CVE-2026-12051 (GCVE-0-2026-12051)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-11 05:31 – Updated: 2026-08-11 14:22
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
NULL pointer dereference in USB DFU device_next download handler (handle_download)
Summary
The USB DFU class implementation in Zephyr's new (experimental) device_next USB device stack contains a NULL pointer dereference in handle_download() (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_dfu.c). The handler computes MIN(setup->wLength, buf->len) and passes buf->data to the image write callback without checking that the buf net_buf pointer is non-NULL.
The handler is reached over the USB control endpoint, driven by the USB host. For a DFU_DNLOAD (download) request with no Data OUT stage — notably the zero-length terminating download that the DFU protocol uses to end a firmware transfer — the USB core invokes the class handler with a NULL buffer. After the device has been advanced to the DFU_DNLOAD_IDLE state (by sending one valid download block and a GET_STATUS), a zero-length DFU_DNLOAD reaches handle_download() with buf == NULL, dereferencing it.
The result is a NULL+offset read that triggers a fatal CPU fault, i.e. a denial of service (device crash/reset). The attacker is whatever controls the USB host the device is attached to; DFU download support must be enabled with a registered image. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure — impact is limited to availability. The fix adds an explicit if (buf != NULL) guard so the callback receives a zero-length, NULL-data transfer instead of crashing.
Severity
4.6 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-11 14:22 UTC
CWE
- CWE-476 - memory-safety
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Affected:
4.4.0 , < 4.5.0
(semver)
|
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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