BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-V865-P3GQ-HW6M)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-20 10:38 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has encoded-path auth bypass in plugin `/api/channels` route classification
Details

Summary (Updated March 2, 2026)

Encoded alternate-path requests could bypass plugin route auth checks for /api/channels/* due to canonicalization depth mismatch in vulnerable builds.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published vulnerable version: 2026.3.1
  • Affected range: <= 2026.3.1
  • Patched release: 2026.3.2 (patched_versions: >= 2026.3.2)

Technical Details

In affected versions, plugin auth-path classification and route-path canonicalization could diverge for deeply encoded slash variants (for example multi-encoded %2f). That mismatch allowed alternate encoded paths to evade protected-prefix auth checks while still resolving to /api/channels/... in plugin route handling.

The fix set hardens this class of issue by: - canonicalizing route paths to a bounded fixpoint, - failing closed on malformed or unresolved canonicalization depth, - requiring explicit plugin-route auth contracts (no implicit auth default), - enforcing route ownership/conflict guards for duplicate route registrations, and - using shared webhook route lifecycle registration to avoid stale/conflicting route surfaces.

Affected Deployments

Deployments exposing plugin HTTP routes and relying on gateway auth for /api/channels/* protection.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 93b07240257919f770d1e263e1f22753937b80ea
  • 2fd8264ab03bd178e62a5f0c50d1c8556c17f12d
  • d74bc257d8432f17e50b23ae713d7e0623a1fe0f
  • 7a7eee920a176a0043398c6b37bf4cc6eb983eeb
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
8.3 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.3.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.5",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.5"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary (Updated March 2, 2026)\nEncoded alternate-path requests could bypass plugin route auth checks for `/api/channels/*` due to canonicalization depth mismatch in vulnerable builds.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.3.1`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.3.1`\n- Patched release: `2026.3.2` (`patched_versions: \u003e= 2026.3.2`)\n\n### Technical Details\nIn affected versions, plugin auth-path classification and route-path canonicalization could diverge for deeply encoded slash variants (for example multi-encoded `%2f`). That mismatch allowed alternate encoded paths to evade protected-prefix auth checks while still resolving to `/api/channels/...` in plugin route handling.\n\nThe fix set hardens this class of issue by:\n- canonicalizing route paths to a bounded fixpoint,\n- failing closed on malformed or unresolved canonicalization depth,\n- requiring explicit plugin-route auth contracts (no implicit auth default),\n- enforcing route ownership/conflict guards for duplicate route registrations, and\n- using shared webhook route lifecycle registration to avoid stale/conflicting route surfaces.\n\n### Affected Deployments\nDeployments exposing plugin HTTP routes and relying on gateway auth for `/api/channels/*` protection.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `93b07240257919f770d1e263e1f22753937b80ea`\n- `2fd8264ab03bd178e62a5f0c50d1c8556c17f12d`\n- `d74bc257d8432f17e50b23ae713d7e0623a1fe0f`\n- `7a7eee920a176a0043398c6b37bf4cc6eb983eeb`",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-32004",
  "modified": "2026-09-20T10:38:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-v865-p3gq-hw6m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2fd8264ab03bd178e62a5f0c50d1c8556c17f12d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/7a7eee920a176a0043398c6b37bf4cc6eb983eeb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/93b07240257919f770d1e263e1f22753937b80ea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d74bc257d8432f17e50b23ae713d7e0623a1fe0f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authentication-bypass-via-encoded-path-in-api-channels-route"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has encoded-path auth bypass in plugin `/api/channels` route classification",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-v865-p3gq-hw6m",
    "CVE-2026-32004"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.