FKIE_CVE-2007-6755
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2013-10-11 22:55 - Updated: 2026-06-16 22:48
Severity
Summary
The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain "skeleton key" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| dell | bsafe_crypto-c-micro-edition | * | |
| dell | bsafe_crypto-j | 5.0 | |
| dell | bsafe_crypto-j | 5.0.1 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:dell:bsafe_crypto-c-micro-edition:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "BBC91A27-A2F7-40BD-8C2B-8AD5B042DC1F",
"versionEndIncluding": "3.0.0.20",
"versionStartIncluding": "3.0.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:dell:bsafe_crypto-j:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "40C23A4D-1F95-422E-946B-9063BC5F8395",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:dell:bsafe_crypto-j:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "86B6427C-851F-4060-8A09-F6E2955269B1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain \"skeleton key\" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El procedimiento por defecto del NIST SP 800-90A del algoritmo Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) contiene puntos constantes Q con una posible relaci\u00f3n con ciertos valores \"skeleton key\", lo que podr\u00eda permitir a atacantes dependientes del contexto romper mecanismos criptogr\u00e1ficos de protecci\u00f3n mediante el aprovechando del conocimiento de esos valores. NOTA: este es un CVE preliminar para Dual_EC_DRBG, la investigaci\u00f3n futura puede brindar detalles adicionales sobre el punto Q y los ataques asociados, y podr\u00eda potencialmente dar lugar a un RECAST o REJECT de esta CVE."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2007-6755",
"lastModified": "2026-06-16T22:48:42.367",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.8,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 8.6,
"impactScore": 4.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
]
},
"published": "2013-10-11T22:55:33.580",
"references": [
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/"
},
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html"
},
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html"
},
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf"
},
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/"
},
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect"
},
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory",
"VDB Entry"
],
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63657"
},
{
"source": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory",
"VDB Entry"
],
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63657"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-327"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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