FKIE_CVE-2026-64192
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-20 17:18 - Updated: 2026-07-20 17:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized
When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps
(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However,
if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted
from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for
the BPF LSM.
Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset
(bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at
its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a
valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes
or more).
When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE
map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously
aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning
of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup
or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued
RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued
callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering
an immediate kernel panic.
Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag
marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init()
when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map
allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning
-EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized.
This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode
storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent,
avoiding zombie map states.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/bpf_lsm.h",
"kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c",
"security/bpf/hooks.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "c76b8abce575e0c6e4096957220b4515ed847d89",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ea636848aca35b9f97c5b5dee30225cf2dd0fe6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ea636848aca35b9f97c5b5dee30225cf2dd0fe6",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/bpf_lsm.h",
"kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c",
"security/bpf/hooks.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized\n\nWhen CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps\n(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However,\nif the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted\nfrom the \"lsm=\" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for\nthe BPF LSM.\n\nConsequently, the BPF inode security blob offset\n(bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at\nits default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a\nvalid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes\nor more).\n\nWhen a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE\nmap, bpf_inode() evaluates inode-\u003ei_security + 8. This erroneously\naliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning\nof the inode-\u003ei_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup\nor inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued\nRCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued\ncallback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering\nan immediate kernel panic.\n\nFix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag\nmarked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init()\nwhen the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map\nallocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning\n-EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized.\n\nThis fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode\nstorage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent,\navoiding zombie map states."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64192",
"lastModified": "2026-07-20T17:18:22.367",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-07-20T17:18:22.367",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76b8abce575e0c6e4096957220b4515ed847d89"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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