CVE-2024-1544 (GCVE-0-2024-1544)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-08-27 18:44 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
ECDSA nonce bias caused by truncation
Summary
Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then
truncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the
order of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used
during the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two
digits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of
n and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size.
Observing the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow
revealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of
k. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a
significant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction
methods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.
Severity
4.1 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2024-08-27 19:14 UTC
CWE
- CWE-203 - Observable Discrepancy
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Date Public
2024-07-08 17:30
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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