Vulnerability-Lookup

BDU:2026-14529

Vulnerability from fstec - Published: 25.04.2026

Title

Уязвимость функции ReadMultiple() компонента Storage REST API сервера хранения объектов MinIO, позволяющая нарушителю получить несанкционированный доступ к защищаемой информации

Description

Уязвимость функции ReadMultiple() компонента Storage REST API сервера хранения объектов MinIO связана с неверным ограничением имени пути к каталогу с ограниченным доступом. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю, действующему удаленно, получить несанкционированный доступ к защищаемой информации

Severity


                    
                      AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N


                    
                      AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Vendor

ООО «Ред Софт», MinIO Inc

Software Name

РЕД ОС (запись в едином реестре российских программ №3751), MinIO

Software Version

7.3 (РЕД ОС), 8.0 (РЕД ОС), от 2022-07-24t01-54-52z до 2026-04-14t21-32-45z (MinIO)

Possible Mitigations

В условиях отсутствия обновлений безопасности от производителя рекомендуется придерживаться "Рекомендаций по безопасной настройке операционных систем LINUX", изложенных в методическом документе ФСТЭК России, утверждённом 25 декабря 2022 года. Использование рекомендаций: Для MinIO: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7 Для Ред ОС: http://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/7.3c/x86_64/updates/ http://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/8.0/x86_64/updates/

Reference

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7 https://github.com/minio/minio https://github.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7 http://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/7.3c/x86_64/updates/ http://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/8.0/x86_64/updates/

CWE

CWE-22

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "CVSS 2.0": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:N/A:N",
  "CVSS 3.0": "AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
  "CVSS 4.0": "AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
  "remediation_\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": null,
  "remediation_\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435": null,
  "\u0412\u0435\u043d\u0434\u043e\u0440 \u041f\u041e": "\u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb, MinIO Inc",
  "\u0412\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f \u041f\u041e": "7.3 (\u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421), 8.0 (\u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421), \u043e\u0442 2022-07-24t01-54-52z \u0434\u043e 2026-04-14t21-32-45z (MinIO)",
  "\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e": "\u0412 \u0443\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u043e\u0442\u0441\u0443\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \"\u0420\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u043e \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043a\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c LINUX\", \u0438\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0432 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0434\u043e\u043a\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0435 \u0424\u0421\u0422\u042d\u041a \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438, \u0443\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0451\u043d\u043d\u043e\u043c 25 \u0434\u0435\u043a\u0430\u0431\u0440\u044f 2022 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430.\n\n\u0418\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439:\n\u0414\u043b\u044f MinIO:\nhttps://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0420\u0435\u0434 \u041e\u0421: \nhttp://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/7.3c/x86_64/updates/\nhttp://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/8.0/x86_64/updates/",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "25.04.2026",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "11.09.2026",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "11.09.2026",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": "BDU:2026-14529",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "CVE-2026-42600, GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7",
  "\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430",
  "\u041a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u041e": "\u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751), MinIO",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041e\u0421 \u0438 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u044b": "\u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb \u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 7.3  (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751), \u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb \u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 8.0  (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751)",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 ReadMultiple() \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 Storage REST API \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u0445\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432 MinIO, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f \u043a \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "\u041d\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0438 \u043a \u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0443 \u0441 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043c (\u00ab\u041e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u00bb) (CWE-22)",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 ReadMultiple() \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 Storage REST API \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u0445\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432 MinIO \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0441 \u043d\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0438 \u043a \u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0443 \u0441 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043c. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e, \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f \u043a \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": null,
  "\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f": null,
  "\u0421\u0432\u044f\u0437\u044c \u0441 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0418\u0411": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "\u041c\u0430\u043d\u0438\u043f\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u0430\u043c\u0438",
  "\u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7\nhttps://github.com/minio/minio\nhttps://github.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7\nhttp://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/7.3c/x86_64/updates/\nhttp://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/8.0/x86_64/updates/",
  "\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u041f\u041e": "\u041e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430, \u041f\u041e \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u043a\u0438 \u0418\u0418",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "CWE-22",
  "\u0423\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 2.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 6,8)\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 3.1 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 4,9)\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 4.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 6,9)"
}

GHSA-XH8F-G2QW-GCM7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 20:05 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:26

Summary

MinIO vulnerable to Path Traversal via msgpack Body in `ReadMultiple` Storage-REST Endpoint

Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

A path traversal vulnerability in MinIO's ReadMultiple internode storage-REST endpoint allows a caller holding the cluster root JWT to read files from outside the configured drive roots, bounded only by the MinIO process UID.

Distributed-erasure (multi-node) MinIO deployments are impacted. Single-node standalone deployments do not register the route and are not affected. The attack requires an HS512 JWT signed with MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD and carrying accessKey = MINIO_ROOT_USER — the same secret every peer in the cluster holds to authenticate internode traffic, so a compromised peer or any actor in possession of the root credential can mint one.

The ReadMultiple handler (cmd/storage-rest-server.go) decodes a msgpack ReadMultipleReq body containing Bucket, Prefix, and Files fields and forwards them to xlStorage.ReadMultiple (cmd/xl-storage.go) without validation:

volumeDir := pathJoin(s.drivePath, req.Bucket)          // traversal resolves here
for _, f := range req.Files {
    fullPath := pathJoin(volumeDir, req.Prefix, f)
    data, mt, err = s.readAllDataWithDMTime(ctx, req.Bucket, volumeDir, fullPath)
}

pathJoin calls path.Clean, which resolves .. components and produces an absolute path anywhere on the filesystem — it is not a root jail. The global setRequestValidityMiddleware rejects .. in r.URL.Path and r.Form but does not inspect request bodies, so msgpack-encoded traversal bypasses it. Sibling storage methods (StatInfoFile, ReadFileHandler, ReadVersion) validate their volume argument through s.getVolDir(volume), which rejects ..; ReadMultiple skips this call.

The attacker sends POST /minio/storage/{drivePath}/v63/rmpl with a msgpack-encoded body carrying ../ sequences in the Bucket field. The server opens the resulting path via os.OpenFile with O_RDONLY|O_NOATIME and returns its contents in the msgpack response stream.

Impact by deployment:

Bare-metal with User=minio in the systemd unit — the O_NOATIME ownership check bounds the read to files owned by the MinIO UID. Reachable secrets include TLS private keys, KMS/KES key material, systemd credentials, and data belonging to other tenants sharing the same UID on the host. Secrets leaked this way persist across cluster credential rotation.
Containerized running as UID 0 (the historical default for the official Docker image, docker-compose examples, and Helm charts without securityContext.runAsNonRoot) — the primitive escalates to arbitrary host-filesystem disclosure: /etc/shadow, /root/**, Kubernetes service-account tokens, cloud-init metadata caches.

Affected components: cmd/storage-rest-server.go (ReadMultiple handler), cmd/xl-storage.go (xlStorage.ReadMultiple).

CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory — 'Path Traversal')

CVSS v4.0 Score: 6.9 (Medium)

Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Affected Versions

All MinIO releases from RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z through the final release of the minio/minio open-source project, RELEASE.2025-09-07T16-13-09Z.

The vulnerability was introduced in commit f939d1c18 ("Independent Multipart Uploads", PR #15346), which added the ReadMultiple storage-REST endpoint as part of the multipart upload redesign. The first affected release is RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z.

Patches

Fixed in: MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z (recommended upgrade target). The fix — which removed the ReadMultiple handler, the corresponding storage-driver method, the msgpack datatypes, the REST-client wrapper, and the route registration — first shipped in MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z. Every AIStor release from RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z onward is unaffected; users should upgrade to RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z or later to pick up the accumulated fixes and improvements shipped since.

Binary Downloads

Platform	Architecture	Download
Linux	amd64	minio
Linux	arm64	minio
macOS	arm64	minio
macOS	amd64	minio
Windows	amd64	minio.exe

FIPS Binaries

Platform	Architecture	Download
Linux	amd64	minio.fips
Linux	arm64	minio.fips

Package Downloads

Format	Architecture	Download
DEB	amd64	minio_20260414213245.0.0_amd64.deb
DEB	arm64	minio_20260414213245.0.0_arm64.deb
RPM	amd64	minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.x86_64.rpm
RPM	arm64	minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm

Container Images

# Standard
docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z
podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z

# FIPS
docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips
podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips

Homebrew (macOS)

brew install minio/aistor/minio

Workarounds

Users of the open-source minio/minio project should upgrade to MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z or later.

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

Rotate the root credential and restrict who holds it. The exploit requires a JWT signed with MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD. Treat the root credential as the host-filesystem disclosure primitive that it is: rotate it after any suspected exposure, store it only in the secret manager that bootstraps the cluster, and do not hand it to applications or operators who only need object-level access.
Do not run the MinIO container as UID 0. Set securityContext.runAsNonRoot: true (and a non-zero runAsUser) in Kubernetes manifests, or add --user to docker run. This reduces the blast radius from arbitrary host-filesystem disclosure to MinIO-UID-owned files only.
Restrict the internode storage-REST port at the network layer. In distributed deployments, the storage-REST route is served on the same port as the S3 API by default. Where feasible, use --internode-port to expose internode traffic on a separate interface reachable only from other cluster peers, and block that interface from client networks.

Credits

Finders: Discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by Adrian Denkiewicz at Doyensec in collaboration with Anthropic Research.

Resources

Severity

4.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/minio/minio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-20220724015452"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260414213245"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42600"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T20:05:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T22:22:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA path traversal vulnerability in MinIO\u0027s `ReadMultiple` internode storage-REST\nendpoint allows a caller holding the cluster root JWT to read files from\noutside the configured drive roots, bounded only by the MinIO process UID.\n\nDistributed-erasure (multi-node) MinIO deployments are impacted. Single-node\nstandalone deployments do not register the route and are not affected. The\nattack requires an HS512 JWT signed with `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` and carrying\n`accessKey = MINIO_ROOT_USER` \u2014 the same secret every peer in the cluster\nholds to authenticate internode traffic, so a compromised peer or any actor in\npossession of the root credential can mint one.\n\nThe `ReadMultiple` handler (`cmd/storage-rest-server.go`) decodes a msgpack\n`ReadMultipleReq` body containing `Bucket`, `Prefix`, and `Files` fields and\nforwards them to `xlStorage.ReadMultiple` (`cmd/xl-storage.go`) without\nvalidation:\n\n```go\nvolumeDir := pathJoin(s.drivePath, req.Bucket)          // traversal resolves here\nfor _, f := range req.Files {\n    fullPath := pathJoin(volumeDir, req.Prefix, f)\n    data, mt, err = s.readAllDataWithDMTime(ctx, req.Bucket, volumeDir, fullPath)\n}\n```\n\n`pathJoin` calls `path.Clean`, which resolves `..` components and produces an\nabsolute path anywhere on the filesystem \u2014 it is not a root jail. The global\n`setRequestValidityMiddleware` rejects `..` in `r.URL.Path` and `r.Form` but\ndoes not inspect request bodies, so msgpack-encoded traversal bypasses it.\nSibling storage methods (`StatInfoFile`, `ReadFileHandler`, `ReadVersion`)\nvalidate their volume argument through `s.getVolDir(volume)`, which rejects\n`..`; `ReadMultiple` skips this call.\n\nThe attacker sends `POST /minio/storage/{drivePath}/v63/rmpl` with a\nmsgpack-encoded body carrying `../` sequences in the `Bucket` field. The\nserver opens the resulting path via `os.OpenFile` with `O_RDONLY|O_NOATIME`\nand returns its contents in the msgpack response stream.\n\n**Impact by deployment:**\n\n- **Bare-metal with `User=minio` in the systemd unit** \u2014 the `O_NOATIME`\n  ownership check bounds the read to files owned by the MinIO UID. Reachable\n  secrets include TLS private keys, KMS/KES key material, systemd credentials,\n  and data belonging to other tenants sharing the same UID on the host.\n  Secrets leaked this way persist across cluster credential rotation.\n\n- **Containerized running as UID 0** (the historical default for the official\n  Docker image, `docker-compose` examples, and Helm charts without\n  `securityContext.runAsNonRoot`) \u2014 the primitive escalates to arbitrary\n  host-filesystem disclosure: `/etc/shadow`, `/root/**`, Kubernetes\n  service-account tokens, cloud-init metadata caches.\n\n**Affected components:** `cmd/storage-rest-server.go` (`ReadMultiple` handler),\n`cmd/xl-storage.go` (`xlStorage.ReadMultiple`).\n\n**CWE:** CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory\n\u2014 \u0027Path Traversal\u0027)\n\n**CVSS v4.0 Score:** 6.9 (Medium)\n\n**Vector:** `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nAll MinIO releases from `RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z` through the final\nrelease of the minio/minio open-source project, `RELEASE.2025-09-07T16-13-09Z`.\n\nThe vulnerability was introduced in commit\n[`f939d1c18`](https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/f939d1c1831c71f4b1c14df6d9cd62b12ccce7a3)\n(\"Independent Multipart Uploads\",\n[PR #15346](https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/15346)), which added the\n`ReadMultiple` storage-REST endpoint as part of the multipart upload\nredesign. The first affected release is `RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z`.\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fixed in**: MinIO AIStor `RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z` (recommended\nupgrade target). The fix \u2014 which removed the `ReadMultiple` handler, the\ncorresponding storage-driver method, the msgpack datatypes, the REST-client\nwrapper, and the route registration \u2014 first shipped in **MinIO AIStor\n`RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z`**. Every AIStor release from\n`RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z` onward is unaffected; users should upgrade to\n`RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z` or later to pick up the accumulated fixes and\nimprovements shipped since.\n\n#### Binary Downloads\n\n| Platform | Architecture | Download                                                                    |\n| -------- | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Linux    | amd64        | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio)           |\n| Linux    | arm64        | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio)           |\n| macOS    | arm64        | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/darwin-arm64/minio)          |\n| macOS    | amd64        | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/darwin-amd64/minio)          |\n| Windows  | amd64        | [minio.exe](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/windows-amd64/minio.exe) |\n\n#### FIPS Binaries\n\n| Platform | Architecture | Download                                                                    |\n| -------- | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Linux    | amd64        | [minio.fips](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio.fips) |\n| Linux    | arm64        | [minio.fips](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio.fips) |\n\n#### Package Downloads\n\n| Format | Architecture | Download                                                                                                                            |\n| ------ | ------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| DEB    | amd64        | [minio_20260414213245.0.0_amd64.deb](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio_20260414213245.0.0_amd64.deb)         |\n| DEB    | arm64        | [minio_20260414213245.0.0_arm64.deb](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio_20260414213245.0.0_arm64.deb)         |\n| RPM    | amd64        | [minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.x86_64.rpm](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.x86_64.rpm)   |\n| RPM    | arm64        | [minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm) |\n\n#### Container Images\n\n```bash\n# Standard\ndocker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z\npodman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z\n\n# FIPS\ndocker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips\npodman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips\n```\n\n#### Homebrew (macOS)\n\n```bash\nbrew install minio/aistor/minio\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- [Users of the open-source `minio/minio` project should upgrade to MinIO AIStor `RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z` or later.](https://docs.min.io/enterprise/aistor-object-store/upgrade-aistor-server/community-edition/)\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- **Rotate the root credential and restrict who holds it.** The exploit\n  requires a JWT signed with `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD`. Treat the root credential\n  as the host-filesystem disclosure primitive that it is: rotate it after any\n  suspected exposure, store it only in the secret manager that bootstraps the\n  cluster, and do not hand it to applications or operators who only need\n  object-level access.\n\n- **Do not run the MinIO container as UID 0.** Set\n  `securityContext.runAsNonRoot: true` (and a non-zero `runAsUser`) in\n  Kubernetes manifests, or add `--user` to `docker run`. This reduces the\n  blast radius from arbitrary host-filesystem disclosure to MinIO-UID-owned\n  files only.\n\n- **Restrict the internode storage-REST port at the network layer.** In\n  distributed deployments, the storage-REST route is served on the same port\n  as the S3 API by default. Where feasible, use `--internode-port` to expose\n  internode traffic on a separate interface reachable only from other cluster\n  peers, and block that interface from client networks.\n\n### Credits\n\n- **Finders:** Discovered by Claude, Anthropic\u0027s AI assistant, and triaged by\n  **Adrian Denkiewicz** at **Doyensec** in collaboration with **Anthropic\n  Research**.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Introducing commit: [`f939d1c18`](https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/f939d1c1831c71f4b1c14df6d9cd62b12ccce7a3)\n  ([PR #15346](https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/15346))\n- [CWE-22 \u2014 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)\n- [CVE-2022-35919 \u2014 MinIO admin-authenticated path traversal in server-update endpoint (same class, different channel)](https://github.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-gr9v-6pcm-rqvg)\n- [MinIO AIStor](https://min.io/aistor)",
  "id": "GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:26:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T20:05:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42600"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/minio/minio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MinIO vulnerable to Path Traversal via msgpack Body in `ReadMultiple` Storage-REST Endpoint"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

BDU:2026-14529

GHSA-XH8F-G2QW-GCM7

Impact

Affected Versions

Patches

Binary Downloads

FIPS Binaries

Package Downloads

Container Images

Homebrew (macOS)

Workarounds

Credits

Resources

Tags

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Nomenclature

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