CVE-2026-71211 (GCVE-0-2026-71211)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 06:59 – Updated: 2026-08-05 13:26
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
mlflow: Unvalidated Gateway Secret api_base Enables SSRF via Gateway Proxy Endpoint
Summary
MLflow's AI Gateway accepts an auth_config.api_base value when creating a gateway secret (mlflow/server/handlers.py, _create_gateway_secret) with no validation of scheme, host, or IP range; the value is stored verbatim. The gateway proxy endpoint (mlflow/server/gateway_api.py, raw_proxy) subsequently issues an HTTP request to that stored api_base plus a caller-supplied path and returns the full response body. MLflow's existing SSRF guard, _validate_webhook_url (which blocks non-global and metadata IPs), is never invoked anywhere in this gateway secret/proxy code path. The CreateGatewaySecret action additionally has no entry in the permission-validator map, so it requires only basic authentication rather than any specific scope, meaning any authenticated user — including read-only accounts — can create a secret pointing at an internal address and reach it via the proxy endpoint, potentially exposing cloud-instance IAM credentials via metadata services. This is related to CVE-2026-4035, which addresses a distinct mechanism in the same gateway-secret feature (server-side $ENV_VAR resolution inside the api_key field leaking credentials to the configured upstream); the finding here is an independent missing-validation gap in the api_base destination itself, unaffected by that fix.
Severity
7.1 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Assigner
References
1 reference
Credits
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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