Vulnerability-Lookup

URL	Tags
https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	x_refsource_MISC

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
pydantic	httpx2	Affected: < 2.11.0	guessed

brew-bump-my-version-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 18:58

Modified

2026-09-10 18:58

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "bump-my-version",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/bump-my-version"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.1_1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-bump-my-version-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T18:58:22Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T18:58:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-hatch-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 19:26

Modified

2026-09-10 19:26

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "hatch",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/hatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.17.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.0_1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-hatch-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T19:26:02Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T19:26:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-httpx2-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 19:29

Modified

2026-09-16 09:16

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/httpx2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.9.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.13.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.13.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-httpx2-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T09:16:38Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T19:29:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-litecli-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 19:42

Modified

2026-09-10 19:42

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "litecli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/litecli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.17.1_3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.1_4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-litecli-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T19:42:52Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T19:42:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-oterm-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 20:19

Modified

2026-09-10 20:19

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "oterm",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/oterm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-oterm-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T20:19:31Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T20:19:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-papis-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 20:21

Modified

2026-09-10 20:21

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "papis",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/papis"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.15.0_5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.16.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-papis-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T20:21:27Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T20:21:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-rapid-mlx-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 20:37

Modified

2026-09-10 20:37

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "rapid-mlx",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/rapid-mlx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.11.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.12.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-rapid-mlx-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T20:37:33Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T20:37:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-strands-agents-sops-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 21:05

Modified

2026-09-10 21:05

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "strands-agents-sops",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/strands-agents-sops"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.3_1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-strands-agents-sops-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T21:05:20Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T21:05:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

brew-yewtube-cve-2026-84380

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Published

2026-09-10 21:31

Modified

2026-09-10 21:31

Summary

HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated

Details

Summary

HTTPX2 can automatically add a Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.

Details

When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default Content-Length. Request._prepare() applies each default header with setdefault(), which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive Transfer-Encoding header is present.

For example:

import httpx2

request = httpx2.Request(
    "POST",
    "http://example.com/",
    headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
    content=b"test 123",
)

print(request.headers)

The request contains both:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8

On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.

Streaming bodies with an explicit Content-Length are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated Transfer-Encoding is already suppressed in that direction.

Impact

An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.

Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled Transfer-Encoding headers are not directly exposed.

Mitigation

Upgrade to HTTPX2 2.11.0 or later. Patched versions treat Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove Transfer-Encoding and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advis…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a…	WEB
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "yewtube",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/yewtube"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.13.1_4"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.1_5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/httpx2@2.12.0",
        "name": "httpx2",
        "resource": "httpx2",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2.12.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a request body has a known size, HTTPX2\u0027s content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.\n\nFor example:\n\n```python\nimport httpx2\n\nrequest = httpx2.Request(\n    \"POST\",\n    \"http://example.com/\",\n    headers={\"Transfer-Encoding\": \"chunked\"},\n    content=b\"test 123\",\n)\n\nprint(request.headers)\n```\n\nThe request contains both:\n\n```text\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Length: 8\n```\n\nOn an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.\n\nStreaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.\n\nDepending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.",
  "id": "BREW-yewtube-CVE-2026-84380",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T21:31:39Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T21:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566",
    "CVE-2026-84380",
    "PYSEC-2026-3849"
  ]
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-84380

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-02 18:21 - Updated: 2026-09-09 21:05

Severity

5.6 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Summary

HTTPX2 is a next generation HTTP client for Python. Prior to 2.11.0, Request._prepare() in src/httpx2/httpx2/_models.py can add a body-derived Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header because its setdefault() processing checks each default header independently rather than treating the two framing headers as mutually exclusive. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can therefore be serialized over HTTP/1.1 with both headers, allowing request smuggling or connection desynchronization when downstream intermediaries disagree about which framing header takes precedence. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "httpx2",
          "vendor": "pydantic",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.11.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "HTTPX2 is a next generation HTTP client for Python. Prior to 2.11.0, Request._prepare() in src/httpx2/httpx2/_models.py can add a body-derived Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header because its setdefault() processing checks each default header independently rather than treating the two framing headers as mutually exclusive. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can therefore be serialized over HTTP/1.1 with both headers, allowing request smuggling or connection desynchronization when downstream intermediaries disagree about which framing header takes precedence. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-84380",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-09T21:05:23.237",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 5.6,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 3.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-84380",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-02T18:07:09.850518Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-02T18:21:29.513",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eab"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-444"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-84380 (GCVE-0-2026-84380)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-84380 (GCVE-0-2026-84380)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

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Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew

Summary

Details

Impact

Mitigation

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Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour