CVE-2026-75484 (GCVE-0-2026-75484)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-20 21:11 – Updated: 2026-08-21 19:52
VLAI
Title
HTTP/2 header field values containing CR, LF or NUL are passed to the application unvalidated in Bandit
Summary
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle CR, LF, or NUL characters into application-visible request headers via HTTP/2. Bandit.HTTP2.Stream.read_headers/1 validates pseudo-header placement and uniqueness, header-name casing, connection-specific headers, the te value, and content-length, but never checks field values. Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain \r, \n, or \0 decodes without error and the values land in conn.req_headers unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not. Bandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or inspect, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug's put_resp_header, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. A related gap bundled in the same fix: only :method, :scheme, and :path were checked for at most one occurrence; a duplicate :authority pseudo-header was accepted, with the first instance silently winning as conn.host while a conflicting value remained visible to the application. This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.12.5.
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-21 19:52 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-93 - Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
mtrudel bandit Affected: 1.4.0 , < 1.12.5 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
mtrudel bandit Affected: fff06efe3be962b484bd4d3eb339372fda5a231f , < d38cf046c9a3cae4d0f88001c2ceb4143f86366b (git)
    cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-75484\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"poc\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"yes\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-08-21T19:52:23.602062Z\"}}}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-x3gh-xhj4-3vq8\", \"tags\": [\"exploit\"]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-21T19:52:34.995Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"HTTP/2 header field values containing CR, LF or NUL are passed to the application unvalidated in Bandit\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"Mat Trudel\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"coordinator\", \"value\": \"Jonatan M\\u00e4nnchen / EEF\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-81\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-81 Web Server Logs Tampering\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 6.9, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit\", \"vendor\": \"mtrudel\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027\"], \"product\": \"bandit\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1.4.0\", \"lessThan\": \"1.12.5\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:hex/bandit\", \"packageName\": \"bandit\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://repo.hex.pm\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027:read_headers/1\"}]}, {\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit\", \"vendor\": \"mtrudel\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027\"], \"product\": \"bandit\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"fff06efe3be962b484bd4d3eb339372fda5a231f\", \"lessThan\": \"d38cf046c9a3cae4d0f88001c2ceb4143f86366b\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:github/mtrudel/bandit\", \"packageName\": \"mtrudel/bandit\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://github.com\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027:read_headers/1\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-x3gh-xhj4-3vq8\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\", \"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-75484.html\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-75484\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/d38cf046c9a3cae4d0f88001c2ceb4143f86366b\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027) vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle CR, LF, or NUL characters into application-visible request headers via HTTP/2. Bandit.HTTP2.Stream.read_headers/1 validates pseudo-header placement and uniqueness, header-name casing, connection-specific headers, the te value, and content-length, but never checks field values. Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain \\\\r, \\\\n, or \\\\0 decodes without error and the values land in conn.req_headers unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not.\\n\\nBandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or inspect, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug\u0027s put_resp_header, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. 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Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain \u003ccode\u003e\\\\r\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\\\\n\u003c/code\u003e, or \u003ccode\u003e\\\\0\u003c/code\u003e decodes without error and the values land in \u003ccode\u003econn.req_headers\u003c/code\u003e unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eBandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or \u003ccode\u003einspect\u003c/code\u003e, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eput_resp_header\u003c/code\u003e, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. A related gap bundled in the same fix: only \u003ccode\u003e:method\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e:scheme\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003e:path\u003c/code\u003e were checked for at most one occurrence; a duplicate \u003ccode\u003e:authority\u003c/code\u003e pseudo-header was accepted, with the first instance silently winning as \u003ccode\u003econn.host\u003c/code\u003e while a conflicting value remained visible to the application.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.12.5.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027) vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle CR, LF, or NUL characters into application-visible request headers via HTTP/2. `Bandit.HTTP2.Stream.read_headers/1` validates pseudo-header placement and uniqueness, header-name casing, connection-specific headers, the `te` value, and `content-length`, but never checks field *values*. Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain `\\\\r`, `\\\\n`, or `\\\\0` decodes without error and the values land in `conn.req_headers` unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not.\\n\\nBandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or `inspect`, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug\u0027s `put_resp_header`, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. A related gap bundled in the same fix: only `:method`, `:scheme`, and `:path` were checked for at most one occurrence; a duplicate `:authority` pseudo-header was accepted, with the first instance silently winning as `conn.host` while a conflicting value remained visible to the application.\\n\\nThis issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.12.5.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-93\", \"description\": \"CWE-93 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027)\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"1.12.5\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"1.4.0\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-20T21:11:27.523Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-75484\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-21T19:52:42.954Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-08-18T10:30:01.764Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-08-20T21:11:27.523Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

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