CVE-2026-72213 (GCVE-0-2026-72213)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-15 05:54 – Updated: 2026-08-17 05:41

Title

mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch In alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd and non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges. When map_chg is set, hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but the immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg with the non-rsvd cgroup pointer. As a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong (non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio's rsvd slot. When the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls both hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(). The rsvd uncharge reads back the wrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never charged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow: page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512 WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel Fix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the rsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent through their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c32ae4a91fb5f494…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1697d253f51cf5e38…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b785f2bd9496faced…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15807d0ddde37407a…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Linux	Linux	Affected: 08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa , < 5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd (git) Affected: 08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa , < 1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2 (git) Affected: 08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa , < b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3 (git) Affected: 08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa , < 15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00 (git)	guessed
Linux	Linux	Affected: 5.7 Unaffected: 0 , < 5.7 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.101 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.40 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.5 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/hugetlb.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd",
              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3",
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              "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
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              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/hugetlb.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.7"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.7",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.101",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.40",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.101",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.7",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.40",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.7",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.7",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.7",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch\n\nIn alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd\nand non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges.  When map_chg is set,\nhugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but\nthe immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg\nwith the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.\n\nAs a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong\n(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio\u0027s rsvd slot.\n\nWhen the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls\nboth hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and\nhugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd().  The rsvd uncharge reads back the\nwrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never\ncharged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:\n\n  page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512\n  WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel\n\nFix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the\nrsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent\nthrough their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The bug is in alloc_hugetlb_folio()/free_huge_folio() and is reached only via local MM paths (mmap/munmap, hugetlb page faults, fallocate, memfd MFD_HUGETLB, MAP_HUGETLB) that syzbot triggered through hugetlbfs inode eviction, not via any network-facing kernel service.\nAC:L - An unprivileged attacker can reliably trigger the mismatch by creating hugetlbfs mappings without reservations (MAP_NORESERVE or fault-before-reserve), faulting in huge pages to run alloc_hugetlb_folio() with map_chg set, then closing/unmapping to free folios and hit the bad rsvd uncharge.\nPR:L - Triggering requires only an unprivileged local process that can use hugetlb memory (hugetlbfs/MAP_HUGETLB/memfd) under a hugetlb cgroup; no init-namespace root or special driver capabilities are needed, and cgroup hugetlb limits are controllable from user namespaces.\nUI:N - Exploitation is fully attacker-driven through normal syscalls (mmap, write/fault, close/unlink) and does not require any victim user action beyond the attacker operating on their own mappings.\nS:U - Impact is confined to kernel hugetlb/cgroup page_counter accounting within the same host kernel security domain; it does not cross VM, container runtime, or IOMMU boundaries.\nC:N - The flaw corrupts hugetlb cgroup reservation counters and emits a WARN on underflow; it does not read or disclose kernel memory, pointers, or other confidential data to the attacker.\nI:H - page_counter underflow forcibly resets hugetlb cgroup reservation usage to zero, corrupting kernel accounting so an attacker can bypass hugetlb.rsvd cgroup limits and consume hugepage resources beyond enforced quotas in multi-tenant/container deployments.\nA:H - free_huge_folio() unconditionally hits the bad rsvd uncharge and triggers a kernel WARNING/page_counter underflow during hugepage teardown; syzbot classified this as DoS and repeated alloc/free cycles can disrupt hugetlb availability for other workloads when limits are bypassed."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:41:39.361Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00"
        }
      ],
      "title": "mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-72213",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-15T05:54:07.854Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-09T03:40:39.912Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:41:39.361Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-72213",
      "date": "2026-09-22",
      "epss": "0.00159",
      "percentile": "0.05525"
    },
    "microsoft_vex": {
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-23T15:00:42.000Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-72213",
      "id": "msrc_CVE-2026-72213",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-23T15:00:42.000Z",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "1",
      "source": "Microsoft CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-72213.json",
      "version": "1"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "product": "Linux",
                "programFiles": [
                  "mm/hugetlb.c"
                ],
                "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
                "vendor": "Linux",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
                    "versionType": "git"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThan": "1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
                    "versionType": "git"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThan": "b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3",
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                    "versionType": "git"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThan": "15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
                    "versionType": "git"
                  }
                ]
              },
              {
                "defaultStatus": "affected",
                "product": "Linux",
                "programFiles": [
                  "mm/hugetlb.c"
                ],
                "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
                "vendor": "Linux",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "5.7"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThan": "5.7",
                    "status": "unaffected",
                    "version": "0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
                    "status": "unaffected",
                    "version": "6.12.101",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
                    "status": "unaffected",
                    "version": "6.18.40",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
                    "status": "unaffected",
                    "version": "7.1.5",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  },
                  {
                    "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
                    "status": "unaffected",
                    "version": "7.2",
                    "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch\n\nIn alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd\nand non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges.  When map_chg is set,\nhugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but\nthe immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg\nwith the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.\n\nAs a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong\n(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio\u0027s rsvd slot.\n\nWhen the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls\nboth hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and\nhugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd().  The rsvd uncharge reads back the\nwrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never\ncharged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:\n\n  page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512\n  WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel\n\nFix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the\nrsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent\nthrough their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-72213",
        "lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:22.243",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV31": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "LOCAL",
                "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                "baseScore": 7.1,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
                "version": "3.1"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
              "impactScore": 5.2,
              "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:40.013",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "vulnStatus": "Received"
      }
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-18T16:29:13+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-72213",
      "id": "CVE-2026-72213",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-15T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "246",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "28",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-72213.json",
      "version": "3"
    },
    "suse_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-31T16:27:03Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-72213",
      "id": "CVE-2026-72213",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-31T16:27:03Z",
      "product_status:known_affected": "178",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "184",
      "source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
      "status": "interim",
      "title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-72213",
      "url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2026-72213.json",
      "version": "2"
    }
  }
}

BELL-CVE-2026-72213 (CVE-2026-72213)

Vulnerability from osv_bellsoft – Published: 2026-08-18 06:06 – Updated: 2026-08-18 06:25 – Source website

Severity

7.1 (High)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

References

URL

Type

https://docs.bell-sw.com/security/cves/CVE-2026-72213

ADVISORY

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Alpaquita:23",
        "name": "linux-lts",
        "purl": "pkg:apk/alpaquita/linux-lts?arch=source\u0026distro=23"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.1.182-r0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Alpaquita:25",
        "name": "linux-lts",
        "purl": "pkg:apk/alpaquita/linux-lts?arch=source\u0026distro=25"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.12.95-r0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.103-r0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Alpaquita:stream",
        "name": "linux-lts",
        "purl": "pkg:apk/alpaquita/linux-lts?arch=source\u0026distro=stream"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.18.38-r0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.18.43-r0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "id": "BELL-CVE-2026-72213",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T06:25:15.407241Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T06:06:24.468234Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://docs.bell-sw.com/security/cves/CVE-2026-72213"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-72213"
  ]
}

CERTFR-2026-AVI-1069

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2026-08-21 - Updated: 2026-08-21

De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer une élévation de privilèges, une atteinte à la confidentialité des données et un déni de service.

Solutions

Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Description
	Debian	Debian	Debian 12 bookworm versions antérieures à 6.12.101-1~deb12u1

References

Title

Publication Time

FKIE_CVE-2026-72213

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:21 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:18

Severity

7.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/hugetlb.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "08cf9faf7558020aed6a0da5810b824b07139dfa",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/hugetlb.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.7"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.7",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.101",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.40",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch\n\nIn alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd\nand non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges.  When map_chg is set,\nhugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but\nthe immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg\nwith the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.\n\nAs a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong\n(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio\u0027s rsvd slot.\n\nWhen the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls\nboth hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and\nhugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd().  The rsvd uncharge reads back the\nwrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never\ncharged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:\n\n  page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512\n  WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel\n\nFix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the\nrsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent\nthrough their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-72213",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:22.243",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:40.013",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}

GHSA-CQHP-GWHX-VMWP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch

In alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd and non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges. When map_chg is set, hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but the immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg with the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.

As a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong (non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio's rsvd slot.

When the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls both hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(). The rsvd uncharge reads back the wrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never charged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:

page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512 WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel

Fix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the rsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent through their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72213"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch\n\nIn alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd\nand non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges.  When map_chg is set,\nhugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but\nthe immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg\nwith the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.\n\nAs a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong\n(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio\u0027s rsvd slot.\n\nWhen the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls\nboth hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and\nhugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd().  The rsvd uncharge reads back the\nwrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never\ncharged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:\n\n  page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512\n  WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel\n\nFix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the\nrsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent\nthrough their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths.",
  "id": "GHSA-cqhp-gwhx-vmwp",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:16Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72213"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15807d0ddde37407af72859426b654f3d1972b00"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1697d253f51cf5e3825a3423ff49e128a3502ab2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c32ae4a91fb5f4941328e0c1720a7fa4189c3bd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b785f2bd9496facedc0a031be09cddcd1d3c84d3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

MSRC_CVE-2026-72213

Vulnerability from csaf_microsoft - Published: 2026-08-23 15:00 - Updated: 2026-08-23 15:00

Summary

mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch

Scope

1 vulnerability in this advisory, including CVE-2026-72213.

CVE-2026-72213

Known not affected: 1 product

Open the full advisory

OESA-2026-3707 (CVE-2026-31668)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-14 16:33 – Updated: 2026-09-14 16:33 – Source website

Summary

kernel security update

Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel

The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts (e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.

Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output, so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE

The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that rxe_set_page() is called with mr->page_size step increments, but the page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing PAGE_SIZE of memory.

ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i>=1 either a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous or b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr->page_size aligned.

This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:

1) page_size < PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K): ibmr->iova = 0x181800 sg[0]: dma_addr=0x181800, len=0x800 sg[1]: dma_addr=0x173000, len=0x1000

Access iova = 0x181800 + 0x810 = 0x182010 Expected VA: 0x173010 (second SG, offset 0x10) Before fix: - index = (0x182010 >> 12) - (0x181800 >> 12) = 1 - page_offset = 0x182010 & 0xFFF = 0x10 - xarray[1] stores system page base 0x170000 - Resulting VA: 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)

2) page_size > PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 64K, system: 4K): ibmr->iova = 0x18f800 sg[0]: dma_addr=0x18f800, len=0x800 sg[1]: dma_addr=0x170000, len=0x1000

Access iova = 0x18f800 + 0x810 = 0x190010 Expected VA: 0x170010 (second SG, offset 0x10) Before fix: - index = (0x190010 >> 16) - (0x18f800 >> 16) = 1 - page_offset = 0x190010 & 0xFFFF = 0x10 - xarray[1] stores system page for dma_addr 0x170000 - Resulting VA: system page of 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)

Yi Zhang reported a kernel panic[1] years ago related to this defect.

Solution: 1. Replace xarray with pre-allocated rxe_mr_page array for sequential indexing (all MR page indices are contiguous) 2. Each rxe_mr_page stores both struct page* and offset within the system page 3. Handle MR page_size != PAGE_SIZE relationships: - page_size > PAGE_SIZE: Split MR pages into multiple system pages - page_size <= PAGE_SIZE: Store offset within system page 4. Add boundary checks and compatibility validation

This ensures correct iova-to-va conversion regardless of MR page size and system PAGE_SIZE relationship, while improving performance through array-based sequential access.

Tests on 4K and 64K PAGE_SIZE hosts: - rdma-core/pytests $ ./build/bin/run_tests.py --dev eth0_rxe - blktest: $ TIMEOUT=30 QUICK_RUN=1 USE_RXE=1 NVMET_TRTYPES=rdma ./check nvme srp rnbd

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9XRqE25jyVw9rj9YugffLn5+f=1znaBEnu1usLOciD+g@mail.gmail.com/T/(CVE-2026-46325)

In the Linux kernel, compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written into the target task's pt_regs, corrupting its register state and potentially leaking kernel stack contents. compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs() even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of the signal-returning task's register state on error.(CVE-2026-64082)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn()

hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev->sent_cmd) when a connection was pending, but hdev->sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path.

Instead of inspecting hdev->sent_cmd, track the in-flight create connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection.

hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync() clear HCI_CONN_CREATE after the create command completes, but the command status handler can free conn via hci_conn_del() (for example when the controller rejects the connection) while the worker is still blocked on the connection complete event. Hold a reference on conn across the create command so the flag can be cleared without a use-after-free.(CVE-2026-64405)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit

handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.

Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path.

The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction.

The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.(CVE-2026-64523)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()

decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads:

ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.

The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.

ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field.

Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, num_lockers, err_inval) ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, type, err_free_lockers)

The goto targets differ intentionally: err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().

err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must be freed.

ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation. Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.

-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).

idryomov: trim changelog, formatting

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: challenge ACK for non-exact RST in SYN-RECEIVED

The SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an in-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT. A non-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a challenge ACK.

RFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in SYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact in-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped.

Apply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC sequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order. Factor the per-netns challenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets can share it. Use the request socket's send_ack() callback and its own out-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response.(CVE-2026-68118)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: gro: fix double aggregation of flush-marked skbs

Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation.

As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated.

This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.

Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding): 1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list 2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set 3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called 4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag 5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs) 6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list

Root cause in skb_segment(): The check at line ~4891: if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) && (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {

When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.

Call Trace: skb_headlen(NULL skb) skb_segment tcp_gso_segment tcp4_gso_segment inet_gso_segment skb_mac_gso_segment __skb_gso_segment skb_gso_segment validate_xmit_skb validate_xmit_skb_list sch_direct_xmit qdisc_restart __qdisc_run qdisc_run net_tx_action

Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive().(CVE-2026-68136)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: serialize qdisc_rtab_list against concurrent get/put

qdisc_get_rtab() and qdisc_put_rtab() mutate the process-global singly linked list qdisc_rtab_list and a plain non-atomic 'int refcnt' with no lock. This was only safe because every caller historically held the RTNL mutex, which serialized all rate-table lookups, inserts and frees.

That invariant no longer holds. cls_flower sets TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED, so tc_new_tfilter() keeps rtnl_held == false for it and sets TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL. That flag propagates through tcf_exts_validate_ex() -> tcf_action_init() -> tcf_action_init_1() -> tcf_police_init(), which calls qdisc_get_rtab()/qdisc_put_rtab() with the RTNL mutex NOT held. Two RTM_NEWTFILTER requests on different CPUs, each adding a flower filter with a police action carrying the same rate, then race on qdisc_rtab_list and on the non-atomic refcnt, leading to a use-after-free / double-free of the kmalloc-2k struct qdisc_rate_table. qdisc_rtab_list is a single global (not per-netns), so the corrupted object is shared system-wide.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160 qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160 tcf_police_init+0xda9/0x1590 tcf_action_init_1+0x460/0x6b0 tcf_action_init+0x439/0xa40 tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x42d/0x550 fl_change+0xddd/0x7da0 tc_new_tfilter+0xaa7/0x2420 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048

Protect qdisc_rtab_list and the refcount with a dedicated spinlock. The (sleeping, GFP_KERNEL) allocation in qdisc_get_rtab() is performed before taking the lock; if a concurrent inserter added an identical table in the meantime the freshly allocated one is freed under the lock, so no duplicate is leaked. qdisc_put_rtab() now decrements the refcount and unlinks under the same lock.(CVE-2026-68138)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range

ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk as (off + len - 1) >> i_blkbits. When off is 0 and len is 0, the unsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge last_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far beyond the ifs->state allocation.

Regarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len cannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is reachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic() returns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate, the guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because !folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called with copied == 0.

Add a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a zero-length range is a no-op.(CVE-2026-68145)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE

__decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack out-of-bounds write.

An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds Write of size 4 ... by task exploit kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833) calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638) __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394) ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490) ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164) rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899) do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138) ... kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670!

idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: v4l2-fwnode: Fix subdev owner overwritten in v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor()

The v4l2 helper v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() calls v4l2_async_register_subdev(), which is a macro that expands to __v4l2_async_register_subdev(sd,THIS_MODULE). Since the macro is expanded inside v4l2-fwnode.c, THIS_MODULE resolves to the v4l2-fwnode module rather than the sensor driver module that originally set sd->owner. When v4l2-fwnode is built-in, THIS_MODULE evaluates to NULL, which then overwrites the sensor driver's owner with NULL.

This causes the problem that the sensor module's reference count is never incremented during async registration, so the module can be removed while the subdevice is still in use by a notifier (e.g., a CSI-2 receiver bridge driver).

Fix this by renaming v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() to __v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() with an added explicit module argument and introducing a wrapper macro: #define v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd) \ __v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd, THIS_MODULE)

This ensures the sensor driver module is properly referenced even when the sensor driver does not init the owner field before calling v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() and prevents premature module removal.(CVE-2026-68205)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment

skb_gso_segment() leaves the segment list head with ->prev pointing at the last segment, an invariant validate_xmit_skb_list() relies on when it sets its tail pointer (tail = skb->prev).

When validate_xmit_xfrm() walks a GSO list and some segments are stolen by async crypto (->xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), those segments are unlinked from the list but the head ->prev is never updated. If the last segment is the one stolen, the returned head still has ->prev pointing at it, even though it is now owned by the crypto engine and may be freed. validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail->next = skb, writing through that stale pointer -- a use-after-free.

Repoint skb->prev at the last retained segment before returning.(CVE-2026-68426)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: ieee80211: validate MLE common info length

ieee80211_mle_common_size() uses the first common-info octet as the common information length for all known MLE types. However, ieee80211_mle_size_ok() only validates that octet for Basic, Probe Request, and TDLS MLEs.

Reconfiguration MLEs also skipped the length octet when calculating the minimum common size, and Priority Access MLEs skipped validation of the advertised common information length.

Account for the Reconfiguration common-info length octet and validate the advertised common information length for all known MLE types. Keep unknown-type handling unchanged.

remove now misleading comment

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dm-verity: fix buffer overflow in FEC calculation

There's a buffer overflow in dm-verity-fec:

if (neras && neras <= v->fec->roots) fio->erasures[(neras)++] = i;

This allows *neras to reach roots + 1 (the post-increment pushes it past roots). This value is then passed as no_eras to decode_rs8(). Inside the RS decoder (lib/reed_solomon/decode_rs.c:113-121), the erasure locator polynomial loop writes lambda[j] where j can reach nroots + 1 — one element past the end of lambda[] (which is sized nroots + 1, valid indices 0..nroots). The out-of-bounds write lands on syn[0], corrupting the syndrome buffer.(CVE-2026-72098)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Reset register bounds before narrowing retval range in check_mem_access()

When the BPF verifier processes a context load of an LSM hook return value, it calls __mark_reg_s32_range() to narrow the register to the hook's valid range. However, __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects the new range with the register's existing bounds using max_t()/min_t() rather than replacing them.

If the destination register carries stale bounds from a prior instruction (e.g. BPF_MOV64_IMM), the intersection can produce a range narrower than reality. The verifier then believes it knows the register's exact value, while at runtime the actual hook return value is loaded, creating a verifier/runtime mismatch that can be used to bypass BPF memory safety checks.

The else branch already calls mark_reg_unknown() to reset register state before any narrowing. Apply the same reset in the is_retval path so stale bounds are cleared before __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects.(CVE-2026-72111)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch

As a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong (non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio's rsvd slot.

page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512 WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_conncount: fix zone comparison in tuple dedup

The "already exists" dedup logic in __nf_conncount_add() decides whether a connection has already been counted and can be skipped instead of incrementing the connlimit count. It compares the conntrack zone of a list entry with the zone of the connection being added using nf_ct_zone_id() and nf_ct_zone_equal(), passing conn->zone.dir or zone->dir as the direction argument.

Those helpers take enum ip_conntrack_dir values: IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL is 0 and IP_CT_DIR_REPLY is 1. However, zone->dir is a u8 bitmask: NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_ORIG is 1, NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_REPL is 2 and NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR is 3. Passing that bitmask as the enum direction shifts the meaning of every non-zero value. An ORIG-only zone passes 1 and is tested as REPLY, while REPL-only and default zones pass 2 or 3 and test bits beyond the valid direction range. In those cases nf_ct_zone_id() can fall back to NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID instead of using the real zone id, so different zones can be treated as equal and dedup collapses to tuple equality alone.

nf_conncount stores and compares the original-direction tuple for a connection. If an skb already has an attached conntrack entry, get_ct_or_tuple_from_skb() explicitly copies ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, regardless of the packet's ctinfo. Therefore the zone comparison in the tuple dedup path must use IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL as well; the zone direction bitmask describes where a zone id applies, not which direction this conncount tuple represents.

Fix the two dedup comparisons by passing IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL directly. Do not special-case NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR and do not compare raw zone ids: using the existing helpers with IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL preserves the direction-aware NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID fallback. A default bidirectional zone contains the ORIG bit, so it naturally returns the real zone id; reply-only zones continue to fall back for original-direction tuple comparisons.(CVE-2026-72247)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: arm64: vgic: Handle race between interrupt affinity change and LPI disabling

Hyunwoo Kim reports some really bad races should the following situation occur:

LPI-I is pending in vcpu-B's AP list
vcpu-A writes to vcpu-B's RD to disable its LPIs
vcpu-C moves I from B to C

If the last two race nicely enough, vgic_prune_ap_list() can drop the irq and AP list locks, reacquire them, and in the interval the irq has been freed. UAF follows.

The fix is two-fold:

Before dropping the irq and ap_list locks, take a reference on the irq
Do not try to handle migration of the pending bit: there is no expectation that this state is retained, as per the architecture

With that, we're sure that the interrupt is still around, and we safely remove it from the AP list as it has no target at this stage (unless another interrupt fires, but that's another story).(CVE-2026-72288)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

LoongArch: KVM: Check irq validity in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt()

Function kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt() can be called from userspace, here add irq validility cheking in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt().(CVE-2026-72294)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: igmp: Fix potential memory leaks in igmp_mod_timer() and igmp_stop_timer()

When a timer is deleted and not re-armed in igmp_mod_timer(), or stopped in igmp_stop_timer(), the code currently decrements the reference counter of the multicast list entry @im using refcount_dec(&im->refcnt).

However, both functions can be called from the RCU reader path: - igmp_mod_timer() via igmp_heard_query() -> for_each_pmc_rcu() - igmp_stop_timer() via igmp_rcv() -> igmp_heard_report()

If the group im was concurrently removed from the list by ip_mc_dec_group(), its reference count might have already been decremented to 1.

In this case, timer_delete() succeeds, and refcount_dec() decrements the refcount from 1 to 0. Since refcount_dec() does not free the object when it hits 0 (unlike ip_ma_put()), the im structure is leaked.

Fix this by using ip_ma_put(im) instead of refcount_dec(&im->refcnt), and deferring the put until after the spinlock is released.(CVE-2026-72321)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/liquidio: drop cached VF pci_dev LUT

The PF SR-IOV enable path caches VF pci_dev pointers in dpiring_to_vfpcidev_lut[] by iterating with pci_get_device(). Those entries do not own a reference, because the iterator drops the previous device reference on each step. The cached pointer is then dereferenced later when handling OCTEON_VF_FLR_REQUEST.

Replace the cached VF mapping with runtime lookup on the mailbox DPI ring: derive the VF index from q_no, resolve the VF via exported PCI IOV helpers, validate it with the PF pointer and VF ID, then issue pcie_flr() and drop the reference with pci_dev_put(). Remove the unused VF lookup table initialization and cleanup.(CVE-2026-72329)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking

In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and reconstructs the original INIT chunk.

When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification is safe.

However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.

Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook()) when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is freed and the packet is discarded.

Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT chunk.

Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk->chunk_end, since the INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.(CVE-2026-72398)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()

TIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its replicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for concurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish:

static void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work) { ... list_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, &ub->rcast.list, list) { dst_cache_destroy(&rcast->dst_cache); list_del_rcu(&rcast->list); kfree_rcu(rcast, rcu); } ... dst_cache_destroy(&ub->rcast.dst_cache); udp_tunnel_sock_release(ub->sk); synchronize_net(); ... }

This is highly buggy because dst_cache_destroy() immediately frees the per-CPU cache memory (free_percpu()) and releases the cached dst entries without any synchronization.

If a concurrent transmitter (e.g., tipc_udp_xmit()) is running on another CPU under RCU protection, it can call dst_cache_get() concurrently, leading to: 1. Use-After-Free on the per-CPU cache pointer itself (crash). 2. "rcuref - imbalanced put()" warning if it attempts to release a dst that was concurrently released by dst_cache_destroy().

Furthermore, calling kfree(ub) immediately after synchronize_net() without closing the socket first (or waiting after closing it) leaves a window where a concurrent receiver (tipc_udp_recv()) could start after synchronize_net(), access ub, and suffer a UAF when kfree(ub) runs.

To fix this, we must defer dst_cache_destroy() and kfree(ub) until after we have ensured that no more readers can see the bearer/socket and all existing readers have finished:

Defer rcast entry destruction (both dst_cache_destroy() and kfree()) to an RCU callback using call_rcu_hurry(). Using call_rcu_hurry() ensures the dst entries are released quickly.
Release the bearer socket using udp_tunnel_sock_release() (stops new receive readers).
Call synchronize_net() to wait for all outstanding RCU readers (both transmit and receive) to finish.
Now that it is safe, call dst_cache_destroy() on the main bearer cache, and free ub.

Note: 3) and 4) can be changed later in net-next to also use call_rcu_hurry() and get rid of the synchronize_net() latency.(CVE-2026-72404)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync

Yue Sun reported a use-after-free and debugobjects warning in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() during concurrent device operations.

The workqueue core clears the internal pending bit before invoking the worker. At that point, a concurrent thread can queue the work again. When the already running worker eventually clears the work_pending flag to 0, it mistakenly clears the flag for the newly queued instance. udp_tunnel_nic_unregister() then observes work_pending as 0 and frees the structure while the second work item is still active in the queue, leading to UAF.

Fix this by returning early in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync() if work_pending is already set, preventing redundant work queueing.(CVE-2026-72405)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: fix err_chunk memory leaks in INIT handling

When sctp_verify_init() encounters unrecognized parameters, it allocates an err_chunk to report them. However, this chunk is leaked in several code paths:

In sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(), if security_sctp_assoc_request() fails after sctp_verify_init() has populated err_chunk, the function returns immediately without freeing it.
In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), the same leak occurs on the security_sctp_assoc_request() failure path.
In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), on the success path after copying unrecognized parameters to the INIT-ACK, the function returns without freeing err_chunk, unlike sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() which properly frees it.

Fix all three leaks by adding sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk) calls before returning in the error paths and on the success path in sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().(CVE-2026-72413)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches

KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request() on sh->dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..

and .. one possible scenario is:

CPU1 CPU2 break_stripe_batch_list(sh1) -> handle sh2 -> lock(sh2) -> sh2->batch_head = NULL -> unlock(sh2) -> test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2->dev[i].flags) -> wake_up_bit(sh2->dev[i].flags) raid5_make_request() -> add_all_stripe_bios(sh2) -> lock(sh2) -> stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap exist bio on sh2 -> true -> set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2->dev[i].flags) -> unlock(sh2) -> wait_on_bit(sh2->dev[i].flags) -> sh2->dev[i].flags = sh1->dev[i].flags & ~R5_Overlap

No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever...

Fix by : - Expand the protect zone. - Use batch_head's device flag's snaphot when no held head_sh->stripe_lock. - Move sh/head_sh->batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and , any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh->stripe_lock now either: - see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps() under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait ) , or , - sees batch_head == NULL, only after dev[i].flags has already been set and the prior R5_Overlap waiters worken.

KCSAN report:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in break_stripe_batch_list / raid5_make_request

write (marked) to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4042 on cpu 0: raid5_make_request+0xea0/0x2930 md_handle_request+0x4a2/0xa40 md_submit_bio+0x109/0x1a0 __submit_bio+0x2ec/0x390 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x457/0x710 submit_bio_noacct+0x2a7/0xc20 submit_bio+0x56/0x250 blkdev_direct_IO+0x54c/0xda0 blkdev_write_iter+0x38f/0x570 aio_write+0x22b/0x490 io_submit_one+0xa51/0xf70 __x64_sys_io_submit+0xf7/0x220 x64_sys_call+0x1907/0x1c60 do_syscall_64+0x130/0x570 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

read to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4010 on cpu 5: break_stripe_batch_list+0x249/0x480 handle_stripe_clean_event+0x720/0x9b0 handle_stripe+0x32fb/0x4500 handle_active_stripes.isra.0+0x6e0/0xa50 raid5d+0x7e0/0xba0 md_thread+0x15a/0x2d0 kthread+0x1e3/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x410 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

value changed: 0x0000000000000019 -> 0x0000000000000099 --> R5_Overlap(CVE-2026-72420)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Guard conntrack opts error writes

The conntrack lookup and allocation kfuncs take an opts pointer together with an opts__sz argument. The verifier checks only the memory range described by opts__sz, but the wrappers unconditionally write opts->error whenever the internal lookup or allocation helper returns an error.

For an invalid size smaller than the end of opts->error, that write can land outside the verifier-checked range. Keep returning NULL for invalid arguments, but only report the error through opts->error when the supplied size includes the field.

This preserves error reporting for the supported 12-byte and 16-byte layouts, and for other invalid sizes that still include opts->error.(CVE-2026-72423)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/bnxt_re: Proper rollback if the ioremap fails

bnxt_qplib_alloc_dpi returns success even if ioremap fails. Add the proper rollback when the ioremap fails and return -ENOMEM status.(CVE-2026-72496)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: clear sock_ops cb flags before force-closing a child socket

A child socket inherits the listener's bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags via sk_clone_lock(). If its setup fails in tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() / tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(), the child is freed through put_and_exit, where inet_csk_prepare_forced_close() drops the socket lock and tcp_done() runs without it.

If BPF_SOCK_OPS_STATE_CB_FLAG was inherited, tcp_done() -> tcp_set_state() calls tcp_call_bpf(), which expects the lock and trips sock_owned_by_me():

WARNING: include/net/sock.h:1799 at tcp_set_state+0x433/0x550 RIP: 0010:tcp_set_state+0x433/0x550 include/net/sock.h:1799 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_done+0xba/0x250 net/ipv4/tcp.c:5095 tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x850/0xa50 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1787 tcp_check_req+0xf30/0x1360 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:926 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1047/0x1b50 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2164 </IRQ>

The child is freed before it is ever established, so it should run no sock_ops callback. Clear its cb flags in inet_csk_prepare_for_destroy_sock(), the common point for the IPv4, IPv6 and chtls forced-close paths and for the MPTCP ->syn_recv_sock() failure path (dispose_child), which reaches tcp_done() on a child that was never established too.(CVE-2026-74268)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: fib: Don't dump dying fib_info in fib_leaf_notify().

syzbot reported use-after-free in nsim_fib4_prepare_event(). [0]

The problem is that the following functions call fib_info_hold() / refcount_inc() while dumping fib_info under RCU, which is unsafe.

mlxsw_sp_router_fib4_event()
rocker_router_fib_event()
nsim_fib4_prepare_event()

refcount_inc_not_zero() must be used, but it would be too late there.

Let's guarantee the lifetime of fib_info in fib_leaf_notify().

Note that IPv6 does not need the corresponding change since fib6_table_dump() holds fib6_table.tb6_lock.

[0]: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25, CPU#0: kworker/u8:15/3420 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3420 Comm: kworker/u8:15 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/18/2026 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25 Code: eb 66 85 db 74 3e 83 fb 01 75 4c e8 1b f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 84 cb f1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 4a e8 08 f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 81 cb f1 0a <67> 48 0f b9 3a eb 37 e8 f5 f0 22 fd 48 8d 3d 7e cb f1 0a 67 48 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f2c7270 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff84a18858 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff888032ff9ec0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8f9353e0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888032ff9ec0 R09: 0000000000000005 R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff8880570cc000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802b40563c R15: ffff8880570cc000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888126173000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb1f4d5d000 CR3: 000000006072a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:-1 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:366 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:383 [inline] fib_info_hold include/net/ip_fib.h:629 [inline] nsim_fib4_prepare_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:930 [inline] nsim_fib_event_schedule_work drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1000 [inline] nsim_fib_event_nb+0x1055/0x1240 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1043 call_fib_notifier+0x45/0x80 net/core/fib_notifier.c:25 call_fib_entry_notifier net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:90 [inline] fib_leaf_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2176 [inline] fib_table_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2194 [inline] fib_notify+0x36b/0x5e0 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2217 fib_net_dump net/core/fib_notifier.c:70 [inline] register_fib_notifier+0x184/0x360 net/core/fib_notifier.c:108 nsim_fib_create+0x85d/0x9f0 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1596 nsim_dev_reload_create drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1604 [inline] nsim_dev_reload_up+0x374/0x7c0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1058 devlink_reload+0x501/0x8d0 net/devlink/dev.c:475 devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0x1ff/0x420 net/devlink/core.c:558 ops_pre_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:161 [inline] ops_undo_list+0x187/0x940 net/core/net_namespace.c:234 cleanup_net+0x56e/0x800 net/core/net_namespace.c:702 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3314 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860 kernel/workqueue.c:3397 worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:3478 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK>(CVE-2026-74289)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix UAF in hci_unregister_dev()

hci_unregister_dev() does not disable cmd_timer and ncmd_timer before the hci_dev structure is freed. If a timeout fires during device teardown, the callback dereferences freed memory (including the hdev->reset function pointer), leading to a use-after-free.

Add disable_delayed_work_sync() calls alongside the existing disable_work_sync() calls to ensure both timers are fully quiesced before teardown proceeds.(CVE-2026-74302)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ixgbe: do not configure xps for XDP queues

netif_set_xps_queue() should not be called for an XDP Tx queue, since such queues are not netdev-exposed. On systems with number of CPUs >=64, on E610 adapter, netdev is configured with maximum number queue pairs being 63 (due to MSI-X assignment), but configuring XDP results in 64 XDP queues.

So, during XDP program load, when netif_set_xps_queue() is called for the last XDP queue, we get a WARNING with a call trace and KASAN report afterwards (if enabled).

[ 2012.699800] WARNING: net/core/dev.c:2854 at __netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40, CPU#36: xdpsock/103668 [...] [ 2012.700029] RIP: 0010:__netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40 [ 2012.700035] Code: b6 34 06 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 40 38 f0 7c 09 40 84 f6 0f 85 03 0a 00 00 0f b7 44 24 40 66 43 89 44 6a 18 e9 01 fb ff ff <0f> 0b e9 f2 ee ff ff 44 8b 44 24 44 45 85 c0 74 50 4d 85 e4 0f 84 [ 2012.700040] RSP: 0018:ffff8882369aeb28 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2012.700046] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000003f RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2012.700050] RDX: 1ffff1111da3d891 RSI: ffff888120e34250 RDI: ffff8888ed1ec488 [ 2012.700054] RBP: ffff888913281560 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8888ed1ec000 [ 2012.700058] R10: ffff8888a2e83180 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000007fa8 [ 2012.700061] R13: 000000000000003f R14: ffff888120e34854 R15: ffff8889132817c8 [ 2012.700065] FS: 00007fc8ea9ff740(0000) GS:ffff88884cefe000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2012.700069] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2012.700073] CR2: 00007f81c8000020 CR3: 00000002299f8006 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [ 2012.700077] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2012.700080] Call Trace: [ 2012.700084] <TASK> [ 2012.700087] ? ktime_get+0x61/0x150 [ 2012.700097] ? usleep_range_state+0x133/0x1b0 [ 2012.700108] ? __pfx_usleep_range_state+0x10/0x10 [ 2012.700114] netif_set_xps_queue+0x31/0x50 [ 2012.700119] ixgbe_configure_tx_ring+0x472/0x920 [ixgbe] [...] [ 2012.700486] ixgbe_xdp+0x38f/0x750 [ixgbe]

[...]

[ 2012.701094] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __netif_set_xps_queue+0x1ac5/0x1e40 [ 2012.701100] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88888d43cff8 by task xdpsock/103668

Skip XPS configuration for XDP Tx queues.(CVE-2026-74317)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vhost: fix vhost_get_avail_idx for a non empty ring

vhost_get_avail_idx is supposed to report whether it has updated vq->avail_idx. Instead, it returns whether all entries have been consumed, which is usually the same. But not always - in drivers/vhost/net.c and when mergeable buffers have been enabled, the driver checks whether the combined entries are big enough to store an incoming packet. If not, the driver re-enables notifications with available entries still in the ring. The incorrect return value from vhost_get_avail_idx propagates through vhost_enable_notify and causes the host to livelock if the guest is not making progress, as vhost will immediately disable notifications and retry using the available entries.

This goes back to commit d3bb267bbdcb ("vhost: cache avail index in vhost_enable_notify()") which changed vhost_enable_notify() to compare the freshly read avail index against vq->last_avail_idx instead of the previously cached vq->avail_idx. Commit 7ad472397667 ("vhost: move smp_rmb() into vhost_get_avail_idx()") then carried over the same comparison when refactoring vhost_enable_notify() to call the unified vhost_get_avail_idx().

The obvious fix is to make vhost_get_avail_idx do what the comment says it does and report whether new entries have been added.(CVE-2026-74356)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md/raid1,raid10: fix deadlock in read error recovery path

raid1d and raid10d may resubmit a split md cloned bio while handling a read error. In this case, resubmitting the bio can lead to a deadlock if the array is suspended before md_handle_request() acquires an active_io reference via percpu_ref_tryget_live().

Since the cloned bio already holds an active_io reference, trying to acquire another reference via percpu_ref_tryget_live() can lead to a deadlock while the array is suspended.

Fix this by using percpu_ref_get() for md cloned bios.(CVE-2026-74375)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet-tcp: fix page fragment cache leak in error path

In nvmet_tcp_alloc_queue(), when a connection is closed during the allocation process (e.g., nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock() returns -ENOTCONN), the error handling jumps to out_destroy_sq and then to out_ida_remove without draining the page fragment cache.

Although nvmet_tcp_free_cmd() is called in some error paths to release individual page fragments, the underlying page cache reference held by queue->pf_cache is never released. The first allocation using pf_cache is the call to nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmd() for queue->connect, which happens after ida_alloc() returns successfully. This results in a page leak each time a connection fails during allocation, which could lead to memory exhaustion over time if connections are repeatedly opened and closed.

Fix this by calling page_frag_cache_drain() before freeing the queue structure in the out_ida_remove label.(CVE-2026-74386)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()

route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data.

However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length.

Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.(CVE-2026-74473)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()

The neighbour hardware address n->ha can be updated asynchronously by the neighbour subsystem, protected by n->ha_lock seqlock. Reading n->ha without holding the seqlock loop can lead to torn reads or reading a partially updated MAC address.

Use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit() to safely copy n->ha under read_seqbegin()/read_seqretry() lock protection before using it.

Note that arp_reduce() and neigh_reduce() seem to have the same issue left for future patches.(CVE-2026-74475)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

veth: convert frag_list skbs before running XDP

A frag_list skb can reach veth with data_len set but nr_frags zero. veth_convert_skb_to_xdp_buff() only converts skbs that are shared, locked, have frags[], or do not have enough headroom. It later uses skb_is_nonlinear() to decide whether to set XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS and xdp_frags_size.

That exposes frag_list data to XDP as if it were stored in frags[], but frags[] is empty. AF_XDP copy mode can then trust the bogus XDP fragment metadata, walk an empty fragment entry, and crash in memcpy() from __xsk_rcv().

Route non-linear skbs through skb_pp_cow_data() before exposing them to XDP, and only advertise XDP frags when the resulting skb has frags[]. skb_copy_bits() already handles frag_list input, and skb_pp_cow_data() builds frags[] output with skb_add_rx_frag(), which is the representation XDP multi-buffer expects.(CVE-2026-74476)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_reporting: use system_freezable_wq to fix UAF during suspend. During PM freeze (e.g. S3 suspend or S4 hibernation), device drivers like virtio_balloon reset their underlying virtio devices and delete their virtqueues via vdev->config->del_vqs(). However, page reporting work (page_reporting_process) was scheduled on the global system_wq. Because system_wq lacks the WQ_FREEZABLE flag, the PM freezer skips it, leaving page_reporting_process active during suspend. If pages are freed into the buddy allocator while suspending, page reporting triggers virtballoon_free_page_report() on deleted virtqueues, resulting in a Use-After-Free / General Protection Fault.(CVE-2026-74481)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter

The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that same delimiter.

Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan.

If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is not a flag character.(CVE-2026-74485)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry

Registering an entry with the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag opens the interpreter via open_exec() which denies write access to it for as long as the entry exists. Removing the entry closes the interpreter file via filp_close() but never restores write access, leaving the inode's i_writecount permanently negative. Opening the interpreter for writing keeps failing with ETXTBSY long after the entry is gone until the inode is evicted from the inode cache.

Commit 90f601b497d7 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()") fixed the same imbalance in the error path of bm_register_write() but the actual removal path has been leaking the write denial since the introduction of the flag.

Restore write access in put_binfmt_handler() before closing the interpreter file.(CVE-2026-74487)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()\n\nsnd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound\n\n\tbuf_end = ep->max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1;\n\nas a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer\nmakes buf_end negative. The loop guard then compares the u32\nurb->transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual\narithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the\nguard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and\npayload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only\nmax_transfer bytes long.\n\nA USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore\ntrigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds\nwrite when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiCD node.\n\nReturn early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is\nnever entered with a bound that would wrap. The loop is the last\nstatement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not\nrunning.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>(CVE-2026-74499)

In the Linux kernel, a use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability exists in the Bluetooth HCI sync module. hci_find_adv_instance() returns an adv_info pointer that is valid only while hdev->lock is held. The advertising command-sync paths perform instance lookups without that lock and, in some cases, retain the pointer while waiting for a controller response. An advertising termination event can interleave, causing a use-after-free of the adv_info pointer, leading to a slab-use-after-free error as detected by KASAN. An attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability to cause a system crash or potential information disclosure.(CVE-2026-74509)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: s390: pci: Fix memory accounting for pinned/unpinned pages

The account_mem() and unaccount_mem() functions call get_uid() which increments the reference count of struct user_struct on every invocation. But we don't decrement the count by calling free_uid(). It also accounted/unaccounted the pages against the current->mm. But its possible the unaccount_mem() can be called from a different process context than the one that originally pinned the pages.

Let's fix this by storing the pinning process user_struct and mm_struct when accounting for pinned pages, and subsequently free these resources when the pages are unpinned.

[(CVE-2026-74514)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/iommufd: Fix IOPF group ownership UAF

iopf_group_alloc() links each last-page IOPF group into the generic IOPF pending list before invoking the domain fault handler. iommufd_fault_iopf_handler() also queued an accepted group in the IOMMUFD deliver list without removing it from the generic pending list.

When detach or HWPT replacement drops the device's IOPF reference count to zero, an IOMMU driver may call iopf_queue_remove_device(). That function responds to and frees groups through the generic pending list without removing the same groups from IOMMUFD's deliver list or response xarray. A later read, response, or cleanup can then access the freed group and cause a UAF.

Fix this by dequeuing an accepted group from the generic pending list before IOMMUFD queues it for userspace response. Make iopf_group_response() send a response regardless of pending-list membership, so the dequeued group can still be completed by IOMMUFD.(CVE-2026-74520)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: ISO: fix leaking sk after socket release

iso_sock_kill() tests !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket || sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) for early return, but this is always true since sock_orphan(sk) sets SOCK_DEAD, so the sk reference released by socket always leaks, iso_sock_destruct is never called.

The socket reference also leaks when __iso_sock_close() does not set SOCK_ZAPPED, since iso_conn_del() does not call iso_sock_kill() after zapping.

Fix by replacing SOCK_DEAD by BT_SK_KILLED flag that is not used for something else, and lock_sock to ensure iso_sock_kill() puts sk only after socket release only once. Release and iso_conn_del may run concurrently. Call iso_sock_kill() from iso_conn_del() to clean sk up after zapping.

Remove call to iso_sock_kill() from iso_sock_close(), as it's generally no-op there.(CVE-2026-74536)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: udp_tunnel: fix memory leak in udp_tunnel_nic_unregister()

syzbot reported a memory leak [1] in the UDP tunnel NIC offload code.

When device registration fails (e.g. in register_netdevice()), netdev core unwinds by sending a single NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification. If work was queued during NETDEV_REGISTER (utn->work_pending is set), udp_tunnel_nic_unregister() returns early:

if (utn-&gt;work_pending)
    return;

Because failed registrations do not enter netdev_wait_allrefs_any(), no subsequent NETDEV_UNREGISTER rebroadcast will ever occur. As a result, the struct udp_tunnel_nic allocated in udp_tunnel_nic_alloc() is leaked permanently.

Fix this by removing the early return. Instead, synchronously cancel any pending work with cancel_delayed_work_sync() before freeing @utn.

To be able to call cancel_delayed_work_sync() while holding RTNL (the work also needs RTNL), switch udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() to rtnl_trylock(). If RTNL is contended, requeue the work with a 1 jiffy delay (via queue_delayed_work()) to prevent high CPU contention while waiting for RTNL lock.

The utn->work_pending bookkeeping is no longer needed and is removed, as the workqueue core already tracks the pending/running state of the work.

[1] BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888127d5f840 (size 96): comm "syz-executor", pid 5806, jiffies 4294942188 backtrace (crc 99fdb6c8): __kmalloc_noprof+0x3bf/0x550 udp_tunnel_nic_alloc net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_nic.c:756 [inline] udp_tunnel_nic_register net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_nic.c:833 [inline] udp_tunnel_nic_netdevice_event+0x804/0xab0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_nic.c:931 notifier_call_chain+0x59/0x160 kernel/notifier.c:85 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7d/0xb0 net/core/dev.c:2250 register_netdevice+0xc10/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:11478(CVE-2026-74543)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_u32: validate offshift to prevent shift-out-of-bounds

u32_change() copies the user-provided tc_u32_sel.offshift (unsigned char, 0-255) into the kernel knode object without bounds validation. When a packet later hits u32_classify() with TC_U32_VAROFFSET set, it evaluates ntohs(offmask & *data) >> offshift where the left operand is a 16-bit value promoted to a 32-bit int. Any offshift >= 32 is undefined behavior per C11 6.5.7p3, triggerable by an unprivileged user via user/network namespaces.

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/cls_u32.c:236:43 shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type int

Fix this by rejecting offshift >= 16 during filter creation in u32_change().(CVE-2026-74544)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: make nft_object rhltable per table

The nft_object rhltable is global, this allows for accessing objects that are being dismangled from lookup path by other existing netns. Given the nft_obj_destroy() releases the object inmediately, this might lead to use-after-free of these objects that are being released. Make the existing rhltable per table to address this issue to deal with with the nft_rcv_nl_event() path too.

Update nft_obj_lookup() to take the table as non-const, otherwise, compiler complains when passing the objname_ht to rhltable_lookup().(CVE-2026-74565)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: clear new_transport when removing a peer. sctp_process_asconf_param() stores a newly added peer transport in asoc->new_transport. After all parameters in the ASCONF chunk have been processed, sctp_sf_do_asconf() uses this pointer to send a HEARTBEAT to the new transport. An authenticated ASCONF from a remote SCTP peer can add a transport and remove it again with a wildcard DEL-IP parameter in the same chunk. The wildcard deletion preserves the transport on which the ASCONF arrived, but removes the newly added transport through sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(). The removal does not clear asoc->new_transport, leaving it pointing to the removed transport. sctp_sf_do_asconf() then creates a HEARTBEAT whose chunk->transport points to the removed transport without holding a transport reference. After the transport is freed by RCU, a successful ASCONF_ACK for the replacement address releases the queued HEARTBEAT and sctp_outq_select_transport() reads the freed transport's state, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-74586)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: fix use-after-free of cached ASCONF chunk\n\naddip_last_asconf caches the outstanding outbound ASCONF chunk. The normal\nASCONF-ACK completion path releases the chunk and clears the pointer.\n\nHowever, sctp_asconf_queue_teardown() releases the cached chunk without\nclearing addip_last_asconf. During peer restart handling,\nsctp_sf_do_dupcook_a() queues SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE, which invokes\nsctp_asconf_queue_teardown() while the association remains alive and leaves\nthe pointer dangling.\n\nA delayed authenticated ASCONF-ACK can then reach sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(),\nwhich accesses the stale chunk and passes it to sctp_process_asconf_ack(),\ncausing a use-after-free and a second release.\n\nClearing the pointer exposes a race with T4 expiry. Peer restart handling\nqueues the timer stop before the purge, but SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP uses\ntimer_delete(), which does not wait for a callback already running on\nanother CPU. Such a callback can reach sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() after\nthe purge and dereference NULL.\n\nClear addip_last_asconf after releasing the cached chunk, and make\nsctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() consume a stale T4 expiry if no outstanding\nASCONF remains.(CVE-2026-74587)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: keep chunk->transport in step with the list it is queued on. __sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport's transmitted list without updating chunk->transport. The chunk then sits on a live transport's list while chunk->transport still names a different one. If that transport is removed - sctp_assoc_rm_peer() from an ASCONF Delete-IP - sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk is left with a dangling pointer. A SACK that reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer().(CVE-2026-74588)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix sk_redir use-after-free in send verdict. sk_psock_msg_verdict() takes a socket reference for psock->sk_redir. tcp_bpf_send_verdict() copies that pointer while holding the source socket lock, but does not take a reference for the local copy before dropping the lock around tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(). When apply_bytes keeps the cached verdict active, another sendmsg() on the same source socket can consume the remaining bytes and release the cached reference while the first thread still holds only the raw local pointer, leading to a use-after-free. KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free error.(CVE-2026-74589)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Use children field for rcu head and add memory barriers. When an eventfs inode is freed, it sets ei->is_freed and then uses its ei->list to add it to the srcu link list as the list field is a union with the rcu list head. As the ei->list is used to iterate over an SRCU protected list without taking the eventfs_mutex, there's nothing stopping the iteration over that list to see the ei->rcu instead of the ei->list and it will read a corrupt target.(CVE-2026-74605)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Fix use-after-free in eventfs_remove_rec(). eventfs_remove_rec() recursively removes the child at the current loop position. After the recursive call returns, list_for_each_entry() advances by reading list.next from the removed child. If free_ei() drops the final reference, release_ei() reuses the list/rcu union to queue an SRCU callback. The child may be freed before that read. The eventfs_mutex serializes list updates, but it does not keep the removed child alive or prevent the SRCU callback from running.(CVE-2026-74606)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_try_adding_channels(). cifs_try_adding_channels() takes a temporary reference to an interface before dropping iface_lock. If cifs_ses_add_channel() fails, it drops that reference and then increments iface->weight_fulfilled. A concurrent interface list refresh can remove the list reference while channel creation is in progress. In that case, the failure-path kref_put() releases the last reference and frees iface. Updating weight_fulfilled afterward then accesses freed memory.(CVE-2026-74608)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: read le->link under the node lock in tipc_node_link_down(). tipc_node_link_down() caches the link pointer before taking n->lock. The delete=true caller frees that very object under n->lock, so the lock does not protect the cached pointer against it. An in-flight CPU that has read l therefore dereferences freed memory once another CPU frees it: a use-after-free read in tipc_link_is_establishing(), and a use-after-free write via tipc_link_reset() on the establishing branch.(CVE-2026-74609)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tls: don't leave a full plaintext sk_msg ring unpushed

When the copy path in tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() adds the fragment that fills the plaintext sk_msg ring, it does not set full_record, so the record is left full and unpushed. A later splice() then adds to an already full ring: sk_msg_page_add() has no fullness check of its own, so sg.end wraps onto sg.start and the ring appears empty. Fragments added after that overwrite live entries, and sg.size no longer matches what is reachable between sg.start and sg.end, so pushing the record runs the scatterwalk off the end of the scatterlist.

An unprivileged user can trigger this on a loopback TCP socket with the "tls" ULP attached:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 RIP: 0010:memcpy_from_scatterwalk+0x32/0xc0 Call Trace: skcipher_walk_next+0x1d1/0x2c0 gcm_encrypt_aesni_avx+0x1e9/0x220 bpf_exec_tx_verdict+0x3bb/0x860 tls_sw_sendmsg+0xa1a/0xca0 __sys_sendto+0x1da/0x1f0

Set full_record in the copy path when the ring becomes full, and push a record that is already full on entry to the sendmsg loop.(CVE-2026-74610)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: rx: restore msg_iter before TLS 1.3 optimistic retry. tls_decrypt_sg() advances msg->msg_iter when it maps user pages for the optimistic TLS 1.3 zero-copy path. If the decrypted record turns out not to be unpadded application data, tls_decrypt_sw() retries into a kernel skb, but leaves the iterator advanced. The subsequent copy from the skb then writes decrypted bytes again at a later point in the caller iovecs while recvmsg() reports only the post-retry length. A TLS peer can trigger this after the receiver enables TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD.(CVE-2026-74611)

In the Linux kernel, the veth driver has an skb length accounting error after XDP frag adjustment. veth exposes non-linear skb fragments through an xdp_buff. If an XDP program adjusts the fragment area, veth_xdp_rcv_skb() copies xdp_frags_size back to skb->data_len but leaves skb->len containing the old fragment contribution. After a fragment shrink, this makes skb_headlen() larger than the actual linear area. In the reproduced UDP receive path, __skb_datagram_iter() copied 1024 bytes past the actual linear tail to userspace, starting at struct skb_shared_info. Additionally, bpf_xdp_pull_data() can advance data_end while leaving frags present, and the old __skb_put(skb, off) triggers SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT().(CVE-2026-74612)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock/virtio: read virtqueues under worker locks\n\nCommit bd50c5dc182b ("vsock/virtio: add support for device suspend/resume") made the *_run flags transition from false to true when restore installs replacement virtqueues. The RX, TX and event workers read their virtqueue before locking and checking the corresponding flag, so a worker delayed across freeze and restore can observe the replacement queue's running state while retaining a pointer to the deleted queue.\n\nRead each virtqueue under its mutex after checking the run flag, keeping the pointer and state in the same queue generation.(CVE-2026-74614)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: do not arm the ageing timer on a device that is down. vxlan_changelink() arms vxlan->age_timer whenever the requested ageing interval differs from the configured one, but there is no netif_running() test, so the timer is armed even on a device that was never brought up. The only synchronous cancel in the driver is the timer_delete_sync() in vxlan_stop(), which is .ndo_stop. netif_close_many() drops devices without IFF_UP before __dev_close_many() runs, so that cancel is skipped for such a device. When free_netdev() releases the allocation, the timer lives in freed memory while still queued on a timer_base, causing a use-after-free condition that can lead to system crash or code execution.(CVE-2026-74615)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom. xdpf_clone() clones broadcast copies into a single page and sets frame_sz to PAGE_SIZE. __xdp_build_skb_from_frame() later treats that page like a normal XDP frame and expects the usual skb_shared_info tailroom at the end of the buffer. The current check only rejects frames whose linear xdp_frame header, headroom, and packet data exceed PAGE_SIZE. A source frame backed by a larger allocation can still satisfy that check while extending into the clone's required shared-info area. When such a clone is converted back into an skb, build_skb_around() places skb_shared_info over live packet bytes and later writes can corrupt XDP return metadata. Reject clones unless their linear area fits inside SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE), matching the tailroom requirement already enforced by the XDP-to-skb conversion path.(CVE-2026-74616)

In the Linux kernel, an input validation vulnerability exists in the net/sched subsystem. The act_gact and act_police modules lack range checking on the fallback control action. The tcf_action_check_ctrlact() function performs range checking on the primary control action, but act_gact and act_police each carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space (TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT) that never reaches that helper. User space can set TC_ACT_CONSUMED (TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1), which tells callers the action took ownership of the skb, resulting in memory leaks of sk_buff and its data buffer - one leaked sk_buff per packet traversing the filter.(CVE-2026-74620)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: atlantic: free stranded TX buffers on ring deinit\n\naq_vec_deinit() drains the TX rings with a single aq_ring_tx_clean() call, which frees at most AQ_CFG_TX_CLEAN_BUDGET (256) descriptors and stops at hw_head, which no longer moves once aq_vec_stop() has stopped the hardware and NAPI. Completed descriptors beyond the budget and everything still posted in [hw_head, sw_tail) keep their skb or xdp_frame when the interface goes down: aq_vec_ring_free() then frees the buffer ring and the references are lost for good.\n\nToday this is a silent memory leak on every interface down under TX/XDP_TX load. With the conversion of the RX path to page_pool posted for net-next it becomes much more visible: XDP_TX frames carry fragment references on the RX ring's page_pool, so a single stranded frame keeps the pool's inflight count above zero forever. page_pool_destroy() then never completes, the pool is leaked together with its pages, and \"page_pool_release_retry() stalled pool shutdown\" is warned every 60 seconds from that point on, on every ifdown, XDP detach or ring resize under XDP_TX load.(CVE-2026-74623)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_conntrack: defer invalid log until after unlock

TCP and SCTP conntrack paths can emit invalid-packet logs while ct->lock is still held.

When invalid logging is routed to nfnetlink_log and conntrack export is enabled, the log path can re-enter conntrack netlink glue and dump the same conntrack again. Protocol attribute dumping may take ct->lock, so logging while holding that lock can deadlock.

Defer the TCP invalid logs by storing only the minimal log context while ct->lock is held and emitting the log after unlocking. Also make the TCP timeout-lowering invalid path return whether a log is needed, then emit that log after unlocking.

Do the same for the SCTP invalid state-transition log that can be reached while ct->lock is held.

Add a lockdep assertion to nf_ct_l4proto_log_invalid() so future callers that log invalid conntracks while holding ct->lock are caught outside TCP and SCTP as well.(CVE-2026-74624)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix race between update_event_fields and event_define_fields. The following sequence may lead to a race between event_define_fields() and update_event_fields(): CPU0 (loads module A) and CPU1 (loads module B) executing concurrently, where access to class->fields is not protected by event_mutex in trace_event_update_all(), leading to a kernel panic. Fix by taking event_mutex in trace_event_update_all() before trace_event_sem.(CVE-2026-74636)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach. perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When a sibling is detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader. This is not safe when the sibling is detached but kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on the sibling follows the stale group_leader pointer and dereferences the freed leader's context, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-74637)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: fix use-after-free in fib_nhc_update_mtu(). fib_nhc_update_mtu() walks the nexthop exception table under RTNL, but RTNL does not serialize this walk with PMTU exception updates. The walk uses rcu_dereference_protected() with a constant true condition without holding fnhe_lock. The following interleaving can therefore occur: CPU 0 (fib_nhc_update_mtu) loads fnhe while CPU 1 (update_or_create_fnhe) holds fnhe_lock, calls fnhe_remove_oldest() to unlink fnhe, and kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu). CPU 0 then accesses fnhe after grace period, causing a use-after-free. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_nhc_update_mtu+0x3df/0x410.(CVE-2026-74656)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ebt_nflog: pin the NFLOG backend

nf_log_unregister() runs after the per-net teardown so its final RCU grace period also drains readers that obtained the logger from a per-net binding. However, ebt_nflog passes an explicit ULOG log type to nf_log_packet() without holding a reference on the selected logger module, unlike the xt_NFLOG and nft_log frontends.

An ebtables nflog rule can therefore remain callable while nfnetlink_log is unloaded. The resulting interleaving causes a use-after-free condition where CPU 1 dereferences per-net state after CPU 0 has freed it.(CVE-2026-74660)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: frags: publish queues before arming timer. inet_frag_create() arms the fragment queue timer before inserting the queue into the fqdir rhashtable. If the namespace fragment timeout is zero or negative, the timer can run before the queue is published. The timer callback then marks the queue complete, tries to remove a node that is not in the hash table yet, and drops the anticipated hash reference. Creation can subsequently publish the completed queue without restoring that reference, leaving a stale hash node after the caller drops the remaining reference. Publish the queue first and arm the timer while holding the queue lock. This makes timer expiry wait until the queue is visible in the hash table, so inet_frag_kill() can remove the node and balance the hash reference.(CVE-2026-74662)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npacket: synchronize pressure clearing with ring reconfiguration\n\npacket_set_ring() updates the RX ring state under sk_receive_queue.lock, but used to publish the tpacket receive mode through po->prot_hook.func after releasing that lock. packet_poll() and packet_recvmsg() can then run the pressure clearing path after the ring has been cleared while still seeing tpacket_rcv, causing __packet_rcv_has_room() to dereference stale or NULL ring storage.(CVE-2026-74666)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path

packet_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame whose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket, any SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave skb->mac_header unset here.

For frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the MAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS path uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads eth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb->head + (u16)~0, an out-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for one consumer in commit f5089008f90c ("macsec: do not read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()").

packet_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb->data points at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type regardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied header and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC header unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is anchored on the bypass path too.

Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; verified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in f5089008f90c. Compile-tested.(CVE-2026-74667)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

packet: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path

tpacket_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len independently for skb allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len negative.

Snapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb().

The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and header_ops->create is not addressed here.(CVE-2026-74668)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: clear IPv4 options after rebasing tunnel ICMP errors. ip_vs_in_icmp() rebases an skb from the outer ICMP packet to the quoted original request before passing it to icmp_send(). However, IPCB(skb)->opt still describes the outer IPv4 header. A timestamp option in the outer header can therefore leave an offset that points into the quoted transport header after the rebase. __ip_options_echo() treats a byte at that stale location as the option length and copies it into the fixed-size option storage on the __icmp_send() stack, causing a stack out-of-bounds write.(CVE-2026-74669)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipvs: stop estimator after disabled calc phase

IPVS estimator kthread 0 starts with zeroed chain and tick limits until its initial calculation phase completes. If network namespace teardown clears ipvs->enable during that phase, ip_vs_est_calc_phase() can return without installing positive limits.

The kthread can then continue into its main loop and drain est_temp_list with zero chain_max, tick_max and est_max_count values. Each enqueue consumes one available tick row, but est_count never reaches the zero est_max_count value. After all rows are consumed, the row lookup returns IPVS_EST_NTICKS and ip_vs_enqueue_estimator() writes past the ticks and tick_len arrays, causing a buffer overflow.

Exit kthread 0 after the calculation phase if the kthread is stopping or IPVS has been disabled. That keeps temporary estimators from being drained after the limits failed to initialize.

Estimator kthreads can now self-exit before teardown or reload stops kd->task. Keep an extra task reference after creation and release it with kthread_stop_put(), so kd->task remains valid until the stop paths consume that reference.(CVE-2026-74670)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values(). In evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the kernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully initialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit or implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these padding bytes are left uninitialized. When this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer and later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak kernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information. Similar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event. Fix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset() before populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared before the data crosses the security boundary.(CVE-2026-74673)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks. The user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK ioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt() and client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask(). While the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative execution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads. Sanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using array_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array access and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index is out of bounds, preventing any speculative memory access to client evmasks array.(CVE-2026-74683)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: tap: set skb->dev before parsing virtio net header in tap_get_user_xdp()\n\nThe commit 4f61f133f354 ("net: tap: NULL pointer derefence in dev_parse_header_protocol when skb->dev is null") fixed a crash in tap_get_user() by assigning skb->dev before calling tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb(). This is required because virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() may invoke dev_parse_header_protocol(), which dereferences skb->dev. Without the assignment, a NULL pointer dereference can occur.\n\nHowever, tap_get_user_xdp() still parses the virtio-net header before assigning skb->dev. When the vhost TX path passes an XDP buffer containing a GSO virtio-net header but the protocol is set to zero on purpose, tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb() can reach dev_parse_header_protocol() while skb->dev is still NULL, resulting in a crash.\n\nFix this by looking up the tap device and assigning skb->dev before calling tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb(), matching the ordering already used in tap_get_user(). Preserve the existing RCU read-side critical section across dev_queue_xmit().(CVE-2026-74684)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: clear control chunk transport if it is being removed\n\nsctp_make_heartbeat_ack() caches the destination transport in chunk->transport without taking a reference. When src_out_of_asoc_ok is enabled, the HEARTBEAT ACK may remain queued on control_chunk_list instead of being transmitted immediately.\n\nIf the peer transport is removed while the chunk is still queued, sctp_assoc_rm_peer() drops the transport and schedules it for RCU freeing, but only clears cached transport pointers in out_chunk_list. The queued control chunk therefore retains a dangling transport pointer.\n\nOnce an ASCONF_ACK clears the suppression and the queued control chunk is transmitted, SCTP dereferences the stale transport pointer, leading to a use-after-free.\n\nFix this by also clearing chunk->transport for queued control chunks in control_chunk_list when removing the transport.(CVE-2026-74688)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix TFO max_qlen accounting across reuseport migration. A listener's TCP_FASTOPEN max_qlen stops being accurate and lets through far more pending Fast Open requests than it was configured for. This only shows up with SO_REUSEPORT listener migration, where closing a listener hands its still-pending TFO children over to a surviving one. fastopenq.qlen is charged in tcp_fastopen_create_child() when the child is created and uncharged in reqsk_fastopen_remove() when the handshake completes. The uncharge follows rsk_listener of the request the child points at, and inet_reqsk_clone() has repointed the child at a new request owned by the new listener, so the ++ and the -- land on two different sockets. The new listener's qlen drifts negative and its limit no longer binds. Charge the new listener during migration, like reqsk_queue_migrated() already does for queue->young and queue->qlen.(CVE-2026-74696)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation

__skb_udp_tunnel_segment() gets the UDP header before ensuring the tunnel header is in the skb head. If the pull reallocates skb->head, the saved UDP header pointer is no longer valid.

Get the UDP header after the pull to avoid a potential use-after-free.(CVE-2026-74705)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs

The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared map value. __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read opts->netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network namespace reference.

The reference imbalance can occur as follows:

CPU 0 CPU 1 read opts->netns_id (-1) skip get_net_ns_by_id() write opts->netns_id (id) read opts->netns_id (id) put_net(net) / no matching get /

The reverse transition leaks the reference. Repeating the unmatched put can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.

The kernel reported:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700 Call Trace: __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Snapshot every input field of opts with READ_ONCE() before validating or using it. The netns_id snapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair balanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from changing partway through an invocation. The individual reads can still observe an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each selected field value remains stable for that invocation.(CVE-2026-74715)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic

When scalar += pointer is handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the destination register inherits the pointer state from the source pointer. Copying only selected fields is fragile because pointer provenance is tracked by several bpf_reg_state fields.

Use the caller's temporary offset register to preserve the scalar operand while replacing the destination with the full pointer state. This preserves the frame number for PTR_TO_STACK registers and keeps parent identity fields consistent.(CVE-2026-74720)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: avoid out-of-bounds write in ip_vs_nat_icmp. Sashiko warns that a local attacker can modify the packet while it is processed by IPVS. Some places read the IP ihl field multiple times which can cause out-of-bounds access. One such place is ip_vs_nat_icmp where we can write after the validated area. Fix it by providing ciph argument just like it is done for IPv6 and use ciph->len as offset to the embedded transport header. Modify some IPv4 header checks by reading the ihl field only once.(CVE-2026-74724)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor\n\nbond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and takes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the active slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL (RTM_DELLINK -> __bond_release_one() -> bond_alb_handle_active_change()), which already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The monitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no failover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed over, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave's promiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC.\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\n Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor\n RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600)\n process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)\n worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nRe-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so the monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding monitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase (bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only one acting on the pre-trylock decision.(CVE-2026-74726)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Pin the 'struct nfs_server' during a FREE_STATEID call. Dan Aloni reports that he was able to hit a use-after-free bug if a FREE_STATEID operation gets delayed for whatever reason. Fix this by bumping the refcount of the 'struct nfs_server' object for the duration of the FREE_STATEID so it doesn't get cleaned up from underneath us while operations are still in flight.(CVE-2026-74730)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirewire: ohci: fix NULL pointer dereference in ar_context_release\n\nDuring the error handling path of the driver's probe function, a NULL pointer dereference can occur in ar_context_release().\n\nWhen pci_probe() fails early (e.g., if pcim_enable_device() or MMIO mapping fails), the devres cleanup mechanism invokes release_ohci(). This function unconditionally calls ar_context_release() to clean up the asynchronous receive contexts. However, if ar_context_init() was not yet called, ctx->ohci remains NULL (as the fw_ohci structure is zero-initialized by devres_alloc()).\n\nar_context_release() immediately dereferences ctx->ohci to get the dev pointer before checking if the context was actually initialized, leading to a crash.(CVE-2026-74734)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: skip hash tables in u32_bind_class(). u32_walk() enumerates both struct tc_u_hnode and struct tc_u_knode through the walker callback. u32_bind_class() unconditionally casts the passed fh to tc_u_knode and accesses &n->res, so when fh is actually a tc_u_hnode, which has no tcf_result member, this results in a slab-out-of-bounds read of res->classid in tc_cls_bind_class().(CVE-2026-74739)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev

ipvlan devices inherit hard_header_len from phy_dev during ipvlan_init(), but leave needed_headroom and needed_tailroom set to 0.

When the underlying phy_dev (or stacked lower device) requires extra headroom or tailroom for headers/trailers (e.g. macsec, ipsec, wireguard, tunnels, or veth with rx headroom), upper layers calculating packet headroom and tailroom fail to reserve sufficient space.

This can result in reallocation overhead, skb headroom underflows, or KASAN slab-use-after-free crashes when dev_hard_header() / ipvlan_hard_header() prepends header data or when lower devices append tailroom.

Fix this by: 1. Inheriting needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev in ipvlan_init(). 2. Propagating needed_headroom and needed_tailroom updates to attached ipvlans in ipvlan_device_event() when receiving NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE events.(CVE-2026-74744)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: revalidate ihl to prevent out-of-bounds access\n\nWhile the outer IP header is already pulled into the skb head,\nwe must be careful and revalidate the embedded headers after\nreading them from the skb frags to prevent out-of-bounds\naccess.\n\nOne such place reported by Sashiko is ip_vs_nat_icmp() where\nlocal process can change the ihl field and after\nskb_ensure_writable() we can see larger value which is a\nproblem for the ip_send_check(cih) calls.\n\nAdd check to drop the packet if the ihl field is changed.(CVE-2026-74747)

In the Linux kernel, the netfilter/ipset component has a refcount race condition vulnerability. __ip_set_put_byindex() resolved the index to a set pointer under RCU, then took ip_set_ref_lock in __ip_set_put() to decrement set->ref. ip_set_swap() holds that same lock while swapping both the ip_set_list slots and the two sets' ref counters, so it can interleave between the dereference and the lock acquisition, leaving the caller to decrement a set whose reference already moved to the other index and hit BUG_ON(set->ref == 0). list_set_gc() reaches this from timer softirq, which the nfnl mutex does not serialize against swap: an expiring list:set member calls list_set_del() -> ip_set_put_byindex() while IPSET_CMD_SWAP runs on the referenced sets. This vulnerability can cause kernel panic.(CVE-2026-74748)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf: Reject exited events as group leaders

perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state and detaches their group relationships. The event's file descriptor can remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and DEAD events.

A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader. When the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling. The sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.

Reject group leaders in the EXIT state. Perform the check while holding the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach the leader between validation and group attachment.

peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent

In the Linux kernel, a deadlock vulnerability has been found in the ceph filesystem. A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds FILE_RD, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via mds_wanted). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke FILE_RD from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire FILE_RD. If the cap update that should request FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after cap->mds_wanted was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local mds_wanted still includes the file read caps, causing the reader to wait indefinitely.(CVE-2026-80527)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info. handle_reply() stores a ceph_mds_request pointer in current->journal_info while filling the inode and dentry cache from an MDS reply. An allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune dentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4 starts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in current->journal_info as a journal handle and dereferences the request's r_tid as h_transaction, causing a kernel crash.(CVE-2026-80528)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: don't swallow dquot recovery verification errors\n\nxlog_recover_dquot_commit_pass2() validates the recovered dquot with xfs_dqblk_verify() and, on failure, sets error = -EFSCORRUPTED and jumps to out_release. But out_release unconditionally returns 0, so the corruption error is discarded: the caller xlog_recover_items_pass2() sees success, log recovery proceeds as if the dquot were valid, and the corrupt quota buffer can be written back to disk.(CVE-2026-80529)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap

xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item:

memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT),
    item-&gt;ri_buf[i].iov_base,
    nbits &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT);

The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(), which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat model XFS already guards against elsewhere.

Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error.

Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it.(CVE-2026-80536)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

s390/vfio_ccw: Move cp cleanup out of not operational

The fsm_notoper() routine is called when the device has been lost, and is (by definition) no longer operational. Since this can happen asynchronously from the normal behavior of the driver, the cleanup may happen when holding other locks in the calling sequence (notably, the cio subchannel lock).

Push the cleanup of the private->cp resources to a workqueue, where it can be done out from under that lock sequence and a future patch can safely manage the locking requirements.(CVE-2026-80549)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant

The first IDAW in a list does not need to be on a 2K/4K boundary like all others, and so is read separately to accurately calculate the size of the buffer needed to read the full IDAL.

Verify that the address found in the first IDAW is unchanged between reads, to ensure a consistent set of IDAWs being worked with.(CVE-2026-80551)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check

ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid: ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end, leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.

The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.

The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants (ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32) after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.

Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.

idryomov: trim changelog

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp

A corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd indices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts that don't exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and acting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target(). While most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp is not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this (potentially invalid) index as target osd for a (linger) request. Because the osd_state, osd_weight, and osd_addr arrays only contain max_osd entries (with indices 0 to max_osd -1), this leads to out-of-bounds accesses when trying to read values from these arrays.

This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to get_temp_osds(), so that only valid osd indices from primary_temp are used, and it falls back to using the primary from pg_temp or the up set if it is invalid.

idryomov: changelog

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn

restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space. All other SR bits are left under user control.

An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME. With the data MMU disabled the CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local privilege escalation. SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way. The ptrace GPR regset already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason.

Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on signal entry.

Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel's mem=32M); afterwards the same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.(CVE-2026-80560)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: avoid combining some incoming suboptions\n\nSome MPTCP suboptions are mutually exclusive according to the RFC8684, but also because in different places, the code doesn't expect some combinations to be present. That's specially true for suboptions that would be present twice, but with different attributes.\n\nThe new restrictions are the same as the ones applied on the output side, with mptcp_write_options. The same rules can be reused with a small fix: an MP_FASTCLOSE can be used with a DSS when the sender picks this option [1], which is not the case on Linux.(CVE-2026-80587)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

block: stop the timeout timer when releasing a never added disk

disk_release() undoes blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() for a disk whose probe failed before add_disk(), but it only calls blk_mq_exit_queue(). Nothing there stops q->timeout, and that timer rolls forward: it stays pending until it next expires, not until the last request completes. So if the driver issued any I/O before adding the disk, the request_queue is freed while still linked into a timer wheel bucket.

Commit 6f8191fdf41d ("block: simplify disk shutdown") dropped the blk_cleanup_queue() call that used to stop it. __del_gendisk() and blk_mq_destroy_queue() still do; only the probe failure path lost it.

nvme gets there because nvme_update_ns_info() submits Report Zones or FDP io-mgmt-recv on ns->queue before the disk is added, so a later failure - a concurrent reset setting NVME_CTRL_FROZEN, or device_add_disk() failing - lands in put_disk() with the timer armed, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-80589)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/probes: Remove WARN_ON_ONCE from parse_btf_arg. Sashiko found that user can cause this WARN_ON_ONCE() easily with adding a kprobe event based on a raw address with BTF parameter. Since this is not an unexpected condition, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().(CVE-2026-80607)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: processor_idle: Mark LPI enter functions as __cpuidle. When function tracing or Kprobes is enabled, entering an ACPI Low Power Idle (LPI) state triggers the following RCU splat: RCU not on for: acpi_idle_lpi_enter+0x4/0xd8. The acpi_idle_lpi_enter() function is invoked within the cpuidle path after RCU has already been disabled for the current local CPU. Consequently, ftrace's function_trace_call() expects RCU to be actively watching before recording trace data, emitting a warning if it is not. Fix this by annotating acpi_idle_lpi_enter(), the generic __weak stub, and the RISC-V implementation of acpi_processor_ffh_lpi_enter() with __cpuidle. This moves these functions into the '.cpuidle.text' section, implicitly disabling ftrace instrumentation (notrace) along this sensitive path and preventing trace-induced RCU warnings during idle entry.(CVE-2026-80611)

In the Linux kernel, the netfilter synproxy module has an unaligned memory access issue in timestamp adjustment. Use get_unaligned_be32() and put_unaligned_be32() to safely read and write the timestamp fields. This prevents performance degradation due to unaligned memory access or even a crash on strict alignment architectures. This follows the implementation of timestamp parsing in the networking stack at tcp_parse_options() and synproxy_parse_options().(CVE-2026-80637)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/hns: Fix warning in poll cq direct mode\n\nCQs allocated by ib_alloc_cq() always have a comp_handler. Though\nin direct mode this handler is never expected to be called, it\nis still called when the driver is reset, triggering the following\nWARN_ONCE():\n\nCall trace:\nib_cq_completion_direct+0x38/0x60\nhns_roce_cq_completion+0x54/0x90 (hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhns_roce_handle_device_err+Ox1c8/0x340 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhns_roce_hw_v2_uninit_instance.constprop.0+0x34/0x70 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0xc4/0xe0 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\nhclge_notify_roce_client+0x60/0xbc [hclge]\nhclge_reset_rebuild+0x48/0x34c [hclge]\nhclge_reset_subtask+0xcc/0xec [hclge]\nhclge_reset_service_task+0x80/0x160 [hclge]\nhclge_service_task+0x50/0x80 (hclge]\nprocess_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0\nworker_thread+0x154/0x414\nkthread+0x104/0x144\nret_from_fork+0x10/0x18(CVE-2026-80647)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: ensure no dangling hcon references in iso_conn. After iso_conn_del(), ISO sockets should not dereference the hcon any more. Currently, clearing iso_conn::hcon relies on iso_conn_del() releasing the last reference to the iso_conn. Simplify this by explicitly clearing conn->hcon in iso_conn_del(), to avoid more complex reasoning on races about who holds the last reference.(CVE-2026-80721)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria

When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB), BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP (with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).

However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp") loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:

skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space before the MAC header (p->mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check with p->mac_header < 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb->head, causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb->mac_header.
It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q / ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because p->protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.
It checked p->encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark, allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate beyond 64KB.

Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce: - NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto == IPPROTO_TCP - Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark && !p->encapsulation) - Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6 - If ETH_P_IPV6, p->mac_header must be at least sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)

Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at <= 64KB and delivered intact without dropping.

This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like 6.18.y.(CVE-2026-80725)

Severity

10.0 (Critical)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

References

URL

Type

	https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bu…	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31668	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46325	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64082	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64405	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64523	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68082	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68118	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68136	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68138	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68145	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68159	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68205	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68426	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68471	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72098	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72111	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72213	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72247	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72288	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72294	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72321	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72329	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72398	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72404	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72405	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72413	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72420	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72423	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72496	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74268	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74289	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74302	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74317	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74356	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74375	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74386	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74473	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74475	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74476	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74481	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74485	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74487	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74499	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74509	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74514	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74520	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74536	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74543	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74544	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74565	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74586	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74587	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74588	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74589	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74605	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74606	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74608	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74609	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74610	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74611	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74612	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74614	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74615	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74616	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74620	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74623	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74624	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74636	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74637	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74656	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74660	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74662	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74666	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74667	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74668	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74669	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74670	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74673	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74683	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74684	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74688	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74696	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74705	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74715	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74720	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74724	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74726	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74730	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74734	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74739	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74744	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74747	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74748	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74753	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80527	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80528	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80529	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80536	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80549	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80551	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80557	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80558	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80560	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80587	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80589	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80607	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80611	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80637	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80647	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80721	ADVISORY
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80725	ADVISORY

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bpftool-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.0-145.1.25.162.oe2403sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nseg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel\n\nThe seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared\nbetween seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths\ncan perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts\n(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table\nseparation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the\nother reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.\n\nFix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,\nso each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE\n\nThe current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with\npage sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that\nrxe_set_page() is called with mr-\u0026gt;page_size step increments, but the\npage_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing\nPAGE_SIZE of memory.\n\nib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i\u0026gt;=1 either\na) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous\nor\nb) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr-\u0026gt;page_size aligned.\n\nThis leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:\n\n1) page_size \u0026lt; PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K):\n   ibmr-\u0026gt;iova = 0x181800\n   sg[0]: dma_addr=0x181800, len=0x800\n   sg[1]: dma_addr=0x173000, len=0x1000\n\n   Access iova = 0x181800 + 0x810 = 0x182010\n   Expected VA: 0x173010 (second SG, offset 0x10)\n   Before fix:\n     - index = (0x182010 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 12) - (0x181800 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 12) = 1\n     - page_offset = 0x182010 \u0026amp; 0xFFF = 0x10\n     - xarray[1] stores system page base 0x170000\n     - Resulting VA: 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)\n\n2) page_size \u0026gt; PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 64K, system: 4K):\n   ibmr-\u0026gt;iova = 0x18f800\n   sg[0]: dma_addr=0x18f800, len=0x800\n   sg[1]: dma_addr=0x170000, len=0x1000\n\n   Access iova = 0x18f800 + 0x810 = 0x190010\n   Expected VA: 0x170010 (second SG, offset 0x10)\n   Before fix:\n     - index = (0x190010 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 16) - (0x18f800 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 16) = 1\n     - page_offset = 0x190010 \u0026amp; 0xFFFF = 0x10\n     - xarray[1] stores system page for dma_addr 0x170000\n     - Resulting VA: system page of 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)\n\nYi Zhang reported a kernel panic[1] years ago related to this defect.\n\nSolution:\n1. Replace xarray with pre-allocated rxe_mr_page array for sequential\n   indexing (all MR page indices are contiguous)\n2. Each rxe_mr_page stores both struct page* and offset within the\n   system page\n3. Handle MR page_size != PAGE_SIZE relationships:\n   - page_size \u0026gt; PAGE_SIZE: Split MR pages into multiple system pages\n   - page_size \u0026lt;= PAGE_SIZE: Store offset within system page\n4. Add boundary checks and compatibility validation\n\nThis ensures correct iova-to-va conversion regardless of MR page size\nand system PAGE_SIZE relationship, while improving performance through\narray-based sequential access.\n\nTests on 4K and 64K PAGE_SIZE hosts:\n- rdma-core/pytests\n  $ ./build/bin/run_tests.py  --dev eth0_rxe\n- blktest:\n  $ TIMEOUT=30 QUICK_RUN=1 USE_RXE=1 NVMET_TRTYPES=rdma ./check nvme srp rnbd\n\n[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9XRqE25jyVw9rj9YugffLn5+f=1znaBEnu1usLOciD+g@mail.gmail.com/T/(CVE-2026-46325)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written into the target task\u0026apos;s pt_regs, corrupting its register state and potentially leaking kernel stack contents. compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs() even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of the signal-returning task\u0026apos;s register state on error.(CVE-2026-64082)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn()\n\nhci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev-\u0026gt;sent_cmd) when a connection\nwas pending, but hdev-\u0026gt;sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still\nHCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general\nprotection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path.\n\nInstead of inspecting hdev-\u0026gt;sent_cmd, track the in-flight create\nconnection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and\nroute all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which\ndispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command\nis in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel\nfunction holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker\ntakes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued\ncommand cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete\nand let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and\nhci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued\ncommand is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this\nconnection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated\ncommand that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag\nmechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection.\n\nhci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync() clear\nHCI_CONN_CREATE after the create command completes, but the command\nstatus handler can free conn via hci_conn_del() (for example when the\ncontroller rejects the connection) while the worker is still blocked on\nthe connection complete event. Hold a reference on conn across the\ncreate command so the flag can be cleared without a use-after-free.(CVE-2026-64405)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit\n\nhandshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing\nreq-\u0026gt;hr_sk-\u0026gt;sk_socket to survive the window between\nhandshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().\nThe submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that.  sk_refcnt keeps\nstruct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock-\u0026gt;file: when\nthe consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears\nthe socket down regardless of any sock_hold.\n\nAdd an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an\nexplicit reference on sock-\u0026gt;file during handshake_req_submit().\nhandshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the\nreference on the completion-bit-winning path.\n\nThe submit error path must also release the file reference, but\nafter rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can\ndiscover the request and race the error path.  Gate the error-path\ncleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction\n-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same\nserialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()\nalready use.  When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit\nerror path returns without touching the request; socket teardown\nhandles final destruction.\n\nThe accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change\ncomes in the next patch.(CVE-2026-64523)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()\n\ndecode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations\nthat allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds\nreads:\n\n1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds\n   check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the\n   internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an\n   OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with\n   p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads\n   4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is\n   passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.\n\n   The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses\n   ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call.\n   decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.\n\n2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding\n   bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop\n   advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads\n   one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed\n   directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by\n   callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct\n   influence over the lock type field.\n\nFix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:\n  ceph_decode_32(p) -\u0026gt; ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers,\n                                           err_inval)\n  ceph_decode_8(p)  -\u0026gt; ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type,\n                                          err_free_lockers)\n\nThe goto targets differ intentionally:\n  err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for\n  the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated\n  and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().\n\n  err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the\n  post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must\n  be freed.\n\nret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that\nerr_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation.\nWithout this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from\nthe successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.\n\n-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the\nOSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure\nclass to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.\n\nAttacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph\ndeployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the\nlock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).\n\n[ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ](CVE-2026-68082)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: challenge ACK for non-exact RST in SYN-RECEIVED\n\nThe SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an\nin-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT.  A\nnon-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a\nchallenge ACK.\n\nRFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in\nSYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact\nin-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped.\n\nApply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC\nsequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order.  Factor the per-netns\nchallenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets\ncan share it.  Use the request socket\u0026apos;s send_ack() callback and its own\nout-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response.(CVE-2026-68118)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: gro: fix double aggregation of flush-marked skbs\n\nCommit 0ab03f353d36 (\u0026quot;net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO\npacket.\u0026quot;) added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but\nskb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation.\n\nAs a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;flush may still be\nre-aggregated.\n\nThis allows already-GRO\u0026apos;d packets with existing frag_list to be\nre-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain\nstructure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets,\nit encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.\n\nScenario (Tethering/Device forwarding):\n  1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list\n  2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set\n  3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called\n  4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag\n  5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs)\n  6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list\n\nRoot cause in skb_segment():\n  The check at line ~4891:\n    if (hsize \u0026lt;= 0 \u0026amp;\u0026amp; i \u0026gt;= nfrags \u0026amp;\u0026amp; skb_headlen(list_skb) \u0026amp;\u0026amp;\n        (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {\n\n  When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is\n  a NULL pointer from skb-\u0026gt;next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference\n  NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.\n\nCall Trace:\n skb_headlen(NULL skb)\n skb_segment\n tcp_gso_segment\n tcp4_gso_segment\n inet_gso_segment\n skb_mac_gso_segment\n __skb_gso_segment\n skb_gso_segment\n validate_xmit_skb\n validate_xmit_skb_list\n sch_direct_xmit\n qdisc_restart\n __qdisc_run\n qdisc_run\n net_tx_action\n\nFix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;flush validation to the early-return check in\nskb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of\nskb_gro_receive().(CVE-2026-68136)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: serialize qdisc_rtab_list against concurrent get/put\n\nqdisc_get_rtab() and qdisc_put_rtab() mutate the process-global singly\nlinked list qdisc_rtab_list and a plain non-atomic \u0026apos;int refcnt\u0026apos; with no\nlock. This was only safe because every caller historically held the RTNL\nmutex, which serialized all rate-table lookups, inserts and frees.\n\nThat invariant no longer holds. cls_flower sets\nTCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED, so tc_new_tfilter() keeps rtnl_held == false\nfor it and sets TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL. That flag propagates through\ntcf_exts_validate_ex() -\u0026gt; tcf_action_init() -\u0026gt; tcf_action_init_1() -\u0026gt;\ntcf_police_init(), which calls qdisc_get_rtab()/qdisc_put_rtab() with the\nRTNL mutex NOT held. Two RTM_NEWTFILTER requests on different CPUs, each\nadding a flower filter with a police action carrying the same rate, then\nrace on qdisc_rtab_list and on the non-atomic refcnt, leading to a\nuse-after-free / double-free of the kmalloc-2k struct qdisc_rate_table.\nqdisc_rtab_list is a single global (not per-netns), so the corrupted\nobject is shared system-wide.\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160\n   qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160\n   tcf_police_init+0xda9/0x1590\n   tcf_action_init_1+0x460/0x6b0\n   tcf_action_init+0x439/0xa40\n   tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x42d/0x550\n   fl_change+0xddd/0x7da0\n   tc_new_tfilter+0xaa7/0x2420\n   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90\n  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048\n\nProtect qdisc_rtab_list and the refcount with a dedicated spinlock. The\n(sleeping, GFP_KERNEL) allocation in qdisc_get_rtab() is performed before\ntaking the lock; if a concurrent inserter added an identical table in the\nmeantime the freshly allocated one is freed under the lock, so no\nduplicate is leaked. qdisc_put_rtab() now decrements the refcount and\nunlinks under the same lock.(CVE-2026-68138)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range\n\nifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk\nas (off + len - 1) \u0026gt;\u0026gt; i_blkbits.  When off is 0 and len is 0, the\nunsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge\nlast_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far\nbeyond the ifs-\u0026gt;state allocation.\n\nRegarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len\ncannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is\nreachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic()\nreturns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate,\nthe guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because\n!folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called\nwith copied == 0.\n\nAdd a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a\nzero-length range is a no-op.(CVE-2026-68145)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE\n\n__decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects\nvalues large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to\nCEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and\napply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size\non-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends\nan OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack\nout-of-bounds write.\n\nAn OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer\nentries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so\nit also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against.\n\n  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds\n  Write of size 4 ... by task exploit\n   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)\n   ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833)\n   calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638)\n   __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394)\n   ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490)\n   ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164)\n   rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899)\n   do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138)\n   ...\n  kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670!\n\n[ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ](CVE-2026-68159)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: v4l2-fwnode: Fix subdev owner overwritten in v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor()\n\nThe v4l2 helper v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() calls\nv4l2_async_register_subdev(), which is a macro that expands to\n__v4l2_async_register_subdev(sd,THIS_MODULE). Since the macro is expanded\ninside v4l2-fwnode.c, THIS_MODULE resolves to the v4l2-fwnode module\nrather than the sensor driver module that originally set sd-\u0026gt;owner. When\nv4l2-fwnode is built-in, THIS_MODULE evaluates to NULL, which then\noverwrites the sensor driver\u0026apos;s owner with NULL.\n\nThis causes the problem that the sensor module\u0026apos;s reference count is never\nincremented during async registration, so the module can be removed while\nthe subdevice is still in use by a notifier (e.g., a CSI-2 receiver\nbridge driver).\n\nFix this by renaming v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() to\n__v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() with an added explicit module\nargument and introducing a wrapper macro:\n    #define v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd) \\\n        __v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd, THIS_MODULE)\n\nThis ensures the sensor driver module is properly referenced even when\nthe sensor driver does not init the owner field before calling\nv4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() and prevents premature module removal.(CVE-2026-68205)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: fix stale skb-\u0026gt;prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment\n\nskb_gso_segment() leaves the segment list head with -\u0026gt;prev pointing at\nthe last segment, an invariant validate_xmit_skb_list() relies on when\nit sets its tail pointer (tail = skb-\u0026gt;prev).\n\nWhen validate_xmit_xfrm() walks a GSO list and some segments are stolen\nby async crypto (-\u0026gt;xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), those segments are\nunlinked from the list but the head -\u0026gt;prev is never updated.  If the\nlast segment is the one stolen, the returned head still has -\u0026gt;prev\npointing at it, even though it is now owned by the crypto engine and may\nbe freed.  validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail-\u0026gt;next = skb, writing\nthrough that stale pointer -- a use-after-free.\n\nRepoint skb-\u0026gt;prev at the last retained segment before returning.(CVE-2026-68426)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ieee80211: validate MLE common info length\n\nieee80211_mle_common_size() uses the first common-info octet as the\ncommon information length for all known MLE types. However,\nieee80211_mle_size_ok() only validates that octet for Basic, Probe\nRequest, and TDLS MLEs.\n\nReconfiguration MLEs also skipped the length octet when calculating the\nminimum common size, and Priority Access MLEs skipped validation of the\nadvertised common information length.\n\nAccount for the Reconfiguration common-info length octet and validate\nthe advertised common information length for all known MLE types. Keep\nunknown-type handling unchanged.\n\n[remove now misleading comment](CVE-2026-68471)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm-verity: fix buffer overflow in FEC calculation\n\nThere\u0026apos;s a buffer overflow in dm-verity-fec:\n\nif (neras \u0026amp;\u0026amp; *neras \u0026lt;= v-\u0026gt;fec-\u0026gt;roots)\n\tfio-\u0026gt;erasures[(*neras)++] = i;\n\nThis allows *neras to reach roots + 1 (the post-increment pushes it past\nroots). This value is then passed as no_eras to decode_rs8(). Inside the\nRS decoder (lib/reed_solomon/decode_rs.c:113-121), the erasure locator\npolynomial loop writes lambda[j] where j can reach nroots + 1 \u2014 one\nelement past the end of lambda[] (which is sized nroots + 1, valid\nindices 0..nroots). The out-of-bounds write lands on syn[0], corrupting\nthe syndrome buffer.(CVE-2026-72098)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reset register bounds before narrowing retval range in check_mem_access()\n\nWhen the BPF verifier processes a context load of an LSM hook return\nvalue, it calls __mark_reg_s32_range() to narrow the register to the\nhook\u0026apos;s valid range. However, __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects the new\nrange with the register\u0026apos;s existing bounds using max_t()/min_t() rather\nthan replacing them.\n\nIf the destination register carries stale bounds from a prior instruction\n(e.g. BPF_MOV64_IMM), the intersection can produce a range narrower than\nreality. The verifier then believes it knows the register\u0026apos;s exact value,\nwhile at runtime the actual hook return value is loaded, creating a\nverifier/runtime mismatch that can be used to bypass BPF memory safety\nchecks.\n\nThe else branch already calls mark_reg_unknown() to reset register state\nbefore any narrowing. Apply the same reset in the is_retval path so\nstale bounds are cleared before __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects.(CVE-2026-72111)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch\n\nIn alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd\nand non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges.  When map_chg is set,\nhugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but\nthe immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg\nwith the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.\n\nAs a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong\n(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio\u0026apos;s rsvd slot.\n\nWhen the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls\nboth hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and\nhugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd().  The rsvd uncharge reads back the\nwrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never\ncharged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:\n\n  page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512\n  WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel\n\nFix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the\nrsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent\nthrough their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths.(CVE-2026-72213)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_conncount: fix zone comparison in tuple dedup\n\nThe \u0026quot;already exists\u0026quot; dedup logic in __nf_conncount_add() decides\nwhether a connection has already been counted and can be skipped instead\nof incrementing the connlimit count.  It compares the conntrack zone of a\nlist entry with the zone of the connection being added using\nnf_ct_zone_id() and nf_ct_zone_equal(), passing conn-\u0026gt;zone.dir or\nzone-\u0026gt;dir as the direction argument.\n\nThose helpers take enum ip_conntrack_dir values: IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL is 0\nand IP_CT_DIR_REPLY is 1.  However, zone-\u0026gt;dir is a u8 bitmask:\nNF_CT_ZONE_DIR_ORIG is 1, NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_REPL is 2 and\nNF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR is 3.  Passing that bitmask as the enum direction\nshifts the meaning of every non-zero value.  An ORIG-only zone passes 1\nand is tested as REPLY, while REPL-only and default zones pass 2 or 3 and\ntest bits beyond the valid direction range.  In those cases\nnf_ct_zone_id() can fall back to NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID instead of using\nthe real zone id, so different zones can be treated as equal and dedup\ncollapses to tuple equality alone.\n\nnf_conncount stores and compares the original-direction tuple for a\nconnection.  If an skb already has an attached conntrack entry,\nget_ct_or_tuple_from_skb() explicitly copies\nct-\u0026gt;tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, regardless of the packet\u0026apos;s\nctinfo.  Therefore the zone comparison in the tuple dedup path must use\nIP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL as well; the zone direction bitmask describes where a\nzone id applies, not which direction this conncount tuple represents.\n\nFix the two dedup comparisons by passing IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL directly.\nDo not special-case NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR and do not compare raw zone\nids: using the existing helpers with IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL preserves the\ndirection-aware NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID fallback.  A default bidirectional\nzone contains the ORIG bit, so it naturally returns the real zone id;\nreply-only zones continue to fall back for original-direction tuple\ncomparisons.(CVE-2026-72247)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: vgic: Handle race between interrupt affinity change and LPI disabling\n\nHyunwoo Kim reports some really bad races should the following\nsituation occur:\n\n- LPI-I is pending in vcpu-B\u0026apos;s AP list\n- vcpu-A writes to vcpu-B\u0026apos;s RD to disable its LPIs\n- vcpu-C moves I from B to C\n\nIf the last two race nicely enough, vgic_prune_ap_list() can drop\nthe irq and AP list locks, reacquire them, and in the interval\nthe irq has been freed. UAF follows.\n\nThe fix is two-fold:\n\n- Before dropping the irq and ap_list locks, take a reference on\n  the irq\n\n- Do not try to handle migration of the pending bit: there is no\n  expectation that this state is retained, as per the architecture\n\nWith that, we\u0026apos;re sure that the interrupt is still around, and we\nsafely remove it from the AP list as it has no target at this\nstage (unless another interrupt fires, but that\u0026apos;s another story).(CVE-2026-72288)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nLoongArch: KVM: Check irq validity in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt()\n\nFunction kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt() can be called from userspace, here\nadd irq validility cheking in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt().(CVE-2026-72294)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: igmp: Fix potential memory leaks in igmp_mod_timer() and igmp_stop_timer()\n\nWhen a timer is deleted and not re-armed in igmp_mod_timer(), or stopped\nin igmp_stop_timer(), the code currently decrements the reference counter\nof the multicast list entry @im using refcount_dec(\u0026amp;im-\u0026gt;refcnt).\n\nHowever, both functions can be called from the RCU reader path:\n- igmp_mod_timer() via igmp_heard_query() -\u0026gt; for_each_pmc_rcu()\n- igmp_stop_timer() via igmp_rcv() -\u0026gt; igmp_heard_report()\n\nIf the group im was concurrently removed from the list by ip_mc_dec_group(),\nits reference count might have already been decremented to 1.\n\nIn this case, timer_delete() succeeds, and refcount_dec() decrements\nthe refcount from 1 to 0. Since refcount_dec() does not free the object\nwhen it hits 0 (unlike ip_ma_put()), the im structure is leaked.\n\nFix this by using ip_ma_put(im) instead of refcount_dec(\u0026amp;im-\u0026gt;refcnt),\nand deferring the put until after the spinlock is released.(CVE-2026-72321)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/liquidio: drop cached VF pci_dev LUT\n\nThe PF SR-IOV enable path caches VF pci_dev pointers in\ndpiring_to_vfpcidev_lut[] by iterating with pci_get_device(). Those\nentries do not own a reference, because the iterator drops the previous\ndevice reference on each step. The cached pointer is then dereferenced\nlater when handling OCTEON_VF_FLR_REQUEST.\n\nReplace the cached VF mapping with runtime lookup on the mailbox DPI\nring: derive the VF index from q_no, resolve the VF via exported PCI\nIOV helpers, validate it with the PF pointer and VF ID, then issue\npcie_flr() and drop the reference with pci_dev_put(). Remove the\nunused VF lookup table initialization and cleanup.(CVE-2026-72329)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking\n\nIn SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server\nand embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then\nreturns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and\nreconstructs the original INIT chunk.\n\nWhen cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected\nagainst tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification\nis safe.\n\nHowever, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT\ncan no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly\nvalidated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.\n\nAdd sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO\nprocessing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())\nwhen cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is\nfreed and the packet is discarded.\n\nAlso tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the\nembedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT\nchunk.\n\nFinally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using\nthe actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-\u0026gt;chunk_end, since the\nINIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.(CVE-2026-72398)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()\n\nTIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its\nreplicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for\nconcurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish:\n\nstatic void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work)\n{\n...\n\tlist_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, \u0026amp;ub-\u0026gt;rcast.list, list) {\n\t\tdst_cache_destroy(\u0026amp;rcast-\u0026gt;dst_cache);\n\t\tlist_del_rcu(\u0026amp;rcast-\u0026gt;list);\n\t\tkfree_rcu(rcast, rcu);\n\t}\n...\n\tdst_cache_destroy(\u0026amp;ub-\u0026gt;rcast.dst_cache);\n\tudp_tunnel_sock_release(ub-\u0026gt;sk);\n\tsynchronize_net();\n...\n}\n\nThis is highly buggy because dst_cache_destroy() immediately frees the\nper-CPU cache memory (free_percpu()) and releases the cached dst\nentries without any synchronization.\n\nIf a concurrent transmitter (e.g., tipc_udp_xmit()) is running on another\nCPU under RCU protection, it can call dst_cache_get() concurrently,\nleading to:\n1. Use-After-Free on the per-CPU cache pointer itself (crash).\n2. \u0026quot;rcuref - imbalanced put()\u0026quot; warning if it attempts to release a\n   dst that was concurrently released by dst_cache_destroy().\n\nFurthermore, calling kfree(ub) immediately after synchronize_net() without\nclosing the socket first (or waiting after closing it) leaves a window\nwhere a concurrent receiver (tipc_udp_recv()) could start after\nsynchronize_net(), access ub, and suffer a UAF when kfree(ub) runs.\n\nTo fix this, we must defer dst_cache_destroy() and kfree(ub) until after\nwe have ensured that no more readers can see the bearer/socket and all\nexisting readers have finished:\n\n1. Defer rcast entry destruction (both dst_cache_destroy() and kfree())\n   to an RCU callback using call_rcu_hurry().\n   Using call_rcu_hurry() ensures the dst entries are released quickly.\n\n2. Release the bearer socket using udp_tunnel_sock_release() (stops\n   new receive readers).\n\n3. Call synchronize_net() to wait for all outstanding RCU readers\n   (both transmit and receive) to finish.\n\n4. Now that it is safe, call dst_cache_destroy() on the main bearer\n   cache, and free ub.\n\nNote: 3) and 4) can be changed later in net-next to also use\ncall_rcu_hurry() and get rid of the synchronize_net() latency.(CVE-2026-72404)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync\n\nYue Sun reported a use-after-free and debugobjects warning in\nudp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() during concurrent device operations.\n\nThe workqueue core clears the internal pending bit before invoking the\nworker. At that point, a concurrent thread can queue the work again.\nWhen the already running worker eventually clears the work_pending flag\nto 0, it mistakenly clears the flag for the newly queued instance.\nudp_tunnel_nic_unregister() then observes work_pending as 0 and frees\nthe structure while the second work item is still active in the queue,\nleading to UAF.\n\nFix this by returning early in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync() if\nwork_pending is already set, preventing redundant work queueing.(CVE-2026-72405)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: fix err_chunk memory leaks in INIT handling\n\nWhen sctp_verify_init() encounters unrecognized parameters, it allocates an\nerr_chunk to report them. However, this chunk is leaked in several code\npaths:\n\n1. In sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(), if security_sctp_assoc_request() fails after\n   sctp_verify_init() has populated err_chunk, the function returns\n   immediately without freeing it.\n\n2. In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), the same leak occurs on the\n   security_sctp_assoc_request() failure path.\n\n3. In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), on the success path after copying\n   unrecognized parameters to the INIT-ACK, the function returns without\n   freeing err_chunk, unlike sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() which properly frees\n   it.\n\nFix all three leaks by adding sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk) calls before\nreturning in the error paths and on the success path in\nsctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().(CVE-2026-72413)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmd/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches\n\nKCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request()\non sh-\u0026gt;dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..\n\nand .. one possible scenario is:\n\nCPU1                            CPU2\nbreak_stripe_batch_list(sh1)\n-\u0026gt; handle sh2\n-\u0026gt; lock(sh2)\n-\u0026gt; sh2-\u0026gt;batch_head = NULL\n-\u0026gt; unlock(sh2)\n-\u0026gt; test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-\u0026gt;dev[i].flags)\n-\u0026gt; wake_up_bit(sh2-\u0026gt;dev[i].flags)\n                                raid5_make_request()\n                                -\u0026gt; add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)\n                                -\u0026gt; lock(sh2)\n                                -\u0026gt; stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true\n\t\t\t\t   batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap\n\t\t\t\t   exist bio on sh2 -\u0026gt; true\n                                -\u0026gt; set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-\u0026gt;dev[i].flags)\n                                -\u0026gt; unlock(sh2)\n                                -\u0026gt; wait_on_bit(sh2-\u0026gt;dev[i].flags)\n-\u0026gt; sh2-\u0026gt;dev[i].flags = sh1-\u0026gt;dev[i].flags \u0026amp; ~R5_Overlap\n\nNo wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever...\n\nFix by :\n- Expand the protect zone.\n- Use batch_head\u0026apos;s device flag\u0026apos;s snaphot when no held head_sh-\u0026gt;stripe_lock.\n- Move sh/head_sh-\u0026gt;batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,\n  any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh-\u0026gt;stripe_lock now either:\n\t- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps()\n\t  under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait ) , or ,\n\t- sees batch_head == NULL, only after dev[i].flags has already been\n\t  set and the prior R5_Overlap waiters worken.\n\nKCSAN report:\n================================================\n  BUG: KCSAN: data-race in break_stripe_batch_list / raid5_make_request\n\n  write (marked) to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4042 on cpu 0:\n    raid5_make_request+0xea0/0x2930\n    md_handle_request+0x4a2/0xa40\n    md_submit_bio+0x109/0x1a0\n    __submit_bio+0x2ec/0x390\n    submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x457/0x710\n    submit_bio_noacct+0x2a7/0xc20\n    submit_bio+0x56/0x250\n    blkdev_direct_IO+0x54c/0xda0\n    blkdev_write_iter+0x38f/0x570\n    aio_write+0x22b/0x490\n    io_submit_one+0xa51/0xf70\n    __x64_sys_io_submit+0xf7/0x220\n    x64_sys_call+0x1907/0x1c60\n    do_syscall_64+0x130/0x570\n    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n  read to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4010 on cpu 5:\n    break_stripe_batch_list+0x249/0x480\n    handle_stripe_clean_event+0x720/0x9b0\n    handle_stripe+0x32fb/0x4500\n    handle_active_stripes.isra.0+0x6e0/0xa50\n    raid5d+0x7e0/0xba0\n    md_thread+0x15a/0x2d0\n    kthread+0x1e3/0x220\n    ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x410\n    ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n  value changed: 0x0000000000000019 -\u0026gt; 0x0000000000000099 --\u0026gt; R5_Overlap(CVE-2026-72420)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Guard conntrack opts error writes\n\nThe conntrack lookup and allocation kfuncs take an opts pointer\ntogether with an opts__sz argument. The verifier checks only the memory\nrange described by opts__sz, but the wrappers unconditionally write\nopts-\u0026gt;error whenever the internal lookup or allocation helper returns an\nerror.\n\nFor an invalid size smaller than the end of opts-\u0026gt;error, that write can\nland outside the verifier-checked range. Keep returning NULL for invalid\narguments, but only report the error through opts-\u0026gt;error when the\nsupplied size includes the field.\n\nThis preserves error reporting for the supported 12-byte and 16-byte\nlayouts, and for other invalid sizes that still include opts-\u0026gt;error.(CVE-2026-72423)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/bnxt_re: Proper rollback if the ioremap fails\n\nbnxt_qplib_alloc_dpi returns success even if ioremap fails.\nAdd the proper rollback when the ioremap fails and return\n-ENOMEM status.(CVE-2026-72496)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: clear sock_ops cb flags before force-closing a child socket\n\nA child socket inherits the listener\u0026apos;s bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags via\nsk_clone_lock(). If its setup fails in tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() /\ntcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(), the child is freed through put_and_exit, where\ninet_csk_prepare_forced_close() drops the socket lock and tcp_done() runs\nwithout it.\n\nIf BPF_SOCK_OPS_STATE_CB_FLAG was inherited, tcp_done() -\u0026gt; tcp_set_state()\ncalls tcp_call_bpf(), which expects the lock and trips sock_owned_by_me():\n\n  WARNING: include/net/sock.h:1799 at tcp_set_state+0x433/0x550\n  RIP: 0010:tcp_set_state+0x433/0x550 include/net/sock.h:1799\n  Call Trace:\n   \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n   tcp_done+0xba/0x250 net/ipv4/tcp.c:5095\n   tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x850/0xa50 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1787\n   tcp_check_req+0xf30/0x1360 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:926\n   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1047/0x1b50 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2164\n   \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;\n\nThe child is freed before it is ever established, so it should run no\nsock_ops callback. Clear its cb flags in inet_csk_prepare_for_destroy_sock(),\nthe common point for the IPv4, IPv6 and chtls forced-close paths and for the\nMPTCP -\u0026gt;syn_recv_sock() failure path (dispose_child), which reaches tcp_done()\non a child that was never established too.(CVE-2026-74268)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: fib: Don\u0026apos;t dump dying fib_info in fib_leaf_notify().\n\nsyzbot reported use-after-free in nsim_fib4_prepare_event(). [0]\n\nThe problem is that the following functions call fib_info_hold() /\nrefcount_inc() while dumping fib_info under RCU, which is unsafe.\n\n  * mlxsw_sp_router_fib4_event()\n  * rocker_router_fib_event()\n  * nsim_fib4_prepare_event()\n\nrefcount_inc_not_zero() must be used, but it would be too late\nthere.\n\nLet\u0026apos;s guarantee the lifetime of fib_info in fib_leaf_notify().\n\nNote that IPv6 does not need the corresponding change since\nfib6_table_dump() holds fib6_table.tb6_lock.\n\n[0]:\nrefcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\nWARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25, CPU#0: kworker/u8:15/3420\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3420 Comm: kworker/u8:15 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/18/2026\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\nRIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25\nCode: eb 66 85 db 74 3e 83 fb 01 75 4c e8 1b f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 84 cb f1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 4a e8 08 f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 81 cb f1 0a \u0026lt;67\u0026gt; 48 0f b9 3a eb 37 e8 f5 f0 22 fd 48 8d 3d 7e cb f1 0a 67 48 0f\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000f2c7270 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: ffffffff84a18858 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff888032ff9ec0\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8f9353e0\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888032ff9ec0 R09: 0000000000000005\nR10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff8880570cc000\nR13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802b40563c R15: ffff8880570cc000\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888126173000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007fb1f4d5d000 CR3: 000000006072a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:-1 [inline]\n __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:366 [inline]\n refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:383 [inline]\n fib_info_hold include/net/ip_fib.h:629 [inline]\n nsim_fib4_prepare_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:930 [inline]\n nsim_fib_event_schedule_work drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1000 [inline]\n nsim_fib_event_nb+0x1055/0x1240 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1043\n call_fib_notifier+0x45/0x80 net/core/fib_notifier.c:25\n call_fib_entry_notifier net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:90 [inline]\n fib_leaf_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2176 [inline]\n fib_table_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2194 [inline]\n fib_notify+0x36b/0x5e0 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2217\n fib_net_dump net/core/fib_notifier.c:70 [inline]\n register_fib_notifier+0x184/0x360 net/core/fib_notifier.c:108\n nsim_fib_create+0x85d/0x9f0 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1596\n nsim_dev_reload_create drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1604 [inline]\n nsim_dev_reload_up+0x374/0x7c0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1058\n devlink_reload+0x501/0x8d0 net/devlink/dev.c:475\n devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0x1ff/0x420 net/devlink/core.c:558\n ops_pre_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:161 [inline]\n ops_undo_list+0x187/0x940 net/core/net_namespace.c:234\n cleanup_net+0x56e/0x800 net/core/net_namespace.c:702\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3314 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860 kernel/workqueue.c:3397\n worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:3478\n kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436\n ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2026-74289)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_core: Fix UAF in hci_unregister_dev()\n\nhci_unregister_dev() does not disable cmd_timer and ncmd_timer\nbefore the hci_dev structure is freed. If a timeout fires\nduring device teardown, the callback dereferences freed memory\n(including the hdev-\u0026gt;reset function pointer), leading to a\nuse-after-free.\n\nAdd disable_delayed_work_sync() calls alongside the existing\ndisable_work_sync() calls to ensure both timers are fully\nquiesced before teardown proceeds.(CVE-2026-74302)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nixgbe: do not configure xps for XDP queues\n\nnetif_set_xps_queue() should not be called for an XDP Tx queue, since such\nqueues are not netdev-exposed. On systems with number of CPUs \u0026gt;=64, on E610\nadapter, netdev is configured with maximum number queue pairs being 63\n(due to MSI-X assignment), but configuring XDP results in 64 XDP queues.\n\nSo, during XDP program load, when netif_set_xps_queue() is called for the\nlast XDP queue, we get a WARNING with a call trace and KASAN report\nafterwards (if enabled).\n\n[ 2012.699800] WARNING: net/core/dev.c:2854 at __netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40, CPU#36: xdpsock/103668\n[...]\n[ 2012.700029] RIP: 0010:__netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40\n[ 2012.700035] Code: b6 34 06 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 40 38 f0 7c 09 40 84 f6 0f 85 03 0a 00 00 0f b7 44 24 40 66 43 89 44 6a 18 e9 01 fb ff ff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b e9 f2 ee ff ff 44 8b 44 24 44 45 85 c0 74 50 4d 85 e4 0f 84\n[ 2012.700040] RSP: 0018:ffff8882369aeb28 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 2012.700046] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000003f RCX: 0000000000000000\n[ 2012.700050] RDX: 1ffff1111da3d891 RSI: ffff888120e34250 RDI: ffff8888ed1ec488\n[ 2012.700054] RBP: ffff888913281560 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8888ed1ec000\n[ 2012.700058] R10: ffff8888a2e83180 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000007fa8\n[ 2012.700061] R13: 000000000000003f R14: ffff888120e34854 R15: ffff8889132817c8\n[ 2012.700065] FS:  00007fc8ea9ff740(0000) GS:ffff88884cefe000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 2012.700069] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 2012.700073] CR2: 00007f81c8000020 CR3: 00000002299f8006 CR4: 00000000007726f0\n[ 2012.700077] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 2012.700080] Call Trace:\n[ 2012.700084]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[ 2012.700087]  ? ktime_get+0x61/0x150\n[ 2012.700097]  ? usleep_range_state+0x133/0x1b0\n[ 2012.700108]  ? __pfx_usleep_range_state+0x10/0x10\n[ 2012.700114]  netif_set_xps_queue+0x31/0x50\n[ 2012.700119]  ixgbe_configure_tx_ring+0x472/0x920 [ixgbe]\n[...]\n[ 2012.700486]  ixgbe_xdp+0x38f/0x750 [ixgbe]\n\n[...]\n\n[ 2012.701094] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __netif_set_xps_queue+0x1ac5/0x1e40\n[ 2012.701100] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88888d43cff8 by task xdpsock/103668\n\nSkip XPS configuration for XDP Tx queues.(CVE-2026-74317)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvhost: fix vhost_get_avail_idx for a non empty ring\n\nvhost_get_avail_idx is supposed to report whether it has updated\nvq-\u0026gt;avail_idx. Instead, it returns whether all entries have been\nconsumed, which is usually the same. But not always - in\ndrivers/vhost/net.c and when mergeable buffers have been enabled, the\ndriver checks whether the combined entries are big enough to store an\nincoming packet. If not, the driver re-enables notifications with\navailable entries still in the ring. The incorrect return value from\nvhost_get_avail_idx propagates through vhost_enable_notify and causes\nthe host to livelock if the guest is not making progress, as vhost will\nimmediately disable notifications and retry using the available entries.\n\nThis goes back to commit d3bb267bbdcb (\u0026quot;vhost: cache avail index in\nvhost_enable_notify()\u0026quot;) which changed vhost_enable_notify() to compare\nthe freshly read avail index against vq-\u0026gt;last_avail_idx instead of the\npreviously cached vq-\u0026gt;avail_idx. Commit 7ad472397667 (\u0026quot;vhost: move\nsmp_rmb() into vhost_get_avail_idx()\u0026quot;) then carried over the same\ncomparison when refactoring vhost_enable_notify() to call the unified\nvhost_get_avail_idx().\n\nThe obvious fix is to make vhost_get_avail_idx do what the comment\nsays it does and report whether new entries have been added.(CVE-2026-74356)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmd/raid1,raid10: fix deadlock in read error recovery path\n\nraid1d and raid10d may resubmit a split md cloned bio while handling\na read error. In this case, resubmitting the bio can lead to a deadlock\nif the array is suspended before md_handle_request() acquires an\nactive_io reference via percpu_ref_tryget_live().\n\nSince the cloned bio already holds an active_io reference,\ntrying to acquire another reference via percpu_ref_tryget_live()\ncan lead to a deadlock while the array is suspended.\n\nFix this by using percpu_ref_get() for md cloned bios.(CVE-2026-74375)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet-tcp: fix page fragment cache leak in error path\n\nIn nvmet_tcp_alloc_queue(), when a connection is closed during the\nallocation process (e.g., nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock() returns -ENOTCONN),\nthe error handling jumps to out_destroy_sq and then to out_ida_remove\nwithout draining the page fragment cache.\n\nAlthough nvmet_tcp_free_cmd() is called in some error paths to release\nindividual page fragments, the underlying page cache reference held by\nqueue-\u0026gt;pf_cache is never released. The first allocation using pf_cache\nis the call to nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmd() for queue-\u0026gt;connect, which happens\nafter ida_alloc() returns successfully. This results in a page leak each\ntime a connection fails during allocation, which could lead to memory\nexhaustion over time if connections are repeatedly opened and closed.\n\nFix this by calling page_frag_cache_drain() before freeing the queue\nstructure in the out_ida_remove label.(CVE-2026-74386)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()\n\nroute_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))\n(or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb-\u0026gt;data.\n\nHowever, in vxlan_xmit(), skb-\u0026gt;data points to the MAC header, so\nskb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20)\nonly checks 20 bytes from skb-\u0026gt;data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of\nIP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear\nfrags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)-\u0026gt;daddr can read beyond the pulled\nlinear buffer length.\n\nFix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to\nthe length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.(CVE-2026-74473)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()\n\nThe neighbour hardware address n-\u0026gt;ha can be updated asynchronously by the\nneighbour subsystem, protected by n-\u0026gt;ha_lock seqlock. Reading n-\u0026gt;ha without\nholding the seqlock loop can lead to torn reads or reading a partially updated\nMAC address.\n\nUse neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit() to safely copy n-\u0026gt;ha under\nread_seqbegin()/read_seqretry() lock protection before using it.\n\nNote that arp_reduce() and neigh_reduce() seem to have the same issue\nleft for future patches.(CVE-2026-74475)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nveth: convert frag_list skbs before running XDP\n\nA frag_list skb can reach veth with data_len set but nr_frags zero.\nveth_convert_skb_to_xdp_buff() only converts skbs that are shared,\nlocked, have frags[], or do not have enough headroom. It later uses\nskb_is_nonlinear() to decide whether to set XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS and\nxdp_frags_size.\n\nThat exposes frag_list data to XDP as if it were stored in frags[], but\nfrags[] is empty. AF_XDP copy mode can then trust the bogus XDP fragment\nmetadata, walk an empty fragment entry, and crash in memcpy() from\n__xsk_rcv().\n\nRoute non-linear skbs through skb_pp_cow_data() before exposing them to\nXDP, and only advertise XDP frags when the resulting skb has frags[].\nskb_copy_bits() already handles frag_list input, and skb_pp_cow_data()\nbuilds frags[] output with skb_add_rx_frag(), which is the\nrepresentation XDP multi-buffer expects.(CVE-2026-74476)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_reporting: use system_freezable_wq to fix UAF during suspend. During PM freeze (e.g. S3 suspend or S4 hibernation), device drivers like virtio_balloon reset their underlying virtio devices and delete their virtqueues via vdev-\u0026gt;config-\u0026gt;del_vqs(). However, page reporting work (page_reporting_process) was scheduled on the global system_wq. Because system_wq lacks the WQ_FREEZABLE flag, the PM freezer skips it, leaving page_reporting_process active during suspend. If pages are freed into the buddy allocator while suspending, page reporting triggers virtballoon_free_page_report() on deleted virtqueues, resulting in a Use-After-Free / General Protection Fault.(CVE-2026-74481)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbinfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter\n\nThe registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that same delimiter.\n\nMost fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag characters \u0026apos;P\u0026apos;, \u0026apos;O\u0026apos;, \u0026apos;C\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;F\u0026apos; and stops at the first byte that is none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan.\n\nIf the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is not a flag character.(CVE-2026-74485)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbinfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry\n\nRegistering an entry with the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag opens the\ninterpreter via open_exec() which denies write access to it for as\nlong as the entry exists. Removing the entry closes the interpreter\nfile via filp_close() but never restores write access, leaving the\ninode\u0026apos;s i_writecount permanently negative. Opening the interpreter\nfor writing keeps failing with ETXTBSY long after the entry is gone\nuntil the inode is evicted from the inode cache.\n\nCommit 90f601b497d7 (\u0026quot;binfmt_misc: restore write access before\nclosing files opened by open_exec()\u0026quot;) fixed the same imbalance in the\nerror path of bm_register_write() but the actual removal path has\nbeen leaking the write denial since the introduction of the flag.\n\nRestore write access in put_binfmt_handler() before closing the\ninterpreter file.(CVE-2026-74487)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()\\n\\nsnd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound\\n\\n\\tbuf_end = ep-\u0026gt;max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1;\\n\\nas a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer\\nmakes buf_end negative.  The loop guard then compares the u32\\nurb-\u0026gt;transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual\\narithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the\\nguard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and\\npayload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only\\nmax_transfer bytes long.\\n\\nA USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore\\ntrigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds\\nwrite when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiC*D* node.\\n\\nReturn early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is\\nnever entered with a bound that would wrap.  The loop is the last\\nstatement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not\\nrunning.\\n\\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee \u0026amp;lt;baul.lee@xbow.com\u0026amp;gt;(CVE-2026-74499)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, a use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability exists in the Bluetooth HCI sync module. hci_find_adv_instance() returns an adv_info pointer that is valid only while hdev-\u0026gt;lock is held. The advertising command-sync paths perform instance lookups without that lock and, in some cases, retain the pointer while waiting for a controller response. An advertising termination event can interleave, causing a use-after-free of the adv_info pointer, leading to a slab-use-after-free error as detected by KASAN. An attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability to cause a system crash or potential information disclosure.(CVE-2026-74509)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: s390: pci: Fix memory accounting for pinned/unpinned pages\n\nThe account_mem() and unaccount_mem() functions call get_uid() which\nincrements the reference count of struct user_struct on every invocation.\nBut we don\u0026apos;t decrement the count by calling free_uid(). It also\naccounted/unaccounted the pages against the current-\u0026gt;mm. But its possible\nthe unaccount_mem() can be called from a different process context than the\none that originally pinned the pages.\n\nLet\u0026apos;s fix this by storing the pinning process user_struct and mm_struct\nwhen accounting for pinned pages, and subsequently free these resources\nwhen the pages are unpinned.\n\n[(CVE-2026-74514)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/iommufd: Fix IOPF group ownership UAF\n\niopf_group_alloc() links each last-page IOPF group into the generic IOPF\npending list before invoking the domain fault handler.\niommufd_fault_iopf_handler() also queued an accepted group in the\nIOMMUFD deliver list without removing it from the generic pending list.\n\nWhen detach or HWPT replacement drops the device\u0026apos;s IOPF reference count\nto zero, an IOMMU driver may call iopf_queue_remove_device(). That\nfunction responds to and frees groups through the generic pending list\nwithout removing the same groups from IOMMUFD\u0026apos;s deliver list or response\nxarray. A later read, response, or cleanup can then access the freed\ngroup and cause a UAF.\n\nFix this by dequeuing an accepted group from the generic pending list\nbefore IOMMUFD queues it for userspace response.\nMake iopf_group_response() send a response regardless of pending-list\nmembership, so the dequeued group can still be completed by IOMMUFD.(CVE-2026-74520)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: fix leaking sk after socket release\n\niso_sock_kill() tests !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk-\u0026gt;sk_socket ||\nsock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) for early return, but this is always true since\nsock_orphan(sk) sets SOCK_DEAD, so the sk reference released by socket\nalways leaks, iso_sock_destruct is never called.\n\nThe socket reference also leaks when __iso_sock_close() does not set\nSOCK_ZAPPED, since iso_conn_del() does not call iso_sock_kill() after\nzapping.\n\nFix by replacing SOCK_DEAD by BT_SK_KILLED flag that is not used for\nsomething else, and lock_sock to ensure iso_sock_kill() puts sk only\nafter socket release only once. Release and iso_conn_del may run\nconcurrently. Call iso_sock_kill() from iso_conn_del() to clean sk up\nafter zapping.\n\nRemove call to iso_sock_kill() from iso_sock_close(), as it\u0026apos;s generally\nno-op there.(CVE-2026-74536)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: udp_tunnel: fix memory leak in udp_tunnel_nic_unregister()\n\nsyzbot reported a memory leak [1] in the UDP tunnel NIC offload code.\n\nWhen device registration fails (e.g. in register_netdevice()), netdev core\nunwinds by sending a single NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification. If work was queued\nduring NETDEV_REGISTER (utn-\u0026gt;work_pending is set), udp_tunnel_nic_unregister()\nreturns early:\n\n\tif (utn-\u0026gt;work_pending)\n\t\treturn;\n\nBecause failed registrations do not enter netdev_wait_allrefs_any(), no\nsubsequent NETDEV_UNREGISTER rebroadcast will ever occur. As a result, the\nstruct udp_tunnel_nic allocated in udp_tunnel_nic_alloc() is leaked\npermanently.\n\nFix this by removing the early return. Instead, synchronously cancel any\npending work with cancel_delayed_work_sync() before freeing @utn.\n\nTo be able to call cancel_delayed_work_sync() while holding RTNL (the work also\nneeds RTNL), switch udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() to rtnl_trylock(). If RTNL\nis contended, requeue the work with a 1 jiffy delay (via queue_delayed_work())\nto prevent high CPU contention while waiting for RTNL lock.\n\nThe utn-\u0026gt;work_pending bookkeeping is no longer needed and is removed, as\nthe workqueue core already tracks the pending/running state of the work.\n\n[1]\nBUG: memory leak\nunreferenced object 0xffff888127d5f840 (size 96):\n  comm \u0026quot;syz-executor\u0026quot;, pid 5806, jiffies 4294942188\n  backtrace (crc 99fdb6c8):\n    __kmalloc_noprof+0x3bf/0x550\n    udp_tunnel_nic_alloc net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_nic.c:756 [inline]\n    udp_tunnel_nic_register net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_nic.c:833 [inline]\n    udp_tunnel_nic_netdevice_event+0x804/0xab0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_nic.c:931\n    notifier_call_chain+0x59/0x160 kernel/notifier.c:85\n    call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7d/0xb0 net/core/dev.c:2250\n    register_netdevice+0xc10/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:11478(CVE-2026-74543)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: cls_u32: validate offshift to prevent shift-out-of-bounds\n\nu32_change() copies the user-provided tc_u32_sel.offshift (unsigned char,\n0-255) into the kernel knode object without bounds validation. When a\npacket later hits u32_classify() with TC_U32_VAROFFSET set, it evaluates\n`ntohs(offmask \u0026amp; *data) \u0026gt;\u0026gt; offshift` where the left operand is a 16-bit\nvalue promoted to a 32-bit int. Any offshift \u0026gt;= 32 is undefined behavior\nper C11 6.5.7p3, triggerable by an unprivileged user via user/network\nnamespaces.\n\nUBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/cls_u32.c:236:43\nshift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type int\n\nFix this by rejecting offshift \u0026gt;= 16 during filter creation in\nu32_change().(CVE-2026-74544)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_tables: make nft_object rhltable per table\n\nThe nft_object rhltable is global, this allows for accessing objects\nthat are being dismangled from lookup path by other existing netns.\nGiven the nft_obj_destroy() releases the object inmediately, this might\nlead to use-after-free of these objects that are being released.\nMake the existing rhltable per table to address this issue to deal with\nwith the nft_rcv_nl_event() path too.\n\nUpdate nft_obj_lookup() to take the table as non-const, otherwise,\ncompiler complains when passing the objname_ht to rhltable_lookup().(CVE-2026-74565)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: clear new_transport when removing a peer. sctp_process_asconf_param() stores a newly added peer transport in asoc-\u0026gt;new_transport. After all parameters in the ASCONF chunk have been processed, sctp_sf_do_asconf() uses this pointer to send a HEARTBEAT to the new transport. An authenticated ASCONF from a remote SCTP peer can add a transport and remove it again with a wildcard DEL-IP parameter in the same chunk. The wildcard deletion preserves the transport on which the ASCONF arrived, but removes the newly added transport through sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(). The removal does not clear asoc-\u0026gt;new_transport, leaving it pointing to the removed transport. sctp_sf_do_asconf() then creates a HEARTBEAT whose chunk-\u0026gt;transport points to the removed transport without holding a transport reference. After the transport is freed by RCU, a successful ASCONF_ACK for the replacement address releases the queued HEARTBEAT and sctp_outq_select_transport() reads the freed transport\u0026apos;s state, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-74586)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nsctp: fix use-after-free of cached ASCONF chunk\\n\\naddip_last_asconf caches the outstanding outbound ASCONF chunk. The normal\\nASCONF-ACK completion path releases the chunk and clears the pointer.\\n\\nHowever, sctp_asconf_queue_teardown() releases the cached chunk without\\nclearing addip_last_asconf. During peer restart handling,\\nsctp_sf_do_dupcook_a() queues SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE, which invokes\\nsctp_asconf_queue_teardown() while the association remains alive and leaves\\nthe pointer dangling.\\n\\nA delayed authenticated ASCONF-ACK can then reach sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(),\\nwhich accesses the stale chunk and passes it to sctp_process_asconf_ack(),\\ncausing a use-after-free and a second release.\\n\\nClearing the pointer exposes a race with T4 expiry. Peer restart handling\\nqueues the timer stop before the purge, but SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP uses\\ntimer_delete(), which does not wait for a callback already running on\\nanother CPU. Such a callback can reach sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() after\\nthe purge and dereference NULL.\\n\\nClear addip_last_asconf after releasing the cached chunk, and make\\nsctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() consume a stale T4 expiry if no outstanding\\nASCONF remains.(CVE-2026-74587)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: keep chunk-\u0026gt;transport in step with the list it is queued on. __sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport\u0026apos;s transmitted list without updating chunk-\u0026gt;transport. The chunk then sits on a live transport\u0026apos;s list while chunk-\u0026gt;transport still names a different one. If that transport is removed - sctp_assoc_rm_peer() from an ASCONF Delete-IP - sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk is left with a dangling pointer. A SACK that reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer().(CVE-2026-74588)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix sk_redir use-after-free in send verdict. sk_psock_msg_verdict() takes a socket reference for psock-\u0026gt;sk_redir. tcp_bpf_send_verdict() copies that pointer while holding the source socket lock, but does not take a reference for the local copy before dropping the lock around tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(). When apply_bytes keeps the cached verdict active, another sendmsg() on the same source socket can consume the remaining bytes and release the cached reference while the first thread still holds only the raw local pointer, leading to a use-after-free. KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free error.(CVE-2026-74589)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Use children field for rcu head and add memory barriers. When an eventfs inode is freed, it sets ei-\u0026gt;is_freed and then uses its ei-\u0026gt;list to add it to the srcu link list as the list field is a union with the rcu list head. As the ei-\u0026gt;list is used to iterate over an SRCU protected list without taking the eventfs_mutex, there\u0026apos;s nothing stopping the iteration over that list to see the ei-\u0026gt;rcu instead of the ei-\u0026gt;list and it will read a corrupt target.(CVE-2026-74605)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Fix use-after-free in eventfs_remove_rec(). eventfs_remove_rec() recursively removes the child at the current loop position. After the recursive call returns, list_for_each_entry() advances by reading list.next from the removed child. If free_ei() drops the final reference, release_ei() reuses the list/rcu union to queue an SRCU callback. The child may be freed before that read. The eventfs_mutex serializes list updates, but it does not keep the removed child alive or prevent the SRCU callback from running.(CVE-2026-74606)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_try_adding_channels(). cifs_try_adding_channels() takes a temporary reference to an interface before dropping iface_lock. If cifs_ses_add_channel() fails, it drops that reference and then increments iface-\u0026gt;weight_fulfilled. A concurrent interface list refresh can remove the list reference while channel creation is in progress. In that case, the failure-path kref_put() releases the last reference and frees iface. Updating weight_fulfilled afterward then accesses freed memory.(CVE-2026-74608)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: read le-\u0026gt;link under the node lock in tipc_node_link_down(). tipc_node_link_down() caches the link pointer before taking n-\u0026gt;lock. The delete=true caller frees that very object under n-\u0026gt;lock, so the lock does not protect the cached pointer against it. An in-flight CPU that has read l therefore dereferences freed memory once another CPU frees it: a use-after-free read in tipc_link_is_establishing(), and a use-after-free write via tipc_link_reset() on the establishing branch.(CVE-2026-74609)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: don\u0026apos;t leave a full plaintext sk_msg ring unpushed\n\nWhen the copy path in tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() adds the fragment that fills the plaintext sk_msg ring, it does not set full_record, so the record is left full and unpushed. A later splice() then adds to an already full ring: sk_msg_page_add() has no fullness check of its own, so sg.end wraps onto sg.start and the ring appears empty. Fragments added after that overwrite live entries, and sg.size no longer matches what is reachable between sg.start and sg.end, so pushing the record runs the scatterwalk off the end of the scatterlist.\n\nAn unprivileged user can trigger this on a loopback TCP socket with the \u0026quot;tls\u0026quot; ULP attached:\n\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008\n  RIP: 0010:memcpy_from_scatterwalk+0x32/0xc0\n  Call Trace:\n   skcipher_walk_next+0x1d1/0x2c0\n   gcm_encrypt_aesni_avx+0x1e9/0x220\n   bpf_exec_tx_verdict+0x3bb/0x860\n   tls_sw_sendmsg+0xa1a/0xca0\n   __sys_sendto+0x1da/0x1f0\n\nSet full_record in the copy path when the ring becomes full, and push a record that is already full on entry to the sendmsg loop.(CVE-2026-74610)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: rx: restore msg_iter before TLS 1.3 optimistic retry. tls_decrypt_sg() advances msg-\u0026gt;msg_iter when it maps user pages for the optimistic TLS 1.3 zero-copy path. If the decrypted record turns out not to be unpadded application data, tls_decrypt_sw() retries into a kernel skb, but leaves the iterator advanced. The subsequent copy from the skb then writes decrypted bytes again at a later point in the caller iovecs while recvmsg() reports only the post-retry length. A TLS peer can trigger this after the receiver enables TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD.(CVE-2026-74611)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the veth driver has an skb length accounting error after XDP frag adjustment. veth exposes non-linear skb fragments through an xdp_buff. If an XDP program adjusts the fragment area, veth_xdp_rcv_skb() copies xdp_frags_size back to skb-\u0026gt;data_len but leaves skb-\u0026gt;len containing the old fragment contribution. After a fragment shrink, this makes skb_headlen() larger than the actual linear area. In the reproduced UDP receive path, __skb_datagram_iter() copied 1024 bytes past the actual linear tail to userspace, starting at struct skb_shared_info. Additionally, bpf_xdp_pull_data() can advance data_end while leaving frags present, and the old __skb_put(skb, off) triggers SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT().(CVE-2026-74612)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nvsock/virtio: read virtqueues under worker locks\\n\\nCommit bd50c5dc182b (\u0026quot;vsock/virtio: add support for device suspend/resume\u0026quot;) made the *_run flags transition from false to true when restore installs replacement virtqueues. The RX, TX and event workers read their virtqueue before locking and checking the corresponding flag, so a worker delayed across freeze and restore can observe the replacement queue\u0026apos;s running state while retaining a pointer to the deleted queue.\\n\\nRead each virtqueue under its mutex after checking the run flag, keeping the pointer and state in the same queue generation.(CVE-2026-74614)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: do not arm the ageing timer on a device that is down. vxlan_changelink() arms vxlan-\u0026gt;age_timer whenever the requested ageing interval differs from the configured one, but there is no netif_running() test, so the timer is armed even on a device that was never brought up. The only synchronous cancel in the driver is the timer_delete_sync() in vxlan_stop(), which is .ndo_stop. netif_close_many() drops devices without IFF_UP before __dev_close_many() runs, so that cancel is skipped for such a device. When free_netdev() releases the allocation, the timer lives in freed memory while still queued on a timer_base, causing a use-after-free condition that can lead to system crash or code execution.(CVE-2026-74615)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom. xdpf_clone() clones broadcast copies into a single page and sets frame_sz to PAGE_SIZE. __xdp_build_skb_from_frame() later treats that page like a normal XDP frame and expects the usual skb_shared_info tailroom at the end of the buffer. The current check only rejects frames whose linear xdp_frame header, headroom, and packet data exceed PAGE_SIZE. A source frame backed by a larger allocation can still satisfy that check while extending into the clone\u0026apos;s required shared-info area. When such a clone is converted back into an skb, build_skb_around() places skb_shared_info over live packet bytes and later writes can corrupt XDP return metadata. Reject clones unless their linear area fits inside SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE), matching the tailroom requirement already enforced by the XDP-to-skb conversion path.(CVE-2026-74616)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, an input validation vulnerability exists in the net/sched subsystem. The act_gact and act_police modules lack range checking on the fallback control action. The tcf_action_check_ctrlact() function performs range checking on the primary control action, but act_gact and act_police each carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space (TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT) that never reaches that helper. User space can set TC_ACT_CONSUMED (TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1), which tells callers the action took ownership of the skb, resulting in memory leaks of sk_buff and its data buffer - one leaked sk_buff per packet traversing the filter.(CVE-2026-74620)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nnet: atlantic: free stranded TX buffers on ring deinit\\n\\naq_vec_deinit() drains the TX rings with a single aq_ring_tx_clean() call, which frees at most AQ_CFG_TX_CLEAN_BUDGET (256) descriptors and stops at hw_head, which no longer moves once aq_vec_stop() has stopped the hardware and NAPI. Completed descriptors beyond the budget and everything still posted in [hw_head, sw_tail) keep their skb or xdp_frame when the interface goes down: aq_vec_ring_free() then frees the buffer ring and the references are lost for good.\\n\\nToday this is a silent memory leak on every interface down under TX/XDP_TX load. With the conversion of the RX path to page_pool posted for net-next it becomes much more visible: XDP_TX frames carry fragment references on the RX ring\u0026apos;s page_pool, so a single stranded frame keeps the pool\u0026apos;s inflight count above zero forever. page_pool_destroy() then never completes, the pool is leaked together with its pages, and \\\u0026quot;page_pool_release_retry() stalled pool shutdown\\\u0026quot; is warned every 60 seconds from that point on, on every ifdown, XDP detach or ring resize under XDP_TX load.(CVE-2026-74623)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_conntrack: defer invalid log until after unlock\n\nTCP and SCTP conntrack paths can emit invalid-packet logs while ct-\u0026gt;lock is still held.\n\nWhen invalid logging is routed to nfnetlink_log and conntrack export is enabled, the log path can re-enter conntrack netlink glue and dump the same conntrack again. Protocol attribute dumping may take ct-\u0026gt;lock, so logging while holding that lock can deadlock.\n\nDefer the TCP invalid logs by storing only the minimal log context while ct-\u0026gt;lock is held and emitting the log after unlocking. Also make the TCP timeout-lowering invalid path return whether a log is needed, then emit that log after unlocking.\n\nDo the same for the SCTP invalid state-transition log that can be reached while ct-\u0026gt;lock is held.\n\nAdd a lockdep assertion to nf_ct_l4proto_log_invalid() so future callers that log invalid conntracks while holding ct-\u0026gt;lock are caught outside TCP and SCTP as well.(CVE-2026-74624)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix race between update_event_fields and event_define_fields. The following sequence may lead to a race between event_define_fields() and update_event_fields(): CPU0 (loads module A) and CPU1 (loads module B) executing concurrently, where access to class-\u0026gt;fields is not protected by event_mutex in trace_event_update_all(), leading to a kernel panic. Fix by taking event_mutex in trace_event_update_all() before trace_event_sem.(CVE-2026-74636)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach. perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When a sibling is detached, it is removed from the leader\u0026apos;s sibling_list, but its group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader. This is not safe when the sibling is detached but kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on the sibling follows the stale group_leader pointer and dereferences the freed leader\u0026apos;s context, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-74637)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: fix use-after-free in fib_nhc_update_mtu(). fib_nhc_update_mtu() walks the nexthop exception table under RTNL, but RTNL does not serialize this walk with PMTU exception updates. The walk uses rcu_dereference_protected() with a constant true condition without holding fnhe_lock. The following interleaving can therefore occur: CPU 0 (fib_nhc_update_mtu) loads fnhe while CPU 1 (update_or_create_fnhe) holds fnhe_lock, calls fnhe_remove_oldest() to unlink fnhe, and kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu). CPU 0 then accesses fnhe after grace period, causing a use-after-free. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_nhc_update_mtu+0x3df/0x410.(CVE-2026-74656)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: ebt_nflog: pin the NFLOG backend\n\nnf_log_unregister() runs after the per-net teardown so its final RCU grace period also drains readers that obtained the logger from a per-net binding. However, ebt_nflog passes an explicit ULOG log type to nf_log_packet() without holding a reference on the selected logger module, unlike the xt_NFLOG and nft_log frontends.\n\nAn ebtables nflog rule can therefore remain callable while nfnetlink_log is unloaded. The resulting interleaving causes a use-after-free condition where CPU 1 dereferences per-net state after CPU 0 has freed it.(CVE-2026-74660)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: frags: publish queues before arming timer. inet_frag_create() arms the fragment queue timer before inserting the queue into the fqdir rhashtable. If the namespace fragment timeout is zero or negative, the timer can run before the queue is published. The timer callback then marks the queue complete, tries to remove a node that is not in the hash table yet, and drops the anticipated hash reference. Creation can subsequently publish the completed queue without restoring that reference, leaving a stale hash node after the caller drops the remaining reference. Publish the queue first and arm the timer while holding the queue lock. This makes timer expiry wait until the queue is visible in the hash table, so inet_frag_kill() can remove the node and balance the hash reference.(CVE-2026-74662)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\npacket: synchronize pressure clearing with ring reconfiguration\\n\\npacket_set_ring() updates the RX ring state under sk_receive_queue.lock, but used to publish the tpacket receive mode through po-\u0026gt;prot_hook.func after releasing that lock. packet_poll() and packet_recvmsg() can then run the pressure clearing path after the ring has been cleared while still seeing tpacket_rcv, causing __packet_rcv_has_room() to dereference stale or NULL ring storage.(CVE-2026-74666)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path\n\npacket_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame whose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket, any SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave skb-\u0026gt;mac_header unset here.\n\nFor frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the MAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS path uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads eth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb-\u0026gt;head + (u16)~0, an out-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for one consumer in commit f5089008f90c (\u0026quot;macsec: do not read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()\u0026quot;).\n\npacket_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb-\u0026gt;data points at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type regardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied header and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC header unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is anchored on the bypass path too.\n\nFound by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; verified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in f5089008f90c. Compile-tested.(CVE-2026-74667)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npacket: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path\n\ntpacket_snd() reads dev-\u0026gt;hard_header_len independently for skb allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len negative.\n\nSnapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb().\n\nThe separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and header_ops-\u0026gt;create is not addressed here.(CVE-2026-74668)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: clear IPv4 options after rebasing tunnel ICMP errors. ip_vs_in_icmp() rebases an skb from the outer ICMP packet to the quoted original request before passing it to icmp_send(). However, IPCB(skb)-\u0026gt;opt still describes the outer IPv4 header. A timestamp option in the outer header can therefore leave an offset that points into the quoted transport header after the rebase. __ip_options_echo() treats a byte at that stale location as the option length and copies it into the fixed-size option storage on the __icmp_send() stack, causing a stack out-of-bounds write.(CVE-2026-74669)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: stop estimator after disabled calc phase\n\nIPVS estimator kthread 0 starts with zeroed chain and tick limits until its initial calculation phase completes. If network namespace teardown clears ipvs-\u0026gt;enable during that phase, ip_vs_est_calc_phase() can return without installing positive limits.\n\nThe kthread can then continue into its main loop and drain est_temp_list with zero chain_max, tick_max and est_max_count values. Each enqueue consumes one available tick row, but est_count never reaches the zero est_max_count value. After all rows are consumed, the row lookup returns IPVS_EST_NTICKS and ip_vs_enqueue_estimator() writes past the ticks and tick_len arrays, causing a buffer overflow.\n\nExit kthread 0 after the calculation phase if the kthread is stopping or IPVS has been disabled. That keeps temporary estimators from being drained after the limits failed to initialize.\n\nEstimator kthreads can now self-exit before teardown or reload stops kd-\u0026gt;task. Keep an extra task reference after creation and release it with kthread_stop_put(), so kd-\u0026gt;task remains valid until the stop paths consume that reference.(CVE-2026-74670)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values(). In evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the kernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully initialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit or implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these padding bytes are left uninitialized. When this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer and later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak kernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information. Similar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event. Fix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset() before populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared before the data crosses the security boundary.(CVE-2026-74673)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks. The user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK ioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt() and client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask(). While the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative execution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads. Sanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using array_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array access and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index is out of bounds, preventing any speculative memory access to client evmasks array.(CVE-2026-74683)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nnet: tap: set skb-\u0026gt;dev before parsing virtio net header in tap_get_user_xdp()\\n\\nThe commit 4f61f133f354 (\u0026quot;net: tap: NULL pointer derefence in dev_parse_header_protocol when skb-\u0026gt;dev is null\u0026quot;) fixed a crash in tap_get_user() by assigning skb-\u0026gt;dev before calling tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb(). This is required because virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() may invoke dev_parse_header_protocol(), which dereferences skb-\u0026gt;dev. Without the assignment, a NULL pointer dereference can occur.\\n\\nHowever, tap_get_user_xdp() still parses the virtio-net header before assigning skb-\u0026gt;dev. When the vhost TX path passes an XDP buffer containing a GSO virtio-net header but the protocol is set to zero on purpose, tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb() can reach dev_parse_header_protocol() while skb-\u0026gt;dev is still NULL, resulting in a crash.\\n\\nFix this by looking up the tap device and assigning skb-\u0026gt;dev before calling tun_vnet_hdr_to_skb(), matching the ordering already used in tap_get_user(). Preserve the existing RCU read-side critical section across dev_queue_xmit().(CVE-2026-74684)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nsctp: clear control chunk transport if it is being removed\\n\\nsctp_make_heartbeat_ack() caches the destination transport in chunk-\u0026gt;transport without taking a reference. When src_out_of_asoc_ok is enabled, the HEARTBEAT ACK may remain queued on control_chunk_list instead of being transmitted immediately.\\n\\nIf the peer transport is removed while the chunk is still queued, sctp_assoc_rm_peer() drops the transport and schedules it for RCU freeing, but only clears cached transport pointers in out_chunk_list. The queued control chunk therefore retains a dangling transport pointer.\\n\\nOnce an ASCONF_ACK clears the suppression and the queued control chunk is transmitted, SCTP dereferences the stale transport pointer, leading to a use-after-free.\\n\\nFix this by also clearing chunk-\u0026gt;transport for queued control chunks in control_chunk_list when removing the transport.(CVE-2026-74688)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix TFO max_qlen accounting across reuseport migration. A listener\u0026apos;s TCP_FASTOPEN max_qlen stops being accurate and lets through far more pending Fast Open requests than it was configured for. This only shows up with SO_REUSEPORT listener migration, where closing a listener hands its still-pending TFO children over to a surviving one. fastopenq.qlen is charged in tcp_fastopen_create_child() when the child is created and uncharged in reqsk_fastopen_remove() when the handshake completes. The uncharge follows rsk_listener of the request the child points at, and inet_reqsk_clone() has repointed the child at a new request owned by the new listener, so the ++ and the -- land on two different sockets. The new listener\u0026apos;s qlen drifts negative and its limit no longer binds. Charge the new listener during migration, like reqsk_queue_migrated() already does for queue-\u0026gt;young and queue-\u0026gt;qlen.(CVE-2026-74696)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation\n\n__skb_udp_tunnel_segment() gets the UDP header before ensuring the\ntunnel header is in the skb head. If the pull reallocates skb-\u0026gt;head,\nthe saved UDP header pointer is no longer valid.\n\nGet the UDP header after the pull to avoid a potential use-after-free.(CVE-2026-74705)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs\n\nThe opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared\nmap value.  __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read\nopts-\u0026gt;netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network\nnamespace reference.\n\nThe reference imbalance can occur as follows:\n\n  CPU 0                                  CPU 1\n  read opts-\u0026gt;netns_id (-1)\n  skip get_net_ns_by_id()\n                                         write opts-\u0026gt;netns_id (id)\n  read opts-\u0026gt;netns_id (id)\n  put_net(net) /* no matching get */\n\nThe reverse transition leaks the reference.  Repeating the unmatched put\ncan destroy a live namespace and crash later users.\n\nThe kernel reported:\n\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef]\n  RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700\n  Call Trace:\n   __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0\n   __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0\n   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nSnapshot every input field of opts with READ_ONCE() before validating or\nusing it.  The netns_id snapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair\nbalanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from\nchanging partway through an invocation.  The individual reads can still\nobserve an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each\nselected field value remains stable for that invocation.(CVE-2026-74715)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic\n\nWhen scalar += pointer is handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the\ndestination register inherits the pointer state from the source pointer.\nCopying only selected fields is fragile because pointer provenance is\ntracked by several bpf_reg_state fields.\n\nUse the caller\u0026apos;s temporary offset register to preserve the scalar operand\nwhile replacing the destination with the full pointer state. This preserves\nthe frame number for PTR_TO_STACK registers and keeps parent identity\nfields consistent.(CVE-2026-74720)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: avoid out-of-bounds write in ip_vs_nat_icmp. Sashiko warns that a local attacker can modify the packet while it is processed by IPVS. Some places read the IP ihl field multiple times which can cause out-of-bounds access. One such place is ip_vs_nat_icmp where we can write after the validated area. Fix it by providing ciph argument just like it is done for IPv6 and use ciph-\u0026gt;len as offset to the embedded transport header. Modify some IPv4 header checks by reading the ihl field only once.(CVE-2026-74724)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nbonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor\\n\\nbond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and takes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the active slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL (RTM_DELLINK -\u0026gt; __bond_release_one() -\u0026gt; bond_alb_handle_active_change()), which already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The monitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no failover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed over, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave\u0026apos;s promiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC.\\n\\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...\\n  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\\n  Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor\\n  RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600)\\n   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)\\n   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)\\n   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\\n   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\\n\\nRe-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so the monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding monitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase (bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only one acting on the pre-trylock decision.(CVE-2026-74726)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Pin the \u0026apos;struct nfs_server\u0026apos; during a FREE_STATEID call. Dan Aloni reports that he was able to hit a use-after-free bug if a FREE_STATEID operation gets delayed for whatever reason. Fix this by bumping the refcount of the \u0026apos;struct nfs_server\u0026apos; object for the duration of the FREE_STATEID so it doesn\u0026apos;t get cleaned up from underneath us while operations are still in flight.(CVE-2026-74730)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nfirewire: ohci: fix NULL pointer dereference in ar_context_release\\n\\nDuring the error handling path of the driver\u0026apos;s probe function, a NULL pointer dereference can occur in ar_context_release().\\n\\nWhen pci_probe() fails early (e.g., if pcim_enable_device() or MMIO mapping fails), the devres cleanup mechanism invokes release_ohci(). This function unconditionally calls ar_context_release() to clean up the asynchronous receive contexts. However, if ar_context_init() was not yet called, ctx-\u0026gt;ohci remains NULL (as the fw_ohci structure is zero-initialized by devres_alloc()).\\n\\nar_context_release() immediately dereferences ctx-\u0026gt;ohci to get the dev pointer before checking if the context was actually initialized, leading to a crash.(CVE-2026-74734)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: skip hash tables in u32_bind_class(). u32_walk() enumerates both struct tc_u_hnode and struct tc_u_knode through the walker callback. u32_bind_class() unconditionally casts the passed fh to tc_u_knode and accesses \u0026amp;n-\u0026gt;res, so when fh is actually a tc_u_hnode, which has no tcf_result member, this results in a slab-out-of-bounds read of res-\u0026gt;classid in tc_cls_bind_class().(CVE-2026-74739)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev\n\nipvlan devices inherit hard_header_len from phy_dev during ipvlan_init(),\nbut leave needed_headroom and needed_tailroom set to 0.\n\nWhen the underlying phy_dev (or stacked lower device) requires extra headroom\nor tailroom for headers/trailers (e.g. macsec, ipsec, wireguard, tunnels, or\nveth with rx headroom), upper layers calculating packet headroom and tailroom\nfail to reserve sufficient space.\n\nThis can result in reallocation overhead, skb headroom underflows, or KASAN\nslab-use-after-free crashes when dev_hard_header() / ipvlan_hard_header()\nprepends header data or when lower devices append tailroom.\n\nFix this by:\n1. Inheriting needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev in ipvlan_init().\n2. Propagating needed_headroom and needed_tailroom updates to attached ipvlans\n   in ipvlan_device_event() when receiving NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE events.(CVE-2026-74744)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nipvs: revalidate ihl to prevent out-of-bounds access\\n\\nWhile the outer IP header is already pulled into the skb head,\\nwe must be careful and revalidate the embedded headers after\\nreading them from the skb frags to prevent out-of-bounds\\naccess.\\n\\nOne such place reported by Sashiko is ip_vs_nat_icmp() where\\nlocal process can change the ihl field and after\\nskb_ensure_writable() we can see larger value which is a\\nproblem for the ip_send_check(cih) calls.\\n\\nAdd check to drop the packet if the ihl field is changed.(CVE-2026-74747)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the netfilter/ipset component has a refcount race condition vulnerability. __ip_set_put_byindex() resolved the index to a set pointer under RCU, then took ip_set_ref_lock in __ip_set_put() to decrement set-\u0026gt;ref. ip_set_swap() holds that same lock while swapping both the ip_set_list slots and the two sets\u0026apos; ref counters, so it can interleave between the dereference and the lock acquisition, leaving the caller to decrement a set whose reference already moved to the other index and hit BUG_ON(set-\u0026gt;ref == 0). list_set_gc() reaches this from timer softirq, which the nfnl mutex does not serialize against swap: an expiring list:set member calls list_set_del() -\u0026gt; ip_set_put_byindex() while IPSET_CMD_SWAP runs on the referenced sets. This vulnerability can cause kernel panic.(CVE-2026-74748)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf: Reject exited events as group leaders\n\nperf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state and detaches their group relationships. The event\u0026apos;s file descriptor can remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and DEAD events.\n\nA new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader. When the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling. The sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.\n\nReject group leaders in the EXIT state. Perform the check while holding the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach the leader between validation and group attachment.\n\n[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent](CVE-2026-74753)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, a deadlock vulnerability has been found in the ceph filesystem. A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds FILE_RD, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via mds_wanted). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke FILE_RD from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire FILE_RD. If the cap update that should request FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after cap-\u0026gt;mds_wanted was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local mds_wanted still includes the file read caps, causing the reader to wait indefinitely.(CVE-2026-80527)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current-\u0026gt;journal_info. handle_reply() stores a ceph_mds_request pointer in current-\u0026gt;journal_info while filling the inode and dentry cache from an MDS reply. An allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune dentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4 starts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in current-\u0026gt;journal_info as a journal handle and dereferences the request\u0026apos;s r_tid as h_transaction, causing a kernel crash.(CVE-2026-80528)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nxfs: don\u0026apos;t swallow dquot recovery verification errors\\n\\nxlog_recover_dquot_commit_pass2() validates the recovered dquot with xfs_dqblk_verify() and, on failure, sets error = -EFSCORRUPTED and jumps to out_release. But out_release unconditionally returns 0, so the corruption error is discarded: the caller xlog_recover_items_pass2() sees success, log recovery proceeds as if the dquot were valid, and the corrupt quota buffer can be written back to disk.(CVE-2026-80529)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: bounds-check buffer log item\u0026apos;s dirty bitmap\n\nxlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a\nbuffer log item\u0026apos;s bitmap into the buffer read for that item:\n\n\tmemcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit \u0026lt;\u0026lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT),\n\t\titem-\u0026gt;ri_buf[i].iov_base,\n\t\tnbits \u0026lt;\u0026lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT);\n\nThe destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the\nbuffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and\notherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(),\nwhich compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a\nsmall blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer\ndrives the memcpy() past the buffer\u0026apos;s allocation, corrupting adjacent\nkernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone\nwho can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat\nmodel XFS already guards against elsewhere.\n\nTurn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery\nof the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail\nidiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and\nxfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes\nSTATIC int and its three callers propagate the error.\n\nFound and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted\nimage trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails\nrecovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it.(CVE-2026-80536)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ns390/vfio_ccw: Move cp cleanup out of not operational\n\nThe fsm_notoper() routine is called when the device has been\nlost, and is (by definition) no longer operational. Since this\ncan happen asynchronously from the normal behavior of the\ndriver, the cleanup may happen when holding other locks\nin the calling sequence (notably, the cio subchannel lock).\n\nPush the cleanup of the private-\u0026gt;cp resources to a workqueue,\nwhere it can be done out from under that lock sequence and\na future patch can safely manage the locking requirements.(CVE-2026-80549)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ns390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant\n\nThe first IDAW in a list does not need to be on a 2K/4K boundary\nlike all others, and so is read separately to accurately calculate\nthe size of the buffer needed to read the full IDAL.\n\nVerify that the address found in the first IDAW is unchanged between\nreads, to ensure a consistent set of IDAWs being worked with.(CVE-2026-80551)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check\n\nceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the\nbuffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:\nceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or\ncompromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with\nstruct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,\nleaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.\n\nThe immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has\nno preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past\nthe validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed\ndirectly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.\n\nThe sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants\n(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)\nafter its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the\nonly site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.\n\nFix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,\n*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.\n\nAttacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph\ndeployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client\nthat calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges\nbeyond OSD session establishment.\n\n[ idryomov: trim changelog ](CVE-2026-80557)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp\n\nA corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd\nindices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts\nthat don\u0026apos;t exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than\nCEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and\nacting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target().\nWhile most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp\nis not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this\n(potentially invalid) index as target osd for a (linger) request.\nBecause the osd_state, osd_weight, and osd_addr arrays only contain\nmax_osd entries (with indices 0 to max_osd -1), this leads to\nout-of-bounds accesses when trying to read values from these arrays.\n\nThis patch fixes the issue by adding a check to get_temp_osds(), so that\nonly valid osd indices from primary_temp are used, and it falls back to\nusing the primary from pg_temp or the up set if it is invalid.\n\n[ idryomov: changelog ](CVE-2026-80558)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nopenrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn\n\nrestore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the\nsignal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into\nthe hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space.  All\nother SR bits are left under user control.\n\nAn unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a\ncrafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME.  With the data MMU disabled the\nCPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task\ngains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local\nprivilege escalation.  SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH\nand the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way.  The ptrace GPR regset\nalready refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason.\n\nRestore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame\nand take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on\nsignal entry.\n\nVerified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an\nunprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to\nphysical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel\u0026apos;s mem=32M); afterwards the\nsame PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.(CVE-2026-80560)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nmptcp: avoid combining some incoming suboptions\\n\\nSome MPTCP suboptions are mutually exclusive according to the RFC8684, but also because in different places, the code doesn\u0026apos;t expect some combinations to be present. That\u0026apos;s specially true for suboptions that would be present twice, but with different attributes.\\n\\nThe new restrictions are the same as the ones applied on the output side, with mptcp_write_options. The same rules can be reused with a small fix: an MP_FASTCLOSE can be used with a DSS when the sender picks this option [1], which is not the case on Linux.(CVE-2026-80587)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblock: stop the timeout timer when releasing a never added disk\n\ndisk_release() undoes blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() for a disk whose probe failed before add_disk(), but it only calls blk_mq_exit_queue(). Nothing there stops q-\u0026gt;timeout, and that timer rolls forward: it stays pending until it next expires, not until the last request completes. So if the driver issued any I/O before adding the disk, the request_queue is freed while still linked into a timer wheel bucket.\n\nCommit 6f8191fdf41d (\u0026quot;block: simplify disk shutdown\u0026quot;) dropped the blk_cleanup_queue() call that used to stop it. __del_gendisk() and blk_mq_destroy_queue() still do; only the probe failure path lost it.\n\nnvme gets there because nvme_update_ns_info() submits Report Zones or FDP io-mgmt-recv on ns-\u0026gt;queue before the disk is added, so a later failure - a concurrent reset setting NVME_CTRL_FROZEN, or device_add_disk() failing - lands in put_disk() with the timer armed, leading to a use-after-free condition.(CVE-2026-80589)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/probes: Remove WARN_ON_ONCE from parse_btf_arg. Sashiko found that user can cause this WARN_ON_ONCE() easily with adding a kprobe event based on a raw address with BTF parameter. Since this is not an unexpected condition, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().(CVE-2026-80607)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: processor_idle: Mark LPI enter functions as __cpuidle. When function tracing or Kprobes is enabled, entering an ACPI Low Power Idle (LPI) state triggers the following RCU splat: RCU not on for: acpi_idle_lpi_enter+0x4/0xd8. The acpi_idle_lpi_enter() function is invoked within the cpuidle path after RCU has already been disabled for the current local CPU. Consequently, ftrace\u0026apos;s function_trace_call() expects RCU to be actively watching before recording trace data, emitting a warning if it is not. Fix this by annotating acpi_idle_lpi_enter(), the generic __weak stub, and the RISC-V implementation of acpi_processor_ffh_lpi_enter() with __cpuidle. This moves these functions into the \u0026apos;.cpuidle.text\u0026apos; section, implicitly disabling ftrace instrumentation (notrace) along this sensitive path and preventing trace-induced RCU warnings during idle entry.(CVE-2026-80611)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the netfilter synproxy module has an unaligned memory access issue in timestamp adjustment. Use get_unaligned_be32() and put_unaligned_be32() to safely read and write the timestamp fields. This prevents performance degradation due to unaligned memory access or even a crash on strict alignment architectures. This follows the implementation of timestamp parsing in the networking stack at tcp_parse_options() and synproxy_parse_options().(CVE-2026-80637)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nRDMA/hns: Fix warning in poll cq direct mode\\n\\nCQs allocated by ib_alloc_cq() always have a comp_handler. Though\\nin direct mode this handler is never expected to be called, it\\nis still called when the driver is reset, triggering the following\\nWARN_ONCE():\\n\\nCall trace:\\nib_cq_completion_direct+0x38/0x60\\nhns_roce_cq_completion+0x54/0x90 (hns_roce_hw_v2]\\nhns_roce_handle_device_err+Ox1c8/0x340 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\\nhns_roce_hw_v2_uninit_instance.constprop.0+0x34/0x70 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\\nhns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0xc4/0xe0 [hns_roce_hw_v2]\\nhclge_notify_roce_client+0x60/0xbc [hclge]\\nhclge_reset_rebuild+0x48/0x34c [hclge]\\nhclge_reset_subtask+0xcc/0xec [hclge]\\nhclge_reset_service_task+0x80/0x160 [hclge]\\nhclge_service_task+0x50/0x80 (hclge]\\nprocess_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0\\nworker_thread+0x154/0x414\\nkthread+0x104/0x144\\nret_from_fork+0x10/0x18(CVE-2026-80647)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: ensure no dangling hcon references in iso_conn. After iso_conn_del(), ISO sockets should not dereference the hcon any more. Currently, clearing iso_conn::hcon relies on iso_conn_del() releasing the last reference to the iso_conn. Simplify this by explicitly clearing conn-\u0026gt;hcon in iso_conn_del(), to avoid more complex reasoning on races about who holds the last reference.(CVE-2026-80721)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria\n\nWhen GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB),\nBIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP\n(with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).\n\nHowever, commit b1a78b9b9886 (\u0026quot;net: add support for ipv4 big tcp\u0026quot;)\nloosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:\n\n1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space\n   before the MAC header (p-\u0026gt;mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes\n   mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check\n   with p-\u0026gt;mac_header \u0026lt; 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the\n   temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb-\u0026gt;head,\n   causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb-\u0026gt;mac_header.\n2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q /\n   ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because\n   p-\u0026gt;protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.\n3. It checked p-\u0026gt;encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;encap_mark,\n   allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate\n   beyond 64KB.\n\nFix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce:\n- NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;proto == IPPROTO_TCP\n- Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;encap_mark \u0026amp;\u0026amp; !p-\u0026gt;encapsulation)\n- Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6\n- If ETH_P_IPV6, p-\u0026gt;mac_header must be at least\n  sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)\n\nReturning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot\nbecome BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at \u0026lt;= 64KB and delivered intact without\ndropping.\n\nThis issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was\nrewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 (\u0026quot;net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX\nside\u0026quot;), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like\n6.18.y.(CVE-2026-80725)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-3707",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:33:35Z",
  "published": "2026-09-14T16:33:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3707"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31668"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46325"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64082"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64405"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64523"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68082"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68118"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68136"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68138"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68145"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68159"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68205"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68426"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68471"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72098"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72111"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72213"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72247"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72288"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72294"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72321"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72329"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72398"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72404"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72405"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72413"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72420"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72423"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72496"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74268"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74289"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74302"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74317"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74356"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74375"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74386"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74473"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74475"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74476"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74481"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74485"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74487"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74499"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74509"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74514"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74520"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74536"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74543"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74544"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74565"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74586"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74587"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74588"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74589"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74605"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74606"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74608"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74609"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74610"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74611"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74612"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74614"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74615"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74616"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74620"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74623"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74624"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74636"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74637"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74656"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74660"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74662"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74666"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74667"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74668"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74669"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74670"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74673"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74683"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74684"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74688"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74696"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74705"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74715"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74720"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74724"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74726"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74730"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74734"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74739"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74744"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74747"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74748"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74753"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80527"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80528"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80529"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80536"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80549"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80551"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80557"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80558"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80560"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80587"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80589"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80607"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80611"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80637"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80647"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80721"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80725"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-31668",
    "CVE-2026-46325",
    "CVE-2026-64082",
    "CVE-2026-64405",
    "CVE-2026-64523",
    "CVE-2026-68082",
    "CVE-2026-68118",
    "CVE-2026-68136",
    "CVE-2026-68138",
    "CVE-2026-68145",
    "CVE-2026-68159",
    "CVE-2026-68205",
    "CVE-2026-68426",
    "CVE-2026-68471",
    "CVE-2026-72098",
    "CVE-2026-72111",
    "CVE-2026-72213",
    "CVE-2026-72247",
    "CVE-2026-72288",
    "CVE-2026-72294",
    "CVE-2026-72321",
    "CVE-2026-72329",
    "CVE-2026-72398",
    "CVE-2026-72404",
    "CVE-2026-72405",
    "CVE-2026-72413",
    "CVE-2026-72420",
    "CVE-2026-72423",
    "CVE-2026-72496",
    "CVE-2026-74268",
    "CVE-2026-74289",
    "CVE-2026-74302",
    "CVE-2026-74317",
    "CVE-2026-74356",
    "CVE-2026-74375",
    "CVE-2026-74386",
    "CVE-2026-74473",
    "CVE-2026-74475",
    "CVE-2026-74476",
    "CVE-2026-74481",
    "CVE-2026-74485",
    "CVE-2026-74487",
    "CVE-2026-74499",
    "CVE-2026-74509",
    "CVE-2026-74514",
    "CVE-2026-74520",
    "CVE-2026-74536",
    "CVE-2026-74543",
    "CVE-2026-74544",
    "CVE-2026-74565",
    "CVE-2026-74586",
    "CVE-2026-74587",
    "CVE-2026-74588",
    "CVE-2026-74589",
    "CVE-2026-74605",
    "CVE-2026-74606",
    "CVE-2026-74608",
    "CVE-2026-74609",
    "CVE-2026-74610",
    "CVE-2026-74611",
    "CVE-2026-74612",
    "CVE-2026-74614",
    "CVE-2026-74615",
    "CVE-2026-74616",
    "CVE-2026-74620",
    "CVE-2026-74623",
    "CVE-2026-74624",
    "CVE-2026-74636",
    "CVE-2026-74637",
    "CVE-2026-74656",
    "CVE-2026-74660",
    "CVE-2026-74662",
    "CVE-2026-74666",
    "CVE-2026-74667",
    "CVE-2026-74668",
    "CVE-2026-74669",
    "CVE-2026-74670",
    "CVE-2026-74673",
    "CVE-2026-74683",
    "CVE-2026-74684",
    "CVE-2026-74688",
    "CVE-2026-74696",
    "CVE-2026-74705",
    "CVE-2026-74715",
    "CVE-2026-74720",
    "CVE-2026-74724",
    "CVE-2026-74726",
    "CVE-2026-74730",
    "CVE-2026-74734",
    "CVE-2026-74739",
    "CVE-2026-74744",
    "CVE-2026-74747",
    "CVE-2026-74748",
    "CVE-2026-74753",
    "CVE-2026-80527",
    "CVE-2026-80528",
    "CVE-2026-80529",
    "CVE-2026-80536",
    "CVE-2026-80549",
    "CVE-2026-80551",
    "CVE-2026-80557",
    "CVE-2026-80558",
    "CVE-2026-80560",
    "CVE-2026-80587",
    "CVE-2026-80589",
    "CVE-2026-80607",
    "CVE-2026-80611",
    "CVE-2026-80637",
    "CVE-2026-80647",
    "CVE-2026-80721",
    "CVE-2026-80725"
  ]
}

OESA-2026-3708 (CVE-2026-31668)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-14 16:33 – Updated: 2026-09-14 16:33 – Source website

Summary

kernel security update

Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel

Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output, so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE

ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i>=1 either a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous or b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr->page_size aligned.

This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:

1) page_size < PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K): ibmr->iova = 0x181800 sg[0]: dma_addr=0x181800, len=0x800 sg[1]: dma_addr=0x173000, len=0x1000

2) page_size > PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 64K, system: 4K): ibmr->iova = 0x18f800 sg[0]: dma_addr=0x18f800, len=0x800 sg[1]: dma_addr=0x170000, len=0x1000

Yi Zhang reported a kernel panic[1] years ago related to this defect.

This ensures correct iova-to-va conversion regardless of MR page size and system PAGE_SIZE relationship, while improving performance through array-based sequential access.

Tests on 4K and 64K PAGE_SIZE hosts: - rdma-core/pytests $ ./build/bin/run_tests.py --dev eth0_rxe - blktest: $ TIMEOUT=30 QUICK_RUN=1 USE_RXE=1 NVMET_TRTYPES=rdma ./check nvme srp rnbd

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9XRqE25jyVw9rj9YugffLn5+f=1znaBEnu1usLOciD+g@mail.gmail.com/T/(CVE-2026-46325)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit

The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.(CVE-2026-64523)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()

decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads:

ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.

The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.

ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field.