n at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0\n #2: ffff888132846b58 (\u0026inode-\u003ei_sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_dir_key/1)\n at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0\n #3: ffff888132845358 (\u0026inode-\u003ei_sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_dir_key/5)\n at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0\n #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (\u0026fsnotify_mark_srcu)\n at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0\n #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex)\n at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0\n\n stack backtrace:\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0\n print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca\n validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00\n __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20\n lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360\n down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230\n __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0\n kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40\n audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0\n audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0\n audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00\n audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0\n audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0\n send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0\n fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0\n fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630\n vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0\n do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0\n __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e\n Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff\n c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e\n 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89\n RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108\n RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e\n RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c\n RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001\n R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a\n R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThe aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running\nthe script below:\n\n audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh\n --------------------------\n #!/bin/bash\n auditctl -D\n mkdir -p /tmp/foo\n touch /tmp/file\n auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr\n mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file\n rm -Rf /tmp/foo\n\nThis patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass\nthe fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the\nalready-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the\nkern_path_parent() path resol\n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68096",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:18:08.860",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-10T13:19:53.837",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36eb77f14b4e6f2dc1008c1fabe31236397be27a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b601938314c24fcd1afb6659cad92fe96c9c2f8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40879c39d6740f3dddfb52b5d6ba7fb8cceb84d8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d1f66c69898ffb1a718926c32a777ecc471caca"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81905b5acbe77284734438df3fbec1158e6429a3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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