OESA-2026-4004 (CVE-2026-86219)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-20 13:24 – Updated: 2026-09-20 13:24 – Source websiteAuthen::SASL::Perl is the pure Perl implementation of SASL mechanisms in the Authen::SASL framework, At the time of this writing it provides the client part implementation for the following SASL mechanisms.
Security Fix(es):
Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.
server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying nc=00000001, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.
An attacker who observes one successful qop=auth exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.(CVE-2026-86219)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"perl-Authen-SASL-2.1700-3.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm",
"perl-Authen-SASL-help-2.1700-3.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"perl-Authen-SASL-2.1700-3.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "perl-Authen-SASL",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/perl-Authen-SASL\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1700-3.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "Authen::SASL::Perl is the pure Perl implementation of SASL mechanisms in the Authen::SASL framework, At the time of this writing it provides the client part implementation for the following SASL mechanisms.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nAuthen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.\n\nserver_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client\u0026apos;s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.\n\nAn attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.(CVE-2026-86219)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4004",
"modified": "2026-09-20T13:24:02Z",
"published": "2026-09-20T13:24:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4004"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86219"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "perl-Authen-SASL security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-86219"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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