GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-GHSA-2… (GHSA-2MC2-G238-722J)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-12 09:47 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw affected by iMessage remote attachment SCP hardening (strict host-key checks and remoteHost validation)
Details

Summary

Remote iMessage attachment fetches used SCP with trust-on-first-use host-key behavior and accepted unvalidated remote host tokens.

Before the fix: - SCP used StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new in the remote attachment path. - channels.imessage.remoteHost was not validated as a strict SSH host token.

Impact

In remote iMessage deployments that use SCP attachment fetching, a first-connection MITM/DNS-poisoning scenario could cause the wrong host key to be trusted. Unsafe remote host token values could also alter SCP argument semantics.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published npm version currently affected: 2026.2.17
  • Vulnerable range (structured field): <= 2026.2.17
  • Patched version (pre-set for next release): >= 2026.2.19

Fix

The fix hardens remote attachment SSH/SCP handling by: - requiring StrictHostKeyChecking=yes for SCP and SSH tunnel paths, - adding strict remoteHost normalization/validation, - adding -- argument barrier for SCP remote source parsing, - validating channels.imessage.remoteHost in config schema, - rejecting unsafe auto-detected host tokens at runtime.

Fix Commit(s)

  • Pushed to main: 49d0def6d1e88f002026b1d2a35aa615d48a751a

OpenClaw thanks @allsmog for reporting.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.19"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nRemote iMessage attachment fetches used SCP with trust-on-first-use host-key behavior and accepted unvalidated remote host tokens.\n\nBefore the fix:\n- SCP used `StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new` in the remote attachment path.\n- `channels.imessage.remoteHost` was not validated as a strict SSH host token.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn remote iMessage deployments that use SCP attachment fetching, a first-connection MITM/DNS-poisoning scenario could cause the wrong host key to be trusted. Unsafe remote host token values could also alter SCP argument semantics.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version currently affected: `2026.2.17`\n- Vulnerable range (structured field): `\u003c= 2026.2.17`\n- Patched version (pre-set for next release): `\u003e= 2026.2.19`\n\n## Fix\n\nThe fix hardens remote attachment SSH/SCP handling by:\n- requiring `StrictHostKeyChecking=yes` for SCP and SSH tunnel paths,\n- adding strict `remoteHost` normalization/validation,\n- adding `--` argument barrier for SCP remote source parsing,\n- validating `channels.imessage.remoteHost` in config schema,\n- rejecting unsafe auto-detected host tokens at runtime.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- Pushed to `main`: 49d0def6d1e88f002026b1d2a35aa615d48a751a\n\nOpenClaw thanks @allsmog for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-2mc2-g238-722j",
  "modified": "2026-09-12T09:47:34Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2mc2-g238-722j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/49d0def6d1e88f002026b1d2a35aa615d48a751a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw affected by iMessage remote attachment SCP hardening (strict host-key checks and remoteHost validation)",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-2mc2-g238-722j"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.