Vulnerability-Lookup

CNVD-2020-27457

Vulnerability from cnvd - Published: 2020-05-09

Title

Argo授权问题漏洞

Description

Argo是一款开源的容器本机工作流引擎。 Argo存在授权问题漏洞，该漏洞源于程序将默认的管理员密码设置为argocd-server容器组名。攻击者可借助特制请求利用该漏洞获取管理员权限。

Severity

中

Formal description

厂商尚未提供漏洞修复方案，请关注厂商主页更新： https://argoproj.github.io/

Reference

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8828

Impacted products

Name
Argo Argo <1.5.0

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

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    "cve": {
      "cveNumber": "CVE-2020-8828"
    }
  },
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  "formalWay": "\u5382\u5546\u5c1a\u672a\u63d0\u4f9b\u6f0f\u6d1e\u4fee\u590d\u65b9\u6848\uff0c\u8bf7\u5173\u6ce8\u5382\u5546\u4e3b\u9875\u66f4\u65b0\uff1a\r\nhttps://argoproj.github.io/",
  "isEvent": "\u901a\u7528\u8f6f\u786c\u4ef6\u6f0f\u6d1e",
  "number": "CNVD-2020-27457",
  "openTime": "2020-05-09",
  "products": {
    "product": "Argo Argo \u003c1.5.0"
  },
  "referenceLink": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8828",
  "serverity": "\u4e2d",
  "submitTime": "2020-04-09",
  "title": "Argo\u6388\u6743\u95ee\u9898\u6f0f\u6d1e"
}

CVE-2020-8828 (GCVE-0-2020-8828)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2020-04-08 19:49 – Updated: 2024-08-04 10:12

Summary

As of v1.5.0, the default admin password is set to the argocd-server pod name. For insiders with access to the cluster or logs, this issue could be abused for privilege escalation, as Argo has privileged roles. A malicious insider is the most realistic threat, but pod names are not meant to be kept secret and could wind up just about anywhere.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

Assigner

mitre mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/argoproj/argo/releases	x_refsource_MISC
https://www.soluble.ai/blog/argo-cves-2020	x_refsource_MISC
https://argoproj.github.io/argo-cd/security_consi…	x_refsource_MISC

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.