fkie_cve-2025-68740
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-12-24 13:16
Modified
2025-12-24 13:16
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match() In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match. Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()\n\nIn ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to\nthe rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the \u0027if (!rc)\u0027 check\nand sets \u0027result = true\u0027. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing\nextra files to be measured by IMA.\n\nThis issue can be reproduced in the following scenario:\nAfter unloading the SELinux policy module via \u0027semodule -d\u0027, if an IMA\nmeasurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated,\nin ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns\n-ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the \u0027if (rc == -ESTALE \u0026\u0026\n!rule_reinitialized)\u0027 block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In\nima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule\nbecomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns\n-ENOENT. This bypasses the \u0027if (!rc)\u0027 check and results in a false match.\n\nCall trace:\n  selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8\n  security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0\n  ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0\n  ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8\n  ima_get_action+0x48/0x60\n  process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98\n  ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8\n  security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78\n  search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318\n  exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8\n  bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130\n  do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258\n  __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68\n  invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128\n  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0\n  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38\n  el0_svc+0x44/0x200\n  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130\n  el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0\n\nFix this by changing \u0027if (!rc)\u0027 to \u0027if (rc \u003c= 0)\u0027 to ensure that error\ncodes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a\nsuccessful match."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-68740",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-24T13:16:28.943",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-24T13:16:28.943",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32952c4f4d1b2deb30dce72ba109da808a9018e1"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/738c9738e690f5cea24a3ad6fd2d9a323cf614f6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2238d487a640ae3511e1b6f4640ab27ce10d7f6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de4431faf308d0c533cb386f5fa9af009bc86158"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}


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