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CVE-2026-15144 (GCVE-0-2026-15144)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-29 16:10 – Updated: 2026-07-29 17:56
VLAI
Title
@fastify/rate-limit vulnerable to rate-limit bypass via IPv6 address rotation
Summary
@fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-29 17:56 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-307 - Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
  • CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
@fastify/rate-limit @fastify/rate-limit Affected: 0 , < 11.2.0 (semver)
Unaffected: 11.2.0 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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