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brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-27009
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew
Published
2026-08-13 17:21
Modified
2026-09-12 09:47
Summary
OpenClaw affected by Stored XSS in Control UI via unsanitized assistant name/avatar in inline script injection
Details

Summary

Stored XSS in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline <script> tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing </script> could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14
  • Fixed in: >= 2026.2.15 (next release; fix is already merged on main)

Details

The gateway Control UI HTML response previously injected assistantName and assistantAvatar directly into an inline <script> block using JSON.stringify(...). JSON.stringify does not prevent </script> from terminating the script element, enabling stored XSS if an operator/admin sets the assistant identity to a malicious string.

OpenClaw’s Control UI is intended for local use only (see SECURITY.md); this advisory’s CVSS reflects a loopback-only/local-access deployment assumption.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to set assistant identity values (config or agent identity) could cause JavaScript execution for Control UI visitors, enabling token/session theft and privileged actions in the UI.

Fix

  • Removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint.
  • Added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (script-src 'self', no inline scripts).

Fix Commit(s)

  • adc818db4a4b3b8d663e7674ef20436947514e1b
  • 3b4096e02e7e335f99f5986ec1bd566e90b14a7e

Release Process Note

This advisory pre-sets the patched version to the planned next release (2026.2.15). Once that version is published to npm, this advisory can be published without further edits.

Thanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.

Severity
5.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.15"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nStored XSS in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline `\u003cscript\u003e` tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing `\u003c/script\u003e` could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Fixed in: `\u003e= 2026.2.15` (next release; fix is already merged on `main`)\n\n## Details\nThe gateway Control UI HTML response previously injected `assistantName` and `assistantAvatar` directly into an inline `\u003cscript\u003e` block using `JSON.stringify(...)`. `JSON.stringify` does not prevent `\u003c/script\u003e` from terminating the script element, enabling stored XSS if an operator/admin sets the assistant identity to a malicious string.\n\nOpenClaw\u2019s Control UI is intended for local use only (see `SECURITY.md`); this advisory\u2019s CVSS reflects a loopback-only/local-access deployment assumption.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker with the ability to set assistant identity values (config or agent identity) could cause JavaScript execution for Control UI visitors, enabling token/session theft and privileged actions in the UI.\n\n## Fix\n- Removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint.\n- Added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (`script-src \u0027self\u0027`, no inline scripts).\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `adc818db4a4b3b8d663e7674ef20436947514e1b`\n- `3b4096e02e7e335f99f5986ec1bd566e90b14a7e`\n\n## Release Process Note\nThis advisory pre-sets the patched version to the planned next release (`2026.2.15`). Once that version is published to npm, this advisory can be published without further edits.\n\nThanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-27009",
  "modified": "2026-09-12T09:47:34Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-37gc-85xm-2ww6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27009"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3b4096e02e7e335f99f5986ec1bd566e90b14a7e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/adc818db4a4b3b8d663e7674ef20436947514e1b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.15"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw affected by Stored XSS in Control UI via unsanitized assistant name/avatar in inline script injection",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-37gc-85xm-2ww6",
    "CVE-2026-27009"
  ]
}



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